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ABSTRACT
The Impact of Pension Obligations on Firm Decisions
by
Margaret J. Lay
Co-Chairs: James R. Hines Jr. and Matthew D. Shapiro
Employer-sponsored defined benefit pensions are declining in popularity, yet these
long-term obligations will influence firm decisions for decades to come. The first
chapter models how the tax and other incentives posed by sponsoring a defined
benefit pension interact with traditional moral hazard between stockholders and
bondholders. While the contracting problems associated with each may be man-
ageable, moral hazards arising from investment risk and from contributing to a
pension plan together lead to first-order distortions. The second chapter describes
how this dynamic leads to higher borrowing rates among firms with defined bene-
fit pensions. Like traditional corporate bonds, pension debt is a long-term liability
that influences default risk and firm value – two important determinants of bond
spreads. Yet pension debt magnifies default risk stemming from agency prob-
lems, implying that a ten percentage point increase in unfunded pension liabilities
raises defined benefit firms’ bond spreads by 23 basis points, while an equivalent
increase in standard external leverage increases bond spreads by only 2.6 basis
points.
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Finally, the third chapter looks at how sponsoring a defined benefit pension influ-
enced firm performance in the Great Recession. Many firms with defined benefit
pensions experienced dramatic losses in the value of pension assets between 2007
and 2009 that led to high required pension payments. A general concern was that
those payments prevented firms from making productive investments that could
assist economic recovery. This paper suggests, instead, that pension losses al-
lowed firms to borrow from their pensioners, while the credit crunch prevented
those firms from taking on sub-optimally high leverage ratios and investment risk
that are usually motivated by costly pensions. Indeed, firms making minimum re-
quired contributions from 2000 through 2007 supported leverage ratios that were
4.6 percentage points higher and default premiums that were 22 percent higher




Pension Obligations, Firm Borrowing and
Investment Risk
Employer-sponsored defined benefit pensions are declining in popularity, yet these long-
term obligations will influence firm decisions for decades to come. This paper builds a new
model to describe how the tax, regulatory, and investment incentives created by sponsor-
ing a defined benefit pension interact with traditional moral hazard between stockholders
and bondholders. While the contracting problems associated with each may be manage-
able, moral hazards arising from investment risk and from contributing to a pension plan
together lead to first-order distortions.
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1.1 Introduction
Defined benefit pensions sponsored by private employers account for 2.5 percent ($3 tril-
lion) of total domestic financial assets in the U.S. economy, belying their reputation as
lost to the mists of time. Firms that sponsor defined benefit pensions manage unfunded
pension liabilities, a type of debt unavailable to firms without pensions. Existing theory
implies that pension debt and external debt are substitutes with similar impacts on invest-
ment decisions (Treynor, 1977; Sharpe, 1979). Yet this theory ignores important regulatory
and investment incentives facing firms that sponsor defined benefit pensions. Explicitly
accounting for these incentives suggests that pension debt and external debt may, in fact,
be complements, and that sponsoring a defined benefit pension encourages some firms to
borrow more and make riskier investments.
This result stems from a new model of firms’ financing and investment decisions when
they sponsor defined benefit pensions. The model explicitly accounts for the interaction
between regulations facing firms that sponsor defined benefit pensions and conflicts of in-
terest among stockholders, bondholders, and pensioners. Facing full information, limited
liability, and non-contractible risk in production, a defined benefit firm raises external debt
(bonds) and equity in competitive markets in the first period and allocates its operating
funds across production, pension contributions, and a safe asset in the second period to
maximize returns to its shareholders. A firm can “borrow” from its pensioners by making
smaller pension contributions than required to maintain a fully funded pension account.
Given the model timing, there is a contracting problem between the borrower (firm) and
its lenders (bondholders and pensioners): the firm is unable to commit itself to a complete
state-contingent set of investment restrictions. With substantial operating funds in the sec-
ond period, the firm will make investments that are more risky than in the interest of its
lenders.
Bondholders and pensioners manage this contracting problem differently. Bondholders
set borrowing premia that reflect the cost of the overly-risky investments the firm would
make so that, in expectation, they recoup the opportunity cost of the funds they lend. Pen-
sioners, on the other hand, limit the extent of pension debt with minimum funding require-
ments and depend on a government-sponsored insurance agency to provide payments if
the firm enters bankruptcy with an underfunded pension account. Neither the minimum
funding requirement nor the insurance premium depend on the firms’ profile of investment
risk. This highlights the key difference between external and pension debt: unlike exter-
nal debt, pension debt payments are determined independently of the additional investment
risk the firm imposes on its lenders. While the firm pays the agency cost associated with
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the risk it imposes on its bondholders through higher borrowing premia, it does not pay the
agency cost it imposes on its pensioners. In this way, the interaction between pension regu-
lations and conflicts of interest among stakeholders provides the firm a source of financing
– pension debt – that does not internalize the consequences of overly-risky investments.
This unique characteristic of pension debt increases both the costs and benefits of ex-
ternal debt. Defined-benefit firms that borrow from pensioners avoid paying the full agency
cost associated with non-contractible production risk. Bondholders have full information
and are aware that these firms, as a result, may make even riskier investments. Accord-
ingly, bondholders charge higher borrowing premia to firms that face the incentive to make
riskier investments: sponsoring a defined benefit pension can make external debt more ex-
pensive. Yet bondholders share bankruptcy liability with pensioners and, therefore, do not
raise premiums enough to reflect the full agency cost of non-contractible production risk.
This encourages the firm to take on more pension debt, the full cost of which it avoids in
bankruptcy. The possibility of avoiding pension costs in bankruptcy, in turn, encourages
the firm to assume higher bankruptcy risk and, thus, higher levels of external debt. In this
way, sponsoring a defined benefit pension can make external debt more attractive.
As a result of this dynamic, defined benefit firms may face a different optimal capi-
tal structure and investment profile than firms without pensions. The firm’s incentive to
take on additional external debt is proportional to the firm’s pension debt: more pension
liabilities can be offloaded in bankruptcy. Similarly, the firm’s incentive to make riskier
investments is also proportional to the firm’s pension debt: higher pension debt implies the
firm pays a lower portion of the agency cost associated with investment risk. Accordingly,
defined-benefit firms with large unfunded pension liabilities take on more external debt,
make riskier investment decisions, and pay higher bond premiums. On the other hand,
under-funding a pension account, or taking on pension debt, is associated with regulatory
fees that are large when the pension account is less funded. Therefore, a defined benefit
firm faces a trade-off when making its financing decision: it could take on more external
debt and contribute more to its pension, but make riskier investments and face higher bond
premiums; or it could constrain the amount of external debt it takes on and make fewer
risky investments, but contribute less to the pension account and face higher regulatory
pension fees. When making its financing decision, the firm compares potential agency
costs determined by the production risk it faces and regulatory pension fees determined by
its current level of pension funding.
In explicitly modeling the role of the interaction between pension regulations and con-
flicts of interest among stakeholders in firms’ financing, investment and pension funding
decisions, this paper explores a new dimension of the risk associated with sponsoring a de-
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fined benefit pension. Previous models of pension obligations envision pension liabilities
analogously to external debt: put options with longer maturities (Treynor, 1977; Sharpe,
1976). Unlike the model proposed here, in which pension and external debt are inter-
twined, unfunded pension obligations function as a type of debt that is independent from
external borrowing. These existing models imply that pension debt and external debt are
substitutes that should be priced the same. The empirical evidence testing this prediction
is mixed: early work suggests that pension liabilities are appropriately priced (Black,1981;
Feldstein and Seligman, 1980), while more recent work suggests that they are mis-priced
(Gold, 2005; Coronado et al., 2008). The model presented here suggests a more nuanced
empirical relationship among pension debt, external debt and market value of the firm.
While pension and external debt may appear to be substitutes at the margin, conflicts of
interest among stakeholders encourage firms with more pension debt to take on higher lev-
els of external debt as well. Further, these conflicts of interest can encourage firms with
more pension debt to make riskier investments, implying that, empirically, pension debt
and external debt may not be similarly priced.
In a nod toward an extensive literature on the tax benefits of debt that arise from the
standard corporate interest exemption (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Miller, 1977; Graham,
2001; Blouin et al., 2010), this paper explicitly models the role of tax treatment of defined
benefit pensions in corporate capital structure decisions. Like traditional interest payments,
pension contributions and interest earned on pension assets are exempt from the corporate
tax. These non-debt tax shields not only encourage higher levels of pension funding but,
like investment-tax credits and depreciation deductions, may also lower the tax benefits of
debt for firms that sponsor a defined benefit pension (DeAngelo and Masulis, 1980). In-
deed, Shivdasani and Stefanescu (2012) estimate that pension-related exemptions decrease
the debt conservatism identified in Graham (2000) by nearly one-third. At the same time,
this paper highlights that a defined benefit firm pays the magnified agency cost that discour-
ages it from taking on more external debt through interest payments. When those payments
are exempt from the corporate tax, higher tax rates will increase the firm’s incentive to make
risky investments and therefore increase the agency cost associated with debt finance.
This model sheds light on a recent empirical literature that exploits variation in min-
imum required pension contributions to speak to a long-standing debate on whether an
observed correlation between cash-flow and investment levels indicates the presence of fi-
nancing constraints (Fazzari et. Al, 1988; Kaplan and Zingales, 1997). This literature
uses differences in required pension contributions as an instrument for variation in cash-
flow. Some of these papers use non-linearities in the formula used to calculate minimum
required pension contributions as exogenous variation (Rauh, 2006; Bakke and Whited,
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2012), while others use policy changes that decrease the minimum required contribution
(Dhambra, 2014; Kubick, et. Al, 2014). Any theoretical model predicting that exogenous
changes in cash flow influence firm value requires that firms face a wedge between the
internal and external cost of funds. The model presented in this paper shows that the inter-
action between pension regulation and the stockholder-bondholder conflict can create such
a wedge, but then brings into question whether changes in minimum pension contributions
– which contribute to the size of that wedge through this mechanism – are valid instruments
for cash-flow.
This paper describes the impact of pension regulations and conflicts of interest among
stakeholders on financing, investment, and pension funding in four steps. Section 2 de-
scribes the regulations facing sponsors of defined benefit pensions with an eye toward how
these regulations generate contracting inefficiencies. Section 3 lays out the model environ-
ment – an environment in which firms without a pension are indifferent between debt and
equity finance. Section 4 explores several nuances of the model solution: defined benefit
firms’ financing decisions depend not only on the investment risk they face, but also on reg-
ulatory costs associated with their pensions; the conflict of interest between stockholders
and bondholders can encourage firms to contribute less to their pensions; unique tax incen-
tives facing firms that sponsor defined benefit pensions can both increase and decrease the
tax benefits of external debt; firms face the incentive to invest pension assets in projects
correlated with investments held within the firm; and sponsoring a pension can create a
wedge between firms’ internal and external cost of funds. Section 5 concludes.
1.2 The Legal Environment
The Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) and subsequent pension legisla-
tion regulates firms sponsoring defined benefit pensions. This regulatory framework in-
cludes the Pension Benefit Guarantee Corporation (PBGC), a government-formed entity
that insures privately-sponsored defined benefit pensions, and a set of regulations that dic-
tates how a private firm manages its DB pension assets. Under ERISA, assets held in the
pension plan face different rules than general assets of the firm.1 This section discusses
four categories in which the rules facing pension and general firm assets differ: pension
funding status, required contributions, and premium; investment regulation; tax treatment;
and bankruptcy rights. Each subsection describes current regulations of DB sponsors in
one of the four categories, considers how those regulations lead to different treatment of
funds borrowed from external lenders through loan agreements and funds borrowed from
1ERISA was enacted in 1974. Major revisions were passed in 1987, 1994, and 2006.
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pensioners through pension shortfalls, and previews how the regulations are integrated a
model of a defined benefit sponsor’s financing, investment, and pension contribution deci-
sions.
1.2.1 Pension funding status, required contributions, and premiums
A pension plan is fully funded when it holds enough assets to cover the present discounted
value of accrued pension promises; otherwise, it faces a funding shortfall. Sponsors of
under-funded plans are required to make minimum pension contributions that cover newly
accrued pension liabilities and amortize any funding shortfall over several years. The
amount of the shortfall that must be amortized increases in relation to the percent by which
the plan is under-funded.2 Firms can request a waiver of the minimum required contri-
bution from the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) when facing extreme financial hardship.
The IRS grants such waivers for a maximum of three consecutive years over a fifteen year
period. These rules may entice a failing defined benefit firm to consider pensioners as stop-
gap lenders: when a firm cannot raise external funds, it can support production by further
under-funding its pension and, thus, borrowing from its pensioners.
Defined benefit firms also pay required insurance premiums to the PBGC. All defined
benefit firms, regardless of the funding status of their pensions, must pay fixed-rate premi-
ums to the PBGC. This fixed-rate premium is proportional to the number of current and
past employees that the plan supports. Firms that sponsor under-funded pensions are also
required to pay variable-rate premiums to the PBGC that are proportional to the magnitude
of their funding shortfall. These required payments manifest in the model as a regulatory
pension cost that is quadratic in the magnitude of the funding shortfall. Firms without a
pension deficit face a flat-rate PBGC premium, while firms with a pension deficit face a
PBGC premium that increases based on the size of the deficit, implying a higher implicit
cost for a larger deficit. The minimum required contribution represents a drain on internal
resources when the firm may face more productive investment opportunities. This required
payment – and, therefore, the potential drain on resources – is higher as a portion of the
funding shortfall when that shortfall is larger.
2Prior to 2006, shortfalls were amortized over 15 years. The Pension Protection Act of 2006 required
firms to amortize shortfalls over seven years. Pension funding relief passed in 2010 allowed firms to either
waive funding shortfalls for two years and then amortize those shortfalls over seven years (the 7+2 plan), or
amortize shortfalls over 15 years (the 15 plan). Pension plans that are over 90 percent funded only amortize a
fraction of the funding shortfall. This fraction is larger for plans that are under 80 percent funded and larger
yet for plans under 60 percent funded.
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1.2.2 Restrictions on investment
Moral hazard between the firm and the pensioner implies that the firm may choose invest-
ments, both in the pension account and with general firm assets, with more risk than is
in pensioner’s interest.3 Federal regulations of DB sponsors restrict the investment allo-
cation of assets held in the pension account, but ignore risk stemming from general firm
investments. Pension assets must be held in readily valued investments and no more than
10% of those investments may be in employer stock or securities. These regulations are
a step toward discouraging excessive risk taking with pension funds. The baseline model
discussed in the next section captures restrictions on pension investments through indepen-
dent return processes facing production and pension investments.4 Further, the regulatory
costs of maintaining an under-funded pension do not depend on the production risk the firm
assumes in general firm investments.
1.2.3 Tax treatment
Contributions to the pension account and returns earned on pension assets are exempt from
the corporate tax. This exemption applies to contributions to and returns on all pension
accounts that are less than 150 percent funded.5 An excise tax of 50 percent that a firm
pays whenever it removes funds from the pension account discourages firms from leaving
operating funds to accumulate tax-free in the pension account and extracting them to cover
general firm expenses.6 The tax break on pension contributions increases the cost to a
defined-benefit sponsor of contributing less to an under-funded pension, while the funding
limit and excise tax decrease the cost of contributing less to an over-funded pension.
This tax treatment manifests in the model in three ways. First, the tax exemption for
pension returns drives a larger wedge between the return on pension assets and return on
productive investments: the pension and production return differ not only because pension
3The extension in section 4.4 suggests that this may be the case if pension and production returns are
correlated. This is an implication of previous models that focus on the moral hazard between the pensioner
and the firm (Sweeting, 2006). Rauh (2009), however, finds that the allocation of pension plans is more likely
to be influenced by risk management than this risk exploitation.
4Section 4.4 discusses an extension in which the pension and production returns can be correlated. The
firm prefers to choose pension investments that are correlated with general firm investments.
5Pension liabilities can be calculated in two ways: the projected and accrued liability. The projected
liability takes into account future salary increases of covered workers, while the accrued liability does not.
The full funding limit for the tax deduction on pension returns an contributions has varied as a portion of
these two liabilities over the years. Prior to 1987, the full funding limit was 100% of the projected liability,
but was lowered in 1987 to the minimum of 100% of the actuarial liability or 150% of the current liability.
This limit was loosened in the early 2000s but currently stands at 150% of the projected liability.
6This excise tax was first introduced at 10% in 1986, and increased to 15% in 1988. The current rate of
the excise tax, 50%, was set in 1990.
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assets cannot be invested in employer stock or securities, but also because pension returns
do not face the corporate tax while production returns do. Second, the quadratic form of
the regulatory pension cost incorporates the loss of the tax break on pension assets over the
full funding limit. It also incorporates solvency costs imposed by holding surplus funds
in the pension account where they cannot be easily accessed. Third, a sponsor can only
claim a fraction 1−χ of surplus pension assets. This fraction represents the excise tax and
other costs due to terminating the pension plan. A model extension in Section 4.3 explicitly
models tax exemptions for pension contributions and traditional interest payments.
1.2.4 Bankruptcy treatment
Because the firm and its pension plan are separate legal entities, treatments of assets held
in a pension plan and assets held in a firm differ in bankruptcy. If a defined benefit firm
enters a termination bankruptcy with a pension deficit, the PBGC takes over the pension
plan: the PBGC appropriates all assets held in the plan and assumes responsibility for
paying accrued benefits. The PBGC also tries to claim general firm assets to fill the funding
shortfall. Secured creditors receive priority over the PBGC in claiming assets held in the
firm, but unsecured creditors and the PBGC vie for the next position in the distribution
priority.7 If a defined benefit firm nears bankruptcy with a pension surplus, the firm may
use surplus assets to repay creditors and avoid bankruptcy. Tapping into these surplus assets
requires the firm to terminate the pension plan by purchasing annuities at market price for
all accrued pension promises made to pensioners. The firm can then claim any excess assets
left in the plan through an asset reversion that faces the 50% excise tax.
The bankruptcy treatment of pension assets and liabilities in the model manifests in the
solvency constraint for the firm and the lender’s payoff in bankruptcy. A defined benefit
firm is solvent if it can make all required payments to the lender using general firm as-
sets and the after-tax portion of pension surplus that can be claimed in an asset reversion.
In bankruptcy, the lender receives all general firm assets and the after-tax portion of any
reverted pension assets.
7The distribution priority in bankruptcy when a firm sponsors an underfunded pension is complicated.
Secured creditors are paid back before pensioners, but if the firm has unsecured creditors, it must prove that
it has done all in its power to write down unsecured claims before the PBGC will take it over. The “lender”
in the model is a secured creditor.
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1.3 The Model Environment
This section describes a formal model of the financing, investment, and pension contri-
bution decisions of a defined benefit firm facing non-contractible production risk. In an
environment of full information and facing the possibility of limited-liability bankruptcy,
the risk-neutral firm raises equity and/or borrows externally to fund risky investment in
production, pension contributions, and investment in a safe asset. Three actors influence
these decisions: the lender, the shareholders or firm, and a government sponsored insurance
agency (the PBGC). The lender determines the conditions of any loan agreement with the
firm. Shareholders are passive participants who receive a return on investments held outside
of the firm equal to the return on safe assets held within the firm. The firm acts on behalf
of its shareholders to maximize their expected payoff. The third actor, the Pension Benefit
Guarantee Corporation (PBGC), insures the firm’s pension at an exogenous insurance rate.
Three of these modeling choices particularly emphasize the role of the interaction be-
tween contracting problems introduced by pension regulations and conflicts of interest
between stockholders and bondholders in financing and investment decisions: the static
structure of the model, the assumption that the firm maximizes shareholder payoff, and the
focus on the PBGC rather than the worker. A static model abstracts from complications
related to debt overhang that arise in a dynamic setting. The assumption that the firm maxi-
mizes shareholder payoff sidesteps potential conflicts of interest between stockholders and
managers.8 The focus on the PBGC rather than the worker abstracts from potential wage
negotiations between the worker and the firm. This last assumption implies that, prior to
the start of the model, workers negotiate a wage that leaves them indifferent between work-
ing at a firm that offers a defined benefit pension and one that does not, taking into account
potential bankruptcy and PBGC pension coverage. As a result, the model focuses on the
financing and investment decisions of the firm, conditional on existing pension liabilities,
rather than the impact of pension regulations on employment.
1.3.1 Assumptions
Four sets of assumptions provide the structure of the model: (1) the timing of decisions
and knowledge of participants, (2) the purview of the loan agreement to contract upon the
sponsor’s decisions, (3) the market structure facing the lender and sponsor, and (4) the
introduction of the defined benefit pension. The first three sets of assumptions are standard
in many models of corporate borrowing, with one deviation: the loan agreement cannot
8See Lay (2016)b or Choy et. Al (2014) for a discussion of how moral hazard between the stockholder
and manager may influence financing and investment decisions with a defined benefit pension.
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contract upon contributions to the pension account. The introduction of the defined benefit
pension is laid out in parallel with the description of the regulations facing defined benefit
firms laid out in the previous section.
Timing of decisions and knowledge of participants
The model features complete markets, full information, and limited liability in bankruptcy.
A firm begins with cash-on-hand X , pension liabilities D, and pension assets P , and faces
two risky investment opportunities: production and pension investments. Investing I in
production results in output zf(I), where f(I) exhibits decreasing returns to scale and
satisfies the Inada Conditions. Productivity z = zs with probability p or z = zF < zs with
probability 1 − p. Contributing C to the pension account yields a constant return 1 + ρ.
Figure 1 describes the model events.
In the first period, the firm raises additional equity E. Knowing the firm’s equity stake,
the lender offers the firm a schedule of loan agreements that consist of a rate, b
B
, and amount
B, discussed further in the next subsection. The firm decides how much to borrow at the
offered rates. In the second period, the firm chooses how much to invest, I ≥ 0, and
contribute to the pension, C ≥ 0, conditional on the amount of funds – cash, debt, and new
equity – it has available, Y . The firm saves any residual funds in a safe asset with return
1+r. In the third period, the firm realizes the return on production and the pension account.
A firm that does not have enough cash-on-hand to repay the lender will go bankrupt. The
lender and shareholders receive their payoffs.
The loan agreement
A loan agreement consists of a loan of sizeB and an amount b that a solvent firm must repay
in period 3. Prior to the loan agreement, the firm raises an observable amount of equity E.
Total funds are then distributed across productive investment, pension contributions, and
a safe asset. The loan agreement cannot contract upon the distribution of funds across
pension contributions and productive investment. This is the key contracting inefficiency
that induces moral hazard problems between the stockholder and bondholder: a firm must
raise enough funds to contribute to the pension, but cannot credibly commit to its lender
that it will avoid over-investing in risky production.9
The lender offers two types of loans. The lender offers a safe loan at rate 1 + r if the
firm has raised enough equity to avoid bankruptcy when production fails. Under a safe
9The lack of covenants on investment represents minor non-contractible conflicts of interest between the
stockholder and bondholder. Without a pension, the resulting inefficiencies are second-order.
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loan, the firm internalizes production losses in all states of the world. The lender offers a
risky loan if the firm does not raise enough equity to avoid bankruptcy if production fails.
Under a risky loan, the lender specifies a borrowing premium, bR > (1 + r)B, to reflect
potential losses it incurs if the firm is insolvent.
The market structure
The lender operates in a competitive market. Therefore, it offers a loan rate b
B
such that it
breaks-even in expectation, conditional on loan sizeB and the firm’s equity positionX+E.
The lender has an opportunity cost of funds 1 + r. The firm produces one good and seeks
to maximize shareholder payoff. The shareholders’ opportunity cost of funds is 1 + r. The
firm is required to pay pension liabilities D in the indefinite future, but this model abstracts
from the labor market in which those liabilities are incurred: assume that pensioners ne-
gotiated wages and deferred compensation, taking into account the insured value of their
pension, prior to model events. The pension insurer, the PBGC, sets an exogenous insur-
ance premium, captured in the regulatory pension cost discussed in following subsections,
that depends on the size of the funding shortfall. While a second moral hazard problem
exists between the PBGC and the firm, the PBGC does not adjust rates to internalize risky
production decisions to the firm.
The defined benefit pension
The firm’s possession of a pension plan and its position in that pension plan are both exoge-
nous: the firm begins the first period with an amount of pension liabilities, D, that it must
pay in the third period and an amount of dedicated pension assets, P . Three sets of further
assumptions integrate this pension plan into the model: (1) the return on assets held in the
pension account relative to the returns on production and the safe asset, (2) the conditions
that lead to firm bankruptcy, and (3) the payoff functions of the lender and firm.
Returns on the pension, production, and safe asset The firm realizes the stochastic
return to its own productivity, z = zj , at the beginning of period 3. The firm also receives
its return on the safe asset, 1 + r, and pension investments, 1 + ρ. The pension return
is independent of the firm’s productivity, reflecting the ERISA requirement that limited
pension assets can be invested in the firm’s own capital stock.10 The pension return can
differ from the return on the safe rate, reflecting the fact that the firm pays the corporate tax
10Assumption is made for clarity in presenting key results. Appendix C shows solution with stochastic
returns that are correlated with investment.
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on returns to safe assets held in the firm but avoids the corporate tax on returns to pension
assets.11
Bankruptcy condition The firm faces two types of required payments: the debt repay-
ment and required pension payments. ERISA regulations allow a firm to waive required
pension payments if making those payments would drive the firm into bankruptcy. There-
fore, a firm must repay only the debt to external lenders, b, to avoid bankruptcy in the final
period. The firm may use assets held in the firm, but cannot claim funds from a pension that
is in deficit to cover required payments and avoid bankruptcy. The firm can claim funds
from a pension that is in surplus to avoid bankruptcy. However, this asset reversion incurs
a cost, χ, proportional to the amount of funds reverted. Let 1− χk = 0 if the pension is in
deficit when the firm contributes C and pension return ρ is realized, and χk = χ ∈ [0, 1] if
the pension is in surplus.12 The firm remains solvent if:
zjf(I) + (1 + r)(B +X + E − I − C)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Assets held within the firm
+
(1− χk)[(1 + ρ)(P + C)−D]︸ ︷︷ ︸
Pension assets that could be used





Lender and firm payoff The lender and firm payoffs in period 3 reflect regulatory treat-
ment of pension assets and contributions. The lender sets the required equity and borrowing
premium according to its expected period 3 payoff, viewed in period 1. The firm allocates
funds across investment and contributions to maximize its expected period 3 payoff, viewed
in period 2. Prior to this allocation decision, the firm determines financing to maximize its
expected period 3 payoff viewed in period 1. These expected payoffs are built from realized
payoffs in period 3.
11While the baseline model abstracts from its effects, section 4.3 presents an extension examining the
effects of the corporate tax. For this section,suppose 1+r is the after-tax return on safe assets, like treasuries,
and 1 + ρ is the pre-tax return on assets held in the pension account. The tax deduction is one factor that
drives the pension return above the safe rate.
12As in section 2, firms with a surplus can terminate the pension and revert surplus funds, taxed at 50%, to
prevent bankruptcy. χ reflects this tax and any other termination fees. Accordingly, assume χ > .5.
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b If firm is solvent
max{zjf(I) + (1 + r)(B +X + E − I − C), 0}︸ ︷︷ ︸
Profits held within firm
+ (1− χk)[(1 + ρ)(P + C)−D]︸ ︷︷ ︸
Potential claimable pension assets
If the firm is insolvent
(1.2)
Note that both I and C depend on the firm’s total funds in period 2, B + X + E, and
the required repayment amount b. When the firm is solvent, lenders receive the agreed-
upon repayment amount b. When the firm is insolvent, lenders have rights to all assets held
within the firm and partial rights to excess pension assets held in over-funded pensions.
These rights do not extend to pension assets held in under-funded pensions. If a defined
benefit sponsor goes bankrupt with its pension in deficit, the PBGC assumes the plan assets
and liabilities.13
A lender that invests an amount B in safe assets receives a certain payment of (1 + r)B
in period 3. Upon request for a loan of size B, the lender will offer a safe agreement with
bS = (1 + r)B if the firm has raised enough equity to avoid bankruptcy. The lender will
offer a risky agreement in which it chooses a borrowing premium bR > (1+r)B if the firm
has not raised enough equity to avoid bankruptcy. In each type of agreement, the choice of
b is made so that the lender breaks-even, or receives (1 + r)B in expectation. The lender’s





W (b|B,E)) = pW S + (1− p)W F
13In takeovers, the PBGC assumes assets held in the plan and responsibility for paying pensioners. Pen-
sioners owed benefits from severely under-funded plans taken over by the PBGC receive, on average, 23 of
promised payments.
14I and C are determined as a function of B+X +E and b, therefore E1(W (b, E|B)) is known in period
1.
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zjf(I) + (1 + r)(B +X + E − I − C)− b︸ ︷︷ ︸
Profits held in firm
+
[
(1 + ρ)(P + C)−D]︸ ︷︷ ︸




(1 + ρ)(P + C)−D]2︸ ︷︷ ︸
Regulatory pension cost
If the firm is solvent
0 If firm is insolvent
(1.3)
Equation 1.3 captures four components of the sponsor’s payoff: limited liability, profits
from production, pension surplus or deficit, and regulatory costs of sponsoring a pension.
Limited liability is evident in the asymmetric payoff function: the shareholders of an insol-
vent firm receive nothing but do not repay debts. Profits from production held within the
firm increase the payoff to the shareholders of a solvent firm (first term in equation 1.3).
A pension surplus will increase the payoff to the shareholders of a solvent firm, while a
pension deficit will decrease their payoff (second term in equation 1.3). Note that the firm,
responsible for future pension contributions and maintenance, pays the pension deficit and
associated regulatory costs when it avoids bankruptcy. This encourages the firm to take on
more debt and risk bankruptcy. The regulatory costs of sponsoring a pension, the third term
in equation 1.3, require a more detailed explanation.
Figure 1.2 provides an example of the payoff a firm receives in the final period from
its pension upon realizing pension return ρ, as a function of its contribution in the sec-
ond period, C. If pension assets and firm assets received equal regulatory treatment, the
marginal return to the firm of a pension contribution of one dollar would be 1+ρ. However,
regulations imply that the firm faces a marginal return on pension contributions that varies
according to the period-3 funding status of the plan. To interpret Figure 1.2, suppose that
the variable-rate component of the PBGC premium is φ – that is, any firm holding a pen-
sion shortfall must pay a fraction φ of that shortfall to the PBGC as an insurance premium
– and the corporate tax rate is τ . Further, suppose that the firm began the first period with
pension assets P and liabilities D, that imply a funding shortfall, P < D.
Suppose the firm contributed an amount C – along the horizontal axis in figure 1.2a – in
the second period, and realized a pension return 1 + ρ in the third period. Further, suppose
that the original funding status of the plan was such that P (1 + ρ) < D: if the firm did not
contribute to the pension account in the second period (C = 0), it faces a pension deficit
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in the third period, pays the variable-rate PBGC premium, and receives a payoff from its
pension of
(
(1 +ρ)P −D)(1−φ). In the figure, suppose that a second-period contribution
of size C0 will lead to an exactly funded pension plan when return 1 + ρ is realized, while
a contribution of size CH will lead to a pension account that is 150% funded when return
1 + ρ is realized. A pension contribution less than C0 results in an under-funded pension
in the third period, while a pension contribution greater than CH results in a pension that is
over-funded to the point of losing the tax deduction on pension returns.
The marginal return to the pension contribution varies by the size of the contribution.
The marginal return to a pension contribution C ∈ (0, C0) in Figure 1.2a results in a
pension deficit and will be higher than 1 + ρ: by contributing another dollar to the pension
account, the firm not only receives the investment return ρ, but also decreases the realized
pension deficit by 1 + ρ. As a result, the PBGC insurance premium, proportional to the
funding shortfall, will decrease by φ(1 + ρ). The marginal return to a pension contribution
C ∈ (C0, CH), on the other hand, results in a pension plan that is between 100 and 150
percent funded and will be lower than 1 + ρ: fees associated with reverting surplus pension
assets will leave the firm only (1 − χ)(1 + ρ) for each dollar contributed to the pension.
Finally, a contribution of size C > CH results in a pension surplus over 150 percent, and
will face a marginal return lower than 1 + ρ for two reasons: (1) the firm can only claim a
fraction 1−χ of surplus assets, and (2) the return on pension assets held in an account over
150 percent funded is not sheltered from corporate taxes. Therefore, the marginal return to
C > CH is (1− τ)(1− χ)(1 + ρ).
In Figure 1.2b, this nonlinear payoff structure is approximated as the sum of the pension
surplus and a quadratic ‘regulatory pension cost’. The quadratic regulatory cost is a second-
order approximation of a variety of loss functions that take into account other regulatory
costs beyond those direct costs described in Figure 1.2a. A firm that sponsors an under-
funded pension, for example, makes minimum required contributions that are an increasing
portion of the size of the pension shortfall. This required contribution represents an indirect
cost of the pension account because it exerts an inflexible demand on cash-flow at a time
when other investments may provide higher return. The parameter µ in Figure 1.2b captures
how important these indirect costs are to the firm; suppose µ decreases in firm size: when
required contributions or insolvent pension assets are smaller relative to total firm assets,
their impact on the firm’s payoff is smaller.
The firm makes two decisions in this model: it borrows and raises equity in period
1 and allocates funds across investment and pension contributions in period 2. Since the
firm makes the allocation decision taking B, E, and b as given, I and C can be considered





V (I, C|B,E, b)) = pV S + (1− p)V F
With I and C functions of the loan agreement and financing decision, the sponsor’s
expected payoff viewed in period 1 can be expressed as a function of B, E, and b:
E1
(
V (B,E|E, b)) = pV S + (1− p)V F
1.3.2 Definition of an Equilibrium
An equilibrium in this model is an arrangement in which the DB sponsor chooses a fi-
nancing position (B∗, E∗) and an allocation of funds (I∗, C∗). These decisions jointly
maximize the sponsor’s payoff, and the lender expects to break-even under the required
loan agreement (b∗|B∗, E∗).
Definition An equilibrium consists of a financing position F = (B∗, E∗), a loan agree-
ment L∗ = (b∗|B∗, E∗), and an allocation decision A = (I∗, C∗) such that:
1. Conditional on L∗ and A∗, the financing position F∗ maximizes the firm’s expected
payoff viewed in period 1:




V (E,B|b∗, I∗, C∗)) (1.4)
2. Conditional on L∗ and F∗, the allocation decisionA∗ maximizes the firm’s expected
payoff viewed in period 2:
(I∗, C∗) = arg max
(I,C)
E2(V (I, C|B∗, E∗, b∗)
subject to
I∗ + C∗ ≤B∗ +X + E∗
(1.5)
3. Conditional on F∗ and A∗, the loan agreement L∗ allows the lender to break-even in
expectation:
(1 + r)B∗ = E1(W (b∗|B∗, E∗, I∗, C∗)) (1.6)
Note that a firm may endogenously choose to limit its period 2 operating funds in the
first period when the production risk a firm faces – and, therefore, it’s borrowing premium
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– is high enough that the firm chooses to limit its borrowing. This will lower its productive
investment and pension contributions.
1.4 The Model Solution
The model solution consists of three decisions of the lender and firm: the lender’s loan
offering, the firm’s allocation decision, and the firm’s financing decision. The main sec-
tion discusses the model solution in parallel with these decisions, with the full analytic
solution to this model presented in Appendix A. The following subsections suggest a quan-
titative interpretation of five analytic results: how a firm chooses financing, the impact of
the stockholder-bondholder conflict on pension funding, the influence of the tax benefits
of debt on defined benefit firms’ financing and investment decisions, the attractiveness of
alternative investment strategies in the pension account, and the impact of exogenous fi-
nancing constraints on the investment and pension contributions of a firm sponsoring a
defined benefit pension.
The Loan Agreement The lender observes the equity the firm raises in the first period
and, with full information, predicts the level of investment and contributions the firm will
choose when it borrows an amount B. The lender offers loans at rates that allow it to break
even, in expectation. When the firm has raised enough equity to avoid bankruptcy, the
lender sets required repayment bS(B|E) = (1 + r)B. When the firm has not raised enough
equity to avoid bankruptcy, the lender sets required repayment bR(B|E):







(1 + r)(I −X − E)− zFf(I)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Standard premium without pension
+ (1 + r)C − E(χS|C)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Premium due to pension
} (1.7)
As in standard models of corporate borrowing, the borrowing premium decreases when
the firm holds more collateral, X + E, or faces less production risk (higher zF ). Sponsor-
ing a pension increases the premium when the expected contribution is non-zero and the
pension faces a small expected surplus or an expected deficit.
The Allocation Decision The firm chooses how much to invest and contribute in the
second period. In period 2, the firm has operating funds, Y = B + E + X , and faces a
required repayment b(B|E). Due to contracting inefficiencies that prevent the firm from
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committing to a complete state-contingent set of investment restrictions, the firm views
Y and b as given when allocating funds across investment, contributions, and the safe
asset. Figure 1.3 describes this allocation decision when the firm saves in the safe asset:
investments in the safe asset receive marginal return 1 + r, and the firm chooses investment
and contributions so that their expected marginal returns are also equal to 1 + r. The
firm that raised enough equity in the first period to avoid bankruptcy faces an expected
payoff from investing I of E(z)f(I). The firm that did not raise enough equity in the
first period to avoid bankruptcy faces an expected payoff from investing I when it remains
solvent of zsf(I). Therefore, the firm that avoids bankruptcy invests at the social optimum
I∗S in Figure 1.3, where E(z)f ′(I∗S) = 1 + r. The firm that faces possible bankruptcy –
and moral hazard with lender – over-invests in risky production, choosing I = I∗R so that
zsf ′(I∗R) = 1 + r. Both firms face the same expected return from the pension: pension and
production returns are independent, and the firm goes bankrupt only if production fails. As
a result, firms that face moral hazard with the lender choose the same pension contribution
as firms that do not. In Figure 1.3, that contribution, C¯, is the firm’s optimal contribution
under current pension regulations.
Figure 1.4 describes the optimal allocations under a safe and risky agreement when the
firm raised fewer operating funds in the first period: Y < I∗S + C¯. With constrained operat-
ing funds, the firm does not save in the safe asset. It chooses investment and contributions
so that their marginal returns are equal, but higher than 1 + r. The resulting investment
and contribution are lower than the allocation in Figure 1.3. When the firm faces possible
bankruptcy, the expected return from investment relative to pension contributions is higher
than when it does not face bankruptcy. As a result, the firm invests more relative to contri-
butions when it finances primarily with debt than when it raises substantial equity: moral
hazard with the lender encourages the firm to invest more at the expense of pensioners
when it is financially constrained.
The financing decision The firm’s financing decision in the first period selects whether
the equilibrium dynamics of Figure 1.3 or those of Figure 1.4 determine investment and
contributions in the second period. In choosing how much equity to raise, the firm deter-
mines whether it faces possible bankruptcy – that is, whether it faces moral hazard with the
lender. In choosing how much to borrow, the firm determines whether it has enough money
to save in the safe asset, and invest and contribute according to the dynamics in Figure 1.3,
or whether it invests and contributes under the constrained dynamics in Figure 1.4.
Figure 1.5 describes three potential equilibrium financing decisions. First, the firm
could raise enough equity to avoid bankruptcy (Position S1 in Figure 1.5). As a re-
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sult, the firm avoids moral hazard with the lender, and raises enough operating funds to
save in the safe asset, invest at the social optimum, and contribute at the firm’s optimum:
(I, C) = (I∗S, C¯). Alternatively, the firm could choose to raise less equity and risk possible
bankruptcy. As a result, the firm faces moral hazard with the lender and internalizes the cost
of that moral hazard through a higher borrowing rate. Facing possible bankruptcy, the firm
chooses one of two financing positions: it borrows enough to over-invest in risky produc-
tion and contribute optimally to its pension account, Position R1: (I∗, C∗) = (I∗R, C¯), or
it constrains its borrowing so that it invests less in risky production and under-contributes
to its pension plan, Position R2: (I∗, C∗) = (I∗R − ∆I, C¯ − ∆C). Each of these three
financing positions is associated with a different cost to the firm: Position S1 requires the
firm to service the pension regardless of production performance; Position R1 requires the
firm to pay the social cost of over-investment in risky production through a higher borrow-
ing rate; and Position R2 requires the firm to pay the regulatory penalty associated with
under-contributing to the pension account. The firm chooses the financing position that is
associated with the lowest cost.
1.4.1 What makes defined benefit firms prefer debt or equity finance?
Firms prefer debt finance when the pension costs avoided in bankruptcy are high relative
to the costs of over-investment or under-contributing to the pension account. Firms prefer
equity finance when the pension cost avoided in bankruptcy is low relative to these other
costs.
Sponsoring a defined benefit pension imposes substantial future costs on the firm. When
the plan is fully funded, the firm faces maintenance costs, investment risk, and the inability
to use the funds in that account for more productive purposes. When the plan is in deficit,
the firm must also make future pension contributions. A firm that avoids bankruptcy by
raising substantial equity will always pay this pension cost; a firm that finances with debt
avoids this pension cost in bankruptcy. Therefore, the cost associated with financing po-
sition S1 in Figure 1.5 is the pension cost the firm would avoid if it went bankrupt when
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production failed:
Expected avoided pension cost with contribution C︸ ︷︷ ︸
APCost(C)
=








− Expected claimable pension surplus︸ ︷︷ ︸
E(S|C)−E(χS|C)
) (1.8)
A firm that goes bankrupt avoids any regulatory burden of maintaining the pension account
when production fails, µ
2
E(S2|C). It loses any pension surplus, whenE(S|C¯)−E(χS|C) >
0, and is not responsible for any deficit, when E(S|C¯) < 0. The “pension cost avoided
in bankruptcy” when the firm contributes C, APCost(C) in equation 1.8, is the cost of
limiting moral hazard with the lender. Figure 1.6 sheds light on the potential magnitude of
this cost for a sample of defined benefit firms.15 Throughout the 2000s, the median pension
deficit is around 2 percent of non-pension assets; this number provides a lower bound on
the pension cost avoided in bankruptcy.
A firm may choose to avoid this pension cost in bankruptcy by raising more debt relative
to equity: position R1 or R2 in Figure 1.5. The firm that chooses position R1, (I∗, C∗) =
(I∗R, C¯), borrows enough to contribute optimally, over-invests in risky production, and pays
the associated efficiency cost of over-investment:
OICost(I∗R) =
(




E(z)f(I∗R)− (1 + r)I∗R
)
The firm that chooses position R2 constrains the amount it borrows to force itself to
invest closer to optimal in period 2. It raises enough debt to invest and contribute so that
the marginal return to each is equal to the increase in the required bond repayment, ∂bR
∂B
.
The cost of committing to invest closer to optimal is a lower contribution to the pension
account: (I∗, C∗) = (I∗R−∆I, C¯−∆C). This firm avoids the full cost of over-investment,
15Section 5 describes the data and sample details.
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but suffers the regulatory cost of under-contributing to the pension, facing efficiency cost:
OICost(I∗R −∆I) + UCCost(C¯ −∆C) = OICost(I∗R −∆I)
+ p
{
E(S|C¯)− E(S|C¯ −∆C)}︸ ︷︷ ︸





E(S2|C¯ −∆C)}︸ ︷︷ ︸
Change in implicit pension cost
+ (1− p){E(χS|C¯)− E(χS|C¯ −∆C)}− (1 + r)∆C︸ ︷︷ ︸
Change in borrowing premium
(1.9)
The cost of under-contributing by ∆C, UCCost(C¯ − ∆C), has three components: a
decrease in expected pension assets, a change in the implicit pension cost, and a change in
the borrowing premium. This cost is increasing in the size of the optimal pension deficit,
E(S|C¯) < 0, and the regulatory burden of under-contributing, µ. Quantitatively, the cost
of under-contributing to a plan that is under-funded by 2% of firm assets, for example,
includes the variable-rate PBGC premium – which increased from .9% to 2.9% of the pen-
sion shortfall since 2012 – and foregone investments due to future minimum required con-
tributions. The cost of under-contributing to a surplus pension is lower claimable tax-free
pension returns; as a result, the cost of under-contributing to a surplus pension decreased
substantially after the 1990 imposition of the 50% excise tax. The cost of over-investment,
OICost(I), is a standard agency cost: firms are willing to accept risky projects that ren-
der a negative net present value because those projects increase the value to stockholders.
Lenders charge the firms for this additional risk. Established estimates of this agency cost
are modest; Leland (1998), for example bounds it between .3 and 1.4 percent of total as-
sets. Its magnitude depends on firm- and project-specific factors – including the correlation
between the firm and project cash-flow, the maturity structure of debt, and the marginal tax
rate – and increases in the firm’s leverage ratio (Parrino and Weisbach, 1999).
A defined benefit firm increases debt issuance when the pension cost avoided in bankruptcy
is high: APCost(C¯) > min{OICost(I∗R−∆I)+UCCost(C¯−∆C), OICost(I∗R)}. Fig-
ure 1.6 suggests that this cost was higher for the median defined-benefit firm after 2000. A
levered firm constrains its borrowing when the cost of doing so is lower than the full cost
of over-investment: OICost(I∗R −∆I) + UCCost(C¯ −∆C) < OICost(I∗R). The direct
cost of under-contributing to a pension in deficit is between .9% and 2.9% of the shortfall;
the direct cost of under-contributing to a pension in surplus is essentially zero following
the imposition of the 50% excise tax. Accordingly, the conflict of interest among the stock-
holder, bondholder, and pension insurance agency encourages defined benefit firms to be
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more likely to borrow on the extensive margin, but borrow less on the intensive margin.
Pension regulation encourages defined benefit firms to borrow more on the intensive mar-
gin. This endogenous financing decision depends solely on the pension position and returns
relative to investment risk and return.
1.4.2 Does the stockholder-bondholder conflict affect pension fund-
ing?
The conflict of interest between the stockholder and bondholder encourages defined benefit
firms to contribute less to their pension accounts. The optimal contribution, C¯, is a product
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The firm has two incentives to contribute to the pension account. The first term in equa-
tion A.3 illustrates the arbitrage incentive. The sponsor will contribute more to the pension
account when it expects a higher return on pension assets, E{1 + ρ}, than it could receive
on safe assets held in the firm, 1 + r. Pension regulations are designed to encourage firms
to maintain pension assets at a value close to the present discounted value of liabilities.
The arbitrage incentive is therefore muted when the regulatory cost of deviating from exact
funding, µ, or uncertainty on pension returns, E{(1 + ρ)2} – and therefore the chance of a
large surplus or deficit – is higher.17
A second incentive to contribute to the pension account arises from the magnitude of
the current shortfall: D − P . The firm’s optimal contribution is increasing in the size of
pension liabilities, D, relative to current pension assets, P . While the magnitude of this
contribution decreases one-for-one with current assets, it increases less than one-for-one
with pension liabilities. This reflects the option value of pension liabilities. Defined benefit
sponsors face an incentive to under-fund the pension to exploit the value of the put-option
in bankruptcy.18 The zero-lower bound will constrain the contributions of firms that have
a large amount of current pension assets or face a very low expected return on the pension
account.
The firm’s optimal contribution leads to an expected pension surplus that is decreasing
in the magnitude of pension liabilities and increasing in the spread of the expected pension
16The firm cannot take money out of the pension account; the optimal contribution is bounded below by 0.
17This arbitrage incentive is discussed in length in Tepper (1980) and Black (1981).
18The option-value incentive to under-fund echoes the insight of Treynor (1976) and Sharpe (1977).
22
return over the safe return:19
E(S|C¯) = E{1 + ρ}
µE{(1 + ρ)2}
(








The optimal expected pension surplus or deficit, unsurprisingly, is determined by the
same two incentives as the pension contribution: arbitrage and option value. The first in-
centive likely encourages a larger surplus: tax breaks on pension returns drive the expected
return on pension investments above the after-tax safe rate. This incentive to hold a pension
surplus is stronger when the regulatory cost, µ, of holding assets in the pension account is
smaller; it dominates among firms that sponsor low pension obligations relative to their
size. The option value associated with pension liabilities encourages firms with a larger
magnitude of pension liabilities to maintain a lower funding ratio. This incentive domi-
nates among small firms that sponsor large pension obligations relative to their size. In the
2000s, for example, untabulated results show that the funding ratio among firms in the low-
est quartile of pension obligations to non-pension assets was 15% higher than the funding
ratio among firms in the highest quartile.
The optimal contribution and expected pension surplus does not depend on the firm’s
productive investment prospects. However, this independence disappears when a firm fac-
ing complete financing markets chooses to contribute less than optimal to the pension ac-
count (financing position R2 in Figure 1.5). When the cost of contributing less is small





zsf ′(I∗R −∆I)− (1 + r)
)
µE{(1 + ρ)2} =
∂bR(B|E)
∂B∗
µE{(1 + ρ)2} (1.12)
Under these conditions, the productive investment prospects of the firm directly influ-
ence its pension contribution. A defined benefit sponsor facing a mean-preserving spread
in the production return – ie., higher risk conditional on mean return: z
S−zF
E(z) – makes a con-
tribution that is further below optimal than a firm facing safer production. The deviation
from optimal will be smaller when the expected regulatory cost of making it, µE{(1+ρ)2},
is larger. As a result, small firms facing safe production processes will make smaller de-
19The expected pension surplus when the firm contributes C is E(S|C) below. Plugging in the optimal
contribution C¯ gives for C gives the optimal surplus: E(S|C¯).
E(S|C) =`
(




(1 + ρF )(P + C)−D
)
= E{(1 + ρ)}(P + C)−D
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viations from the optimal funding level. A contribution of C¯ − ∆C leads to a surplus
of:
E(S|C¯ −∆C) = E(S|C¯)− E{1 + ρ}∆C (1.13)
Conflicts of interest between stockholders and bondholders encourage the defined ben-
efit sponsor hold a pension deficit that is larger than optimal by E{1 + ρ}∆C: this impact
of moral hazard between the stockholders and the bondholders on the amount of assets the
PBGC can expect to claim in a termination depends on both the production process and
the pension return. The cost this moral hazard imposes on the PBGC is higher when the
production process is risky and expected productivity is low. The cost is lower when the
pension process is risky and expected pension return is low.
1.4.3 The tax benefits of debt for firms with defined benefit pensions
The basic intuition that sponsoring a defined benefit pension encourages some firms to
raise more debt and others to raise more equity is derived in a baseline model that abstracts
from the corporate tax. Yet any analysis that discusses firms’ trade-off between debt and
equity finance would be remiss to ignore the tax benefits associated with debt. Under
U.S. tax laws, interest payments to external bondholders are exempt from the corporate
tax. Incorporating this tax benefit of debt into the model presented here confirms a classic
theoretical result (Modigliani and Miller, 1963): while a non-pension firm is indifferent
between debt and equity finance without taxes, the tax benefit of debt implies a non-pension
firm strictly prefers debt finance.
Firms that sponsor defined benefit pensions in the baseline model without taxes are not
indifferent between debt and equity: firms with high pension deficits relative to agency
costs or regulatory pension costs prefer debt, while firms with lower pension deficits prefer
equity. The tax exemption for interest payments will encourage some – but not all – of these
firms to assume more debt. Like non-pension firms, pension firms face higher benefits of
debt when interest payments are exempt from the corporate tax, but they also face higher
agency costs to increasing leverage. The tax exemption encourages firms with high pension
deficits and lower production risk to assume more debt, while firms with lower pension
deficits and higher production risk will continue to prefer equity to debt finance.
Pension contributions and returns earned on assets held in the pension account are also
exempt from the corporate tax. The previous analysis has assumed that this exemption is
incorporated into the difference between the return on pension assets, ρ, and the return on
safe investments, r. The model with taxes presented in Appendix B allows a more careful
consideration of the role of the tax exemption for pension contributions in the firms fund-
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ing, investment, and borrowing decisions. The tax exemption strengthens firms’ arbitrage
incentive to contribute to the pension account leading to a higher optimal contribution that





. In this way, the exemption for pen-
sion contributions encourages firms to maintain better-funded pension accounts. Indeed,
Thomas (1988) estimates that firms facing the corporate tax maintained a 13 percent higher
funding status in their pensions than non-profit firms that did not face the corporate tax.
The tax exemption for pensions also increases the after-tax benefit of contributing to the
pension account relative to investing more in the firm. As a result, it encourages firms
that face financial constraints and the stockholder-bondholder conflict to drain fewer funds
from the pension to support investment. At the same time, many firms with large pension
deficits – and, therefore, high benefits of debt relative to equity because of their pension –
will increase borrowing to make higher optimal contributions. Contracting problems then
imply that those firms make more risky investment and face higher agency costs.
The streamlined assumptions of this model abstract from two potentially important im-
plications of the interaction between corporate taxes and defined benefit pensions. First,
the static setting abstracts from some effects that would arise in a dynamic setting. For
example, the tax exemption for pension contributions can decrease the firm’s current and
future taxable income. By functioning as a non-debt tax shield in this way, the pension ex-
emption may lower the tax benefits of debt (DeAngelo and Marsulis, 1980; Shivdasani and
Stefanescu, 2012). Second, the assumption that firms save pension assets in one investment
with a safe return abstracts from asset allocation that could be motivated by differential tax
treatment of assets inside and outside of the pension. Black (1980) and Tepper (1981) argue
that firms should hold high-income investments, such as bonds, in their pension accounts
and lower-income investments like equities in the general account of the firm.
1.4.4 Correlated pension and production returns
The baseline model abstracts from portfolio choice within the pension account. Yet a firm’s
optimal strategy may be to invest pension assets in a portfolio with returns that are corre-
lated with the firm’s production. As a result, the firm enjoys a higher pension payoff when
it stays in business. A model extension in Appendix C allows the firm to choose between
two portfolios in the pension account: one in which the returns are uncorrelated with invest-
ment returns on assets held in the firm, and another in which those returns are uncorrelated.
In this extension, the benefits of debt are higher with correlated returns: the firm faces only
upside risk in both production and the pension account. The cost of under-contributing
to the pension is also higher, making it more likely that the firm will borrow enough to
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contribute optimally and make riskier investment decisions. Yet the optimal contribution
itself is lower when the firm faces moral hazard between stockholders and bondholders.
As a result, pension accounts are better funded when the firm remains in business, but the
income supporting pension benefits is less diversified. The model suggests that firms would
prefer a pension allocation that is correlated with its own production return. Rauh (2009)
shows that firms choose more conservative pension allocations when pension accounts are
severely under-funded, but little other empirical work has been done to compare returns in
pension accounts to returns on investments held in firms’ general accounts.
1.4.5 Investment and Contributions Under Financial Constraints
The baseline model shows that sponsoring a defined benefit pension can introduce a wedge
between the internal and external cost of funds. Contracting problems arising from pension
regulation imply that pension debt magnifies existing agency costs of debt and encourages
firms to make riskier investments. As a result, firms facing high non-contractible risk and
small pension deficits prefer to finance with internal equity to avoid the agency costs asso-
ciated with debt finance, while firms with large pension deficits and high costs to lowering
their pension contributions prefer to finance with external debt so that equity holders pay
lower pension costs in the bankruptcy state.
This finding speaks to a longstanding debate in corporate finance on whether an ob-
served correlation between cash-flow and investment levels indicates the presence of fi-
nancing constraints (Fazzari, et. Al, 1988; Kaplan and Zingales, 1997). Many theoretical
models invoke a wedge between the internal and external cost of funds, like the one cre-
ated by these pension incentives, to motivate cash-flow effects on investment in constrained
firms: when firms face higher costs to external than internal financing, exogenous increases
in cash will lead to higher investment. These direct cash-flow effects on investment are not
the only possible explanation for empirical correlations between cash flow and investment
levels. Unobserved investment opportunities are likely correlated with both cash flow and
investment levels and can create the appearance of cash-flow effects on investment. A large
empirical literature focuses on exogenous instruments for cash flow that identify the true
effect of cash flow on investment levels.
One strategy in this literature, pioneered by Rauh (2006), has been to use legal differ-
ences in the minimum required pension contribution to instrument for cash-flow variation.
Two approaches have been used to capture differences in minimum required contributions
that are exogenous from unobserved investment opportunities. The first approach is to
use policy changes that decrease the minimum required contribution for all firms (Dham-
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bra, 2014; Kubick, et. Al, 2014). The policy change used in these papers – the Pension
Funding Relief Act of 2012 – was the result of intensive lobbying efforts on the part of
firms that struggled to make pension payments during the Great Recession. As such, it
may not be strictly independent of the investment opportunities facing those firms. The
second approach has been to use non-linearities in the formula used to calculate minimum
required contributions as a function of the plan funding ratio. Rauh (2006) exploits these
non-linearities with an instrumental variables specification that controls for the funding ra-
tio, while Bakke and Whited (2012) use a regression discontinuity design that recognizes
the funding ratio as the running variable. These non-linearities conditional on the fund-
ing ratio more plausibly identify differences in minimum required contributions that are
exogenous from investment opportunities than policy changes that respond to business cy-
cle dynamics. However, both approaches are vulnerable to a confounding factor identified
by the model in this paper: even if changes in minimum required contributions are ex-
ogenous from unobserved investment opportunities, they directly affect firms’ regulatory
cost of contributing less to the pension. Firms with higher regulatory costs to contributing
less – higher minimum required pension contributions – will borrow more, maintain more
cash-on-hand, contribute more to the pension, and make riskier investments. As a result,
any empirical response to minimum required contributions captures not only be the direct
cash-flow effect on investment, but also firms’ behavioral investment response to stronger
borrowing incentives resulting from this dynamic.
1.5 Conclusion
This paper presents a new way of understanding the impact of defined benefit pensions on
firms’ finance and investment decisions that takes into account the interplay between pen-
sion obligations and traditional agency problems arising from debt finance. It shows that
well-understood concepts in finance may interact in unexpected ways when firms sponsor
a defined benefit pension. Contracting inefficiencies associated with a defined benefit pen-
sion lead to a departure from the indifference result of Modigliani-Miller (1958); a defined
benefit sponsor often prefers debt to equity finance, and contracting inefficiencies allow this
preference to affect the value of the firm by changing its investment incentives. Further, an
endogenous borrowing premium and decision, effective in reducing inefficiently risky in-
vestment decisions in many models,20 may be unsuccessful in aligning the decisions of the
20This model integrates risky investment in a way that is similar to Green (1983), but adds a step that
allows the lender to pass on the agency costs of debt to the borrower: an endogenous borrowing premium
and decision. As in Myers (1977), this borrowing premium encourages the firm to make socially optimal
investments.
27
defined benefit sponsor with the incentives of its external lender. The common perception
of the role of defined benefit pensions in corporate finance ignores the inefficiencies that
arise from this important interaction between external and pension debt.
The interplay between contracting inefficiencies associated with defined-benefit pen-
sions and conflicts of interest among stakeholders is unlikely to disappear, even as fewer
new workers are offered a defined benefit pension. Volatility in asset prices and interest
rates implies that the firm’s optimal funding decision is a careful balance of macroeco-
nomic expectations and regulatory incentives. Many firms that maintained well-funded
pensions in the 1990s support under-funded pensions in today’s macroeconomic environ-
ment. Other firms are terminating their defined benefit pension plans. A detailed literature
describes several possible reasons for employer termination of pension plans;21 this paper
suggests one more: contracting problems arising from the defined benefit pension mag-
nify the agency costs of debt. Termination can be costly, and firms that terminate tend to
be those with well-funded plans and substantial cash flow.22 This paper suggests that in-
vestment inefficiencies due to the defined benefit pension are more extreme among firms
that sponsor under-funded plans and contribute only the minimum required to their pension
account – a class of sponsors that is not terminating their pension plans.
The model presented in this paper suggests one mechanism to reduce inefficiencies as-
sociated with the defined-benefit pension: an actuarially-fair PBGC premium that includes
not only a risk adjustment that incorporates risk due to the allocation of pension assets –
a proposal that has been considered but set aside in recent policy discussions – but also a
risk adjustment that internalizes the downside consequences of risky investment decisions
the firm makes with general operating funds. Federal regulations that determine premiums,
managed by Congress rather than the PBGC, are often set to maximize objective functions
other than the optimal funding of the PBGC; a recent increase in premium rates, for exam-
ple, was passed as a budget offset in the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2013. Without a change
in this policy approach, employer-sponsored defined benefit pensions will remain a source
of inefficiency that decreases the payoff to firms that sponsor those pensions, as well as
generations of workers.
Millions of Americans continue to rely on employer-sponsored defined benefit pensions
in their retirement, and will for decades to come. Employers themselves maintain these
obligations, and fluctuations in the value of pension assets will influence firm decisions for
just as long. The transition from defined-benefit to defined-contribution pensions represents
21See, for example, Aaronson and Coronado, 2005; Rauh and Stefanescu, 2009; Kapinos, 2011.
22Terminating a pension plan required the firm to purchase annuities at market price for all accrued pension
liabilities. Market price tends to be higher than the price firms assume when calculating plan funding ratios.
Many firms are able to write down pension liabilities by offering lump-sum buyouts to their pensioners.
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a sea change in the American economy. Literature on household savings has recognized
that this transition has changed the way people manage and view their retirement security.23
It will also change the way employers make financing and investment decisions and support
their workers in retirement. While this dimension of the transition from defined-benefit to
defined-contribution has been largely ignored, these employer decisions are integral both to
the US economy and worker’s retirement security: a firm that that goes bankrupt because
the structure of its pension encourages it to make risky investment decisions will exert a
drag on the economy and be unable to support its workers in employment or retirement.




















◦ Conditional on b, E, B:
I + C ≤ B + E +X︸ ︷︷ ︸
Y
◦ Firm saves residual,
Y − I − C in safe asset
with return 1 + r.
Period 3:
◦ Firm realizes return on
investment zj
◦ Firm realizes return on pension
ρk
◦ Production: zjf(I),
zj = {zS , zF } with probability
{p, 1− p}, zS > zF
◦ Pension return: 1 + ρk,
ρk = {ρs, ρF } with probability
{`, 1− `}, ρs > ρF
◦ Firm is solvent if equation (1) is
satisfied.
◦ Lender and shareholders receive
payoff.
Notes. The model has three periods. The firm begins the first period with cash on hand X and an exogenous
position in the pension account: pension assets P and liabilitiesD. With full information, the firm and lender
know the expected realization of pension and production returns in period 3. These returns are independent
in the baseline model. In the first period, the firm raises equity E, and the lender offers loans requiring
repayment amount b conditional on the amount of equity the firm has raised and the loan size requested. The
firm borrows an amount B at rate bB , and cannot contract upon the distribution of funds in the second period.
In the second period, the firm distributes its funds across pension contributions, productive investment, and
a safe asset. In the third period, production and pension returns are realized. The firm goes bankrupt if it
cannot repay its lender with assets held in the firm and the claimable portion of pension assets.
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Figure 1.2: Approximation of the Firm’s Payoff From Pension in Period 3
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𝑘)(𝑃 + 𝐶0) = 𝐷 
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premium, which is a portion 𝜙 of 
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fee to re-claim pension 
assets.  $1 to the pension 
receives return 1 + 𝜌𝑘 less 
excise tax and fees 𝜒. 
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𝑃𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑆𝑢𝑟𝑝𝑙𝑢𝑠 − 𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑦 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡 
𝜇: 𝑑𝑒𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑖𝑛 𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑛𝑜𝑛 − 𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 
 
B. Functional approximation of firm’s payoff from pension 
(1 − 𝜙)(𝑃 − 𝐷) 
Notes. Figure describes firm’s payoff from its pension in period 3 when beginning period 1 with pension assets P and pension liabilitiesD, as a function of period-2
contributions C, if the firm avoids bankruptcy. Pension assets realize return ρ, but the firm also pays regulatory penalties that depend on the realized surplus or
deficit. If C is low and the pension is in deficit in the period 3, the firm pays a portion of the pension shortfall (D−P ) as the variable rate premium. If firm realizes
a pension surplus in the period 3, it pays an excise tax to re-claim pension assets. If the realized surplus is over 150% of liabilities, the firm loses its tax break on
pension returns. Regulatory penalties are modeled as a quadratic approximation, which is assumed to take into account the expected future pension payoff.
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1 + 𝑟 
𝐶 − Δ𝐶 
Notes. Optimal allocation to investment and pension contributions when firm saves in safe asset with return 1 + r; To do so, firm raised sufficient funds in 1st
period to invest and contribute to point where marginal return to pension contributions and investment is equal to return on safe assets, 1 + r. I∗S is socially optimal
level of investment when a firm signs a safe agreement and does not face moral hazard, while I∗R is the optimal investment for a firm that signs a risky agreement
and faces moral hazard. Firm signing risky agreement pays cost of over-investment through a higher borrowing rate. Because the pension and production returns
are independent, firms signing safe agreement (do not face moral hazard) and risky agreement (face moral hazard) both experience the upside and downside risk to
pension contributions. Both types of firms optimally contribute C¯ to pension. C¯ is contribution firms choose given exogenous regulatory constraints.
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Figure 1.4: Optimal Allocations When Firm Faces Constrained Funds
A. Constrained Allocation Under a Safe Agreement 
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B. Sponsor’s Payoff from Constrained Allocation Under Safe Agreement  
When Facing a Risky Agreement 
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C. Constrained Allocation Under a Risky Agreement  


















1 + 𝑟 + Δ𝑟𝑅 






Notes. Firm’s allocation under safe and risky agreements when the amount of funds raised in first period
cannot cover the interior solutions: Y ∗ < I∗S + C¯. A plots the constrained allocation for a firm facing a safe
agreement (ICS , C¯ −∆CS). In B, a firm facing a risky agreement would receive a higher marginal return to
investment than contributions at that allocation. Therefore, in C, firm invests a higher amount in production
and contributes less to the pension, (ICR , C¯−∆CR). When firm faces exogenous financing constraints, moral
hazard encourages it to invest closer to the social optimum, but does so at the expense of pensioners.
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Figure 1.5: Three Endogenous Financing and Allocation Decisions
S1. A firm that raises primarily equity will invest at the social optimum and contribute
at the firm’s optimum: (I∗S, C¯). The firm receives a marginal return of 1 + r on
investments, contributions, and the safe asset.
R1. A sponsor that raises primarily debt and faces a low cost to over-investment rela-
tive to the cost from under-contributing will over-invest and contribute optimally to
its pension: (I∗R, C¯). The firm receives a marginal return of 1 + r on investments,
contributions, and the safe asset.
R2. A sponsor that raises primarily debt and faces a high cost to over-investment will
endogenously constrain its period-2 operating funds to invest closer to the social
optimum and under-contribute to its pension plan: (I∗R −∆I, C¯ −∆C), where I∗S <
I∗R − ∆I < I∗R. The firm does not save in the safe asset, and receives a marginal
return on investments and contributions equal to the increase in the borrowing rate
resulting from borrowing an additional dollar: ∂bR
∂B
.
















1980 1990 2000 2010 2020
Year
Median Mean
Notes. Data drawn from Compustat. Sample includes all firms in Compustat for at least 10 years between
1976 and 2012, and either reported a pension in each year or never reported a pension. Independent pension
debt is all pension debt reported on the firm’s balance sheet. Non-Pension assets are all assets, cleansed of
pension assets according to the method in appendix D.
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CHAPTER 2
Pension Obligations and the Cost of Corporate
Debt
How does sponsoring defined benefit pensions influence firms’ cost of borrowing? Like
traditional corporate bonds, pension debt is a long-term liability that influences default risk
and firm value – two important determinants of bond spreads. Yet this paper suggests that
tax, regulatory, and agency incentives associated with pension obligations imply a sub-
stantially different impact of pension leverage on bond spreads than more standard forms
of leverage. In fact, a ten percentage point increase in unfunded pension liabilities raises
defined benefit firms’ bond spreads by 23 basis points, while an equivalent increase in
standard external leverage increases bond spreads by only 2.6 basis points.
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2.1 Introduction
Defined benefit pension obligations sponsored by private employers amount to over three
trillion dollars in the U.S. economy. These pension obligations offer firms a unique type
of borrowing: by under-funding their pension accounts, firms can borrow from their own
workers and pensioners. In the presence of frictions such as bankruptcy costs, taxes, and
agency problems, the financing structure of firms can influence the spreads they face on
corporate bonds. While existing literature has explored the impact of a wide range of
financing arrangements – including traditional debt, equity, and lines of credit – on firms’
bond spreads, it has largely ignored the role of unfunded pension obligations. This paper
fills that gap by asking how unfunded pension liabilities influence the spreads firms face on
corporate bonds.
In the standard trade-off theory of capital structure, bond spreads depend on firms’
capital structure. Firms choose their optimal leverage ratio by trading off the benefits
of external debt with its costs. Benefits of external debt include tax benefits (Kraus and
Litzenberger, 1973; Miller, 1977; Graham, 2000, 2006) and agency benefits from con-
trolling self-interested managers (Jensen, 1986), while its costs include direct bankruptcy
costs, debt overhang (Myers, 1977), and asset substitution (Jensen and Meckling, 1976).
Higher benefits of external debt lead to higher leverage ratios and bond spreads; higher
costs of external debt lead to lower leverage ratios and bond spreads.
Defined benefit pensions can affect both the costs and benefits of debt, in turn influenc-
ing the bond spreads pension firms face on corporate debt. Understanding the intricacies
of this relationship requires focusing not only on how pension debt is integrated into firms’
capital structure, but also how it influences their investment decisions. If pension leverage
and external leverage are perfect substitutes, a firm that maintains pension debt equal to 20
percent of its assets will face the same borrowing rate as a firm that maintains external debt
equal to 20 percent of its assets. Yet if market frictions associated with that pension debt
encourage the firm’s managers to make different investment decisions than they would with
only external debt, an increase in pension debt could have a different impact on corporate
bond spreads than an equivalent increase in external debt.
While sponsoring a defined benefit pension can allow firms to borrow from their pen-
sioners, pension funding regulations imply that pension debt is not, in fact, as flexible as
external debt. Pension assets are earmarked to pay future pension obligations and held in
a legally separate account. A combination of regulations on plan terminations and excise
taxes essentially prohibit firms from using assets held in the pension account for general
firm expenses. Firms can “borrow” from their pensioners by constraining the amount of
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money they contribute to their pension account. Just as firms are required to make interest
payments on external loans, firms are also required to make contributions to underfunded
pension accounts. Unlike interest payments, however, these contributions do not reflect the
investment risk of a firm; rather, they depend on the amount of pension liabilities that are
under-funded and the number of pensioners the plan covers. In this way, firms with under-
funded pension liabilities are borrowing from a lender (pensioners) that does not charge a
risk premium to internalize the consequences of risky investments.
How does this unique type of debt influence the borrowing rates that firms face from
traditional bondholders? Existing literature provides some theoretical insights to this ques-
tion. First, Treynor (1976) and Sharpe (1977) envision pension obligations to be analogous
to external debt: put options with longer maturities. Echoing Black and Scholes (1973) and
Merton (1974), this theory suggests that pension obligations will be valued like traditional
external debt and, by extension, have a similar impact on firms’ borrowing rates. Empirical
evidence on whether pension debt is empirically priced like external debt is mixed. Black
(1980) and Feldstein and Seligman (1981) find that pension debt is priced analogously to
traditional debt. These papers, however, used data from an earlier regulatory regime that
did, in fact, treat pension and external debt more alike. More recent papers (Coronado, et
al, 2007; Gold, 2005) find that pension obligations tend to be mis-priced, suggesting that
investors have different perceptions of pension debt and external debt.
More recent theoretical considerations highlight the impact of pension debt on the costs
and benefits of traditional external debt. Pension debt can be a tax shield: pension contri-
butions, exempt from the corporate tax, function as non-debt tax shield that decreases the
tax benefits associated with debt (D’Angelo and Masulis, 1980; Graham, 2006; Shivdasani
and Stefanescu, 2012). Shivdasani and Stefanescu (2012) estimate the tax savings associ-
ated with pension debt to be 2.1 percent of book assets; these savings translate to lower tax
benefits of debt, and could encourage firms to take on less debt at lower rates. Firms’ man-
agers may also have a different agency relationship with their pensioners than with their
bondholders. When managers internalize pensioners’ payoffs in bankruptcy – either due
to an innate sense of responsibility to their workers or because they are compensated with
defined benefit pensions (Sundaram and Yermack, 2007) – pension debt functions as inside
debt: higher levels of pension debt align managers’ interests with those of bondholders,
encouraging them to make investments consistent with bondholders’ interests, decreasing
agency costs of debt, and lowering the spread bondholders require. Choy et al. (2014)
explore this hypothesis and suggest that managers do, indeed, increase risk following a
decrease in pension debt associated with a freeze.
Alternatively, the agency relationship between managers and pensioners may mirror
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that between managers and bondholders. Yet regulatory structures preclude pensioners
from using the same tools – such as bond covenants and risk premia – that bondholders
use to manage agency costs. As a result, firms with pension debt equal to 20 percent of
its assets will make riskier investment decisions than firms with external debt equal to 20
percent of its assets. Traditional bondholders may recognize this incentive and raise spreads
accordingly (Lay, 2016).
This paper conducts a systematic analysis of four theories of the relationship between
pension debt and spreads on new bond issuances identified in existing literature. These
theories suggest viewing pension debt as (1) a substitute for external debt, (2) a non-debt
tax shield that lowers the tax benefits of debt, (3) inside debt that aligns managers’ interests
with those of bondholders, or (4) external debt with imperfect agency control mechanisms.
Section 2 uses a simple graphical exposition of the supply and demand of a firm’s debt
to describe each theory and translate these theories into testable empirical predictions. A
strict interpretation of the first theory suggests that a change in pension leverage will have
the same impact on firms’ bond spreads as an equivalent change in external leverage. The
second theory suggests that unfunded pension obligations decrease the tax benefits of debt
because pension contributions replace interest payments as corporate tax shields. The third
theory suggests that when pension debt functions as inside debt, higher pension debt will
encourage managers to make fewer inefficient private investments and, in turn, lower bor-
rowing rates. The fourth theory, viewing pension debt functions as outside debt without
internalized investment risk, suggests that firms with higher pension debt will take on more
external debt, make riskier investments, and face higher bond spreads on new issuances.
This paper uses two sources of data to explore the relationship between pension debt
and bond spreads for publicly-listed firms. Compustat, compiled from annual financial
statements of publicly-listed firms, describes the general financial status of a firm and re-
ports limited information on pension assets and liabilities. Deal Scan, a database of loans
constructed by the Loan Pricing Corporation (LPC), describes characteristics of loans to
large firms. These datasets are linked using the publicly-available Dealscan-Compustat
Link Data created by Michael Roberts and provide detailed information on a broad array
of potential determinants of bond spreads.
This paper examines the relationship between defined benefit pension obligations and
bond spreads in six steps. Section 2.2 discusses related literature. Section 2.3 describes four
theories of the interaction between defined benefit pension obligations and the cost of cor-
porate debt, and translates these theories into empirical predictions. Section 2.4 describes
relevant data from publicly-listed firms. Section 2.5 uses cross-sectional regressions to find
that an increase in pension leverage raises firms’ bond spreads almost 9 times more than
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an equivalent increase in external leverage. These findings support the view that pension
debt functions as external debt with imperfect agency control mechanisms. Section 2.6,
therefore, investigates a further prediction of the fourth model: increases in bond spreads
associated with pension debt are higher when firms face higher initial agency costs of ex-
ternal debt. Section 2.7 concludes.
2.2 Related Literature
This work is related to three strands of literature. First, the theory of capital structure in-
forms the understanding of how pension obligations influence bond spreads. Starting with
the seminal work by Merton (1974), a contingent-claims framework suggests that the bor-
rowing rate a firm faces is a function of the firm’s default risk and amount of funds available
to repay lenders in the event of default. Subsequent work has expanded this framework to
address the impact of frictions such as the tax benefits of debt (Graham, 2000), moral
hazard between manager and bondholders (DeMarzo and Fishman, 2007a), and agency
costs associated with asset substitution (Mello and Parsons, 1992; Leland, 1994). Each of
these expansions are critical in understanding how pension debt influences corporate bond
spreads.
A second strand of related literature investigates optimal contracting associated with
capital structure. Asvanunt, et al. (2011) suggest that credit lines may be a better mech-
anism than cash to manage liquidity because those credit lines are able to reduce agency
costs associated with principle-agent problems between the bondholder and manager. De-
Marzo and Sannikov (2006) similarly show that traditional loan commitments are an impor-
tant component of a firm’s capital structure because they manage moral hazard problems
between managers and bondholders. These papers are related to the current one in that
they emphasize that different capital structures will manage agency relationships, and thus
firms’ borrowing rates, in different ways. An important implication of the present paper
is that pension debt, an often overlooked component of firms’ financial structure, can ex-
acerbate some agency costs but minimize others. These behavioral effects associated with
sponsoring defined benefit pensions can have important impacts on firms’ borrowing rates.
Perhaps they, too, could be taken into account when considering the optimal capital struc-
ture of a firm that sponsors defined benefit pensions.
The final strand of literature related to the present paper investigates the determinants
of bond spreads. Collin-Dufrense et al. (2001) and Huang and Huang (2012) show that
variation in credit spreads cannot be fully explained by firm-level characteristics that are
traditionally used to proxy for default risk and firm solvency – the two factors that the
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contingent-claims framework predicts determine capital structure and borrowing rates. Sev-
eral papers work to explain this unexplained variation by considering factors that later
models predict to explain variation in bond spreads. By constraining managers’ behavior,
bond covenants have the potential to decrease agency costs associated with external bor-
rowing. Chava and Roberts (2008) and Bradley and Roberts (2015) find that, empirically,
certain bond covenants are associated with lower credit spreads. Information asymmetry
between lender and manager may also lead to higher borrowing rates; accordingly, Bharath
et al, (2009) find that firms with closer relationships to their lenders pay lower rates. Other
works have cited a variety of factors leading to lower bond spreads, including securitiza-
tion (Nedauld and Weisbach, 2012), operating in more competitive product markets (Valta,
2012), and lackluster corporate responsibility (Oikonomou et al., 2014). This paper ex-
plores one more factor – pension obligations – that may explain the difference in borrowing
spreads across firms.
2.3 Pension Leverage, External Leverage, and Bond Spreads
This section explores four theories of the relationship between pension debt and borrowing
rates: (1) pension debt as a put option that substitutes for external debt (Treynor, 1977;
Sharpe, 1976), (2) pension debt as a non-debt tax shield that lowers the tax benefits of
debt (D’Angelo and Masulis, 1980; Shivdasani and Stefanescu, 2012), (3) pension debt as
inside debt that aligns managers interests with that of bondholders (Choy, 2015), and (4)
pension debt as outside debt that magnifies existing agency costs of debt (Lay, 2016).
Each theory is described using a simple graphical exposition of the supply of and de-
mand for one firm’s new debt issuances. This graphical exposition distinguishes three
types of leverage. Pension leverage is the ratio of total unfunded pension liabilities to
non-pension assets, where unfunded pension liabilities are the present discounted value of
projected benefit promises less the market value of assets held in the firm’s pension ac-
count. External leverage is the ratio of traditional long-term debt held on the balance sheet
to non-pension assets. Finally, the legal separation between pension assets and general firm
assets motivates a non-traditional definition of total leverage: total leverage is the sum of
pension leverage and external leverage.1
1Pension obligations and assets are reported in firms’ financial statements in the footnotes. Total firm
assets and liabilities are adjusted through the cash flow statement to reflect year-to-year changes in the pension
account. Shivdasani and Stefanescu (2012) propose integrating pension liabilities through a consolidated
balance sheet approach. In contrast, the method in this paper considers unfunded pension liabilities to directly
add to total debt. Regressions control for the level of total pension obligations, discussed further in following
sections.
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To introduce this graphical framework, consider the demand for and supply of corporate
debt when a firm does not sponsor a pension in Figure 2.1a. S∗ represents the firm’s supply
of corporate debt, while D∗ represents investors’ demand for corporate debt issued by the
firm. The total amount of funds a firm raises through external debt and equity is fixed.
The horizontal axis represents the firm’s external leverage ratio: as a firm moves rightward,
debt finance increases relative to equity finance. The vertical axis represents returns to
the risk-neutral firm and investors. The convention in the corporate finance literature of
placing returns, rather than price, on the vertical axis implies that – unconventionally –
supply slopes down and demand slopes up. In a slight departure from this convention, the
vertical axis in this paper represents gross returns rather than risk-adjusted returns. In this
figure, the firm without a pension will select a leverage ratio L∗ and borrow at rate r∗. This
firm faces a spread over the risk-free rate of r∗ − rsafe.
The benchmark model in Figure 2.1a is built on several classic models of finance. Un-
der the assumptions of Modigliani and Miller (1958), the firm’s supply of and investors’
demand for corporate debt would be represented by overlapping horizontal lines at the safe
rate: with perfect markets, no taxes, no bankruptcy risk and no agency conflicts, the firm
is indifferent between debt and equity finance. Taking into account the tax exemption for
interest payments, the firm’s supply of corporate debt shifts up to a horizontal line at rsafe
1−τ ,
where τ is the corporate income tax: when interest payments are exempt from the corpo-
rate tax, the firm strictly prefers debt finance (Modigliani and Miller, 1963). However, as
corporate income is finite, this tax benefit of debt will decrease as leverage – and, therefore,
interest payments – increase. Taking into account tax carry-forwards and carry-backs, Gra-
ham (2000) suggests that the firm’s supply curve has a “kink” after which it slopes down:
the tax benefit of debt encourages debt finance to the extent that the firm has taxable income
to shield with interest payments. Further, when there is a conflict of interest between man-
agers and shareholders, the firm also faces an agency benefit of debt that shifts the supply
curve up and amplifies its downward curvature (Jensen, 1986): recurring interest payments
associated with debt prevent managers from using cash flow to fund projects with private
benefits. This agency benefit decreases marginally as the amount of debt, and therefore
level of recurring interest payments, increases. Finally, bankruptcy risk and conflicts of
interest between stockholders and bondholders lead to an upward curvature in investors’
demand for the firm’s debt (Greene, 1985; Myers, 1977). With low levels of leverage, the
firm faces little risk of bankruptcy and lenders lend to the firm at the risk-free rate, rsafe.
As leverage increases, the firm faces possible bankruptcy and the incentive to make invest-
ments that are riskier than those in the lender’s interest. The lender, setting the return so
that it receives the safe rate in expectation, raises the required borrowing rate and thus inter-
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nalizes this agency cost of debt to the firm (Greene, 1985; Myers, 1977). The combination
of these incentives motivate the shape of the benchmark demand and supply curves, D∗
and S∗, in Figure 2.1(a).
The following subsections use similar graphical analysis to describe each of the four
theories of pension debt and bond spreads listed above. The assumptions underlying each
theory differ in three important ways: how they capture current regulations facing firms
that sponsor defined benefit pensions, how pension debt influences firms’ default risk, and
whether managers interests align more closely with the pensioners or the stockholders.
Each subsection lays out these assumptions in describing the role of pension debt in de-
termining bond spreads. Throughout this analysis, consider the model presented in Figure
2.1(a) as the benchmark without pensions, and assume that the firm can finance with equity,
external debt, and pension debt. Three leverage ratios are of interest: external leverage is
the ratio of external debt (long-term bonds) to total assets, pension leverage is the ratio of
pension debt (unfunded pension liabilities) to total assets, and total leverage is the ratio of
the sum of pension and external debt to total assets.
2.3.1 Pension debt as a put option
Figure 2.1(b) describes the direct effect of pension debt on bond spreads when it is en-
visioned as a simple put option that does not affect tax benefits or agency relationships
(Sharpe, 1976). In this figure, total funds – equity, external debt, and pension debt – remain
fixed, but an increase in pension leverage increases total leverage and, in turn, increases
bond spreads. The red lines represent the supply and demand for the firm’s external debt
at different levels of pension leverage. The dashed line represents the firm with a pension
deficit, while the dotted line represents the firm with a pension surplus. External leverage
is fixed at each point on the horizontal axis, but pension leverage increases as the demand
curve shifts from D∗ to DputD and decreases as the demand curve shifts from D
∗ to DputS .
As a result, total leverage increases from D∗ to DputD and decreases from D
∗ to DputS .
Suppose the firm holds external debt equal to 20 percent of its assets and a pension
surplus equal to 5 percent of non-pension assets. This firm’s external leverage ratio is .2
and pension leverage ratio is -.05. Without further frictions, this pension surplus decreases
the total leverage ratio to .15. Relative to the firm without a pension in Figure 1(a), this
corresponds to a shift of the demand curve for external debt to the right by .05. The firm
with a pension surplus will borrow more externally at a lower interest rate. Now, suppose
the firm has a pension deficit equal to .05 percent of firm assets. This firm faces a total
leverage ratio of .25, and the demand curve for its external debt shifts to the left by .05:
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it will borrow less externally and face higher bond spreads in equilibrium. Assuming that
changes in pension debt do no influence the agency or tax benefits of external debt, the
supply of external debt does not shift with pension debt. As a result, this model suggests
that the firm’s borrowing rate increases with pension debt.
Figure 2.2(a) describes the indirect effect of pension debt on bond spreads when it is
envisioned as a simple put option. As in Figure 2.1, total funds in Figure 2.2 remain fixed
and the red lines represent the supply and demand for the firm’s external debt at different
levels of pension leverage.2 Unlike Figure 2.1, the horizontal axis represents total leverage
instead of external leverage. Since total leverage is fixed at each point on the horizontal
axis, the increase in pension leverage as the demand curve shifts fromD∗ toDputD coincides
with an equivalent decrease in external leverage. Analogously, the decrease in pension
leverage as the demand curve shifts from D∗ to DputD coincides with an equivalent increase
in external leverage. In Figure 2.2, therefore, movements from the non-pension supply and
demand curves, S∗ and D∗, to the pension supply and demand curves, SputD or S and D
put
D or S ,
represent changes in the composition of total leverage rather than changes in the level of
total leverage.
In the put option model, the firm makes the same investment choices when its total
leverage is fully comprised of pension leverage as it does when its total leverage is fully
comprised of external leverage: there is no behavioral response or indirect effect of pension
liabilities. Therefore, the firm faces the same bond spread and total leverage ratio with a
pension as it does without: D∗ = DputD = D
put
S and S
∗ = SputD = S
put
S . This interpreta-
tion of the put option model of pension liabilities relies on several important assumptions
that imply pension debt and external debt are perfect substitutes. First, it abstracts from
any effect that the maturity of debt may have on the costs or benefits of debt to the firm.
Second, it assumes that the impact of pension debt on default risk is the same as the im-
pact of external debt on default risk. Third, it assumes that agency relationships between
the manager and pensioner are the same as those between the manager and the bondholder.
These assumptions imply that substituting pension debt for external debt does not influence
the slope(b) of the supply or demand curve in Figure 2.1(a) and, as a result, there are no
indirect effects of pension leverage on the bond spread in Figure 2.2.
Regulations facing firms that sponsor defined benefit pensions likely undermine the va-
lidity of these assumptions. Pension assets are held in legally separate accounts that imply
that firms cannot borrow from their pensioners at will. Further regulations allow firms to
2In each subfigure of Figure 2.2, the dotted lines represent a pension surplus and the dashed lines represent
a pension deficit. Where the supply or demand curves for a firm with a pension surplus or pension deficit
overlap, they are dash-dotted.
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default on pension debt when the firm is in trouble without entering bankruptcy proceed-
ings. Finally, pensioners and bondholders are significantly different types of lenders that
have different mechanisms available to them to manage the firms’ investment decisions and
may have different agency relationships with the borrower.
2.3.2 Pension debt as a non-debt tax shield
The regulatory exemption of interest payments from the corporate income tax creates tax
benefits of external debt relative to equity financing (Modigliani and Miller, 1963). Pension
contributions are similarly tax exempt and may function as non-debt tax shields that lower
these tax benefits of debt (D’Angelo and Masulis, 1980; Shivdasani and Stefanescu, 2012).
Firms with higher pension debt make more tax-exempt contributions. By decreasing the
tax benefits of debt, pension debt could lead to lower equilibrium levels of external leverage
and lower bond spreads.
Figure 2.1(c) describes the direct effect of pension debt on the firm’s bond spread when
the firm enjoys a tax exemption on pension contributions. As in Figure 2.1(b), a pension
surplus will shift investors’ demand for external debt to the right, and a pension deficit will
shift the investors’ demand for external debt to the left. The tax benefits of debt accrue
strictly to the firm and, therefore, only affect the supply of debt. The reductions in the
tax benefits of debt are realized through tax exempt pension contributions; as a result, the
demand curve shifts to the left as expected pension contributions decrease the firm’s taxable
income. If the firm with a pension surplus does not plan to make pension contributions, then
the firm’s supply curve remains unchanged (Staxs = S
∗). A firm with a pension deficit, on
the other hand, likely plans to make contributions. The resulting tax shield lowers the firm’s
tax benefit of debt, shifting the supply curve from S∗ to Staxd . Positive pension contributions
associated with pension debt lead lower tax benefits of external debt and lower spreads on
external debt.
Figure 2.2(b) describes the indirect effect of pension debt on bond spreads, taking into
account the tax shield provided by pension contributions. Since this tax shield does not
influence investors’ demand for the firm’s external debt, the demand curve does not change
as a function of total leverage: D∗ = Dput. Similarly, when the firm has a pension surplus
and does not plan to contribute, there is no change in the supply curve as a function of
total leverage: S∗ = Sput = StaxS . However, when the firm plans to contribute to a plan in
deficit, the supply of external debt as a function of total leverage may differ from the supply
as a function of external leverage. If one dollar of pension debt implies more tax-exempt
lifetime payments than one dollar of external debt, pension debt decreases the tax benefits
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of external debt less than an equivalent increase in external debt. In this case, the firm with
a pension deficit faces supply S ′ in Figure 2.2. If one dollar of pension debt implies fewer
tax-exempt lifetime payments than one dollar of external debt, pension debt decreases the
tax benefits of external debt less than an equivalent increase in external debt. In this case,
the firm with a pension deficit faces supply S ′D in Figure 2.2. If one dollar of pension debt
implies more tax-exempt lifetime payments than one dollar of external debt, pension debt
decreases the tax benefits of external debt more than an equivalent increase in external debt.
In this case, the firm with a pension deficit faces supply S ′′D in Figure 2.2. If one dollar of
pension debt implies the same amount of tax-exempt lifetime payments as one dollar of
external debt, pension debt does not have an indirect effect on external debt and the firm
with a pension deficit faces supply Sput in Figure 2.2.
This interpretation relaxes one assumption made in the previous subsection to incor-
porate the tax exemption of pension contributions. In figures 2.1(c) and 2.2(b), pension
debt influences the tax benefits of debt. The preceding discussion remains agnostic on how
pension regulations may influence the level of lifetime pension payments incurred by one
dollar of pension debt relative to lifetime interest payments incurred by one dollar of exter-
nal debt. The following analysis, however, assumes that lifetime payments incurred by the
two types of debt are the same. This assumption reflects the fact that one dollar of pension
debt incurs the same present discounted value of obligations as one dollar of external debt
at the same maturity. It also eases exposition of the next theories of pension debt.
2.3.3 Pension debt as inside debt
In the theories discussed to this point, agency relationships between managers and pen-
sioners mirror those relationships between managers and bondholders. This assumption
implies that firms with pension leverage make the same investment decisions as firms with
an equivalent level of external leverage. The third theory relaxes this assumption. It posits
that pension debt is an important source of inside debt that aligns managers interests with
that of bondholders (Sundaram and Yermack, 2007; Choy et al., 2014). When firms fi-
nance with such inside debt, lenders are willing to accept lower spreads on their corporate
bonds (Anantharaman et al., 2011).3 Unfunded pension liabilities function as inside debt
when managers internalize realized payoffs to pensioners in bankruptcy. As these realized
payoffs are unsecured and similar to the payoffs debtholders realize in bankruptcy, pension
debt aligns managers’ interest with that of other debtholders. Managers may internalize
3This article shows that private lenders do in fact offer lower spreads when they see inside debt – they
recognize these incentive alignment effects.
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payoffs to pensioners in bankruptcy if they themselves are compensated with pensions, or
intrinsically care that pensioners receive their full promised pension payment.
The impact of this agency relationship on bond spreads functions through an indirect
effect: when the composition of leverage shifts toward pension debt, the agency benefits
and costs associated with external debt change in a way that encourages managers to make
different investment decisions. These different investment decisions, in turn, influence
the supply and demand for the firm’s debt. When pension debt functions as inside debt,
increases in pension leverage increase the manager’s incentive to maximize the value of
the firm in bankruptcy. This has two effects on the agency benefits and costs of external
debt. First, the agency benefits of debt payments in managing spendthrift managers will
decrease. Second, asset substitution arising from agency problems between stockholders
and debtholders also decreases: managers, maximizing the value to stockholders, make
less risky investments with more inside debt and debtholders accept lower bond spreads as
a result.
Figure 2.2(c) describes the impact of these effects on the supply of and demand for the
firm’s debt. Consider first the firm with a pension surplus. In bankruptcy, it can terminate
its pension and use surplus funds to repay debtholders. Its debtholders, in turn, expect
higher payouts in bankruptcy and will accept lower bond spreads. The demand for the
firm’s debt, relative to when it does not have a pension, shifts from D∗ to D1. At the same
time, the pension surplus ensures that pensioners will be fully repaid in bankruptcy and,
because the surplus pension is not inside debt, the agency benefits of external debt remain
unabated. The supply curve remains the same: SIDS = S
∗.
Suppose, instead, the firm faces a pension deficit. With a pension deficit, the payoff
to pensioners (and managers) depends on the value of the firm in bankruptcy. This deficit
functions as inside debt: managers are less likely to divert firm resources to self-interested
projects and make less risky investments to maximize the value of the firm in bankruptcy.
The agency benefits of external debt decrease (supply shifts down to SIDD ) and bondholders
are willing to accept lower rates (demand shifts right to DIDD ). This theory implies that as
leverage shifts toward pension debt and away from external debt, borrowing rates fall.
This interpretation of pension debt as inside debt makes two assumptions. First, it
assumes that one dollar of pension debt leads to the same tax exempt payments as one
dollar of external debt. Second, it assumes one particular form of the agency relationship
among managers, bondholders, and pensioners. The next section explores a situation in
which managers do not internalize pensioners’ losses in bankruptcy.
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2.3.4 Pension debt as external debt with imperfect agency control
Now suppose that managers view pension debt as traditional outside debt. Three regula-
tions associated with the pension account constrain these managers from using traditional
mechanisms to control agency costs when borrowing from pensioners. First, pension assets
are held in a legally separate account and cannot be claimed by other lenders in bankruptcy.
Second, required pension payments do not reflect the full downside risk associated with the
firms’ investment. And third, firms cannot make covenants with pensioners. These con-
tracting problems cause pension debt to magnify existing agency costs between stockhold-
ers and bondholders. As a result, firms with high pension debt pay higher bond premiums
to external lenders (Lay, 2016).
Figure 2.2(d) describes the impact of these regulations on the supply and demand for
a firm’s bonds. Suppose the firm sponsors a defined benefit pension that is in surplus.
The dotted line in Figure 2.2(d) represents this situation. A pension surplus decreases the
firm’s overall leverage ratio since those assets can be liquidated to repay external claimants,
increasing the expected return to lenders at any given level of leverage. These lenders,
operating in a competitive market, lower their demand for the firm’s debt from S∗ to SEDS .
As a result, the firm with a pension surplus will choose a higher level of debt at a lower
bond spread.
Suppose, instead, the firm has a pension deficit. First, consider the firm’s supply of
external debt. This firm does not have to repay pension liabilities in bankruptcy, and the
pensioners do not charge higher payments when the firm is solvent to internalize that cost
to the firm. As a result, the chance of bankruptcy – which rises with total leverage – is more
attractive, and the supply curve shifts to the right, from S∗ to SEDS . Next consider investors’
demand for the firm’s debt. When the firm holds pension debt, it faces a stronger incentives
to make investments that are riskier than socially optimal because the pensioners – not the
shareholders or managers – pay the downside risk. As a result, the firm will make riskier
investments. External lenders understand this incentive and correctly predict that the firm
assumes more investment risk, decreasing lenders’ expected return at any given interest
rate. Lenders, accordingly charge higher interest rates for high leverage levels, rotating
the demand curve upward to DEDD . Yet these higher interest rates do not fully reflect the
increased agency cost due to pension debt; pensioners absorb much of that risk. In Figure
2.2(d), the firm with positive pension debt maintains a higher leverage ratio than it would
without a pension, but also faces a higher spread, rd − rsafe > r∗ − rsafe.
This exposition relies on several assumptions. First, it assumes that pension leverage
and external leverage have the same impact on the tax benefits of debt. Second, it assumes
that there are no agency problems between the manager and the stockholder; as a result,
47
there are no agency benefits to debt. Finally, contrary to the inside debt theory, it supposes
that managers do not internalize low pension payouts received in bankruptcy.
2.3.5 Bond Spread Patterns in Each Theory
Each theory described above has different predictions for the relationship between bond
spreads and various types of leverage. Figure 2.3 takes two approaches to describing these
relationships for firms with and without pensions. In each figure, the vertical axis represents
the firm’s equilibrium interest rate determined by the intersection of supply and demand
for the firm’s external debt. Figures 2.3(a) and (c) hold fixed the firm’s total leverage ratio.
Movements along the horizontal axis correspond to increases in pension relative to external
leverage. Figures 2.3(b) and (d) allow total leverage to increase along the horizontal axis. In
2.3(b), external leverage increases while pension leverage remains fixed; in 2.3(d), pension
leverage increases while external leverage remains fixed.
Figure 2(a) describes the interest rate in a firm without a pension. As pension leverage
does not increase when the firm does not have a pension, the horizontal axis in this figure
is perfunctory and included only to establish a comparison for the firm with a pension.
Without a pension, the firm faces a bond spread of r∗ − rsafe. Figure 2(c) describes the
bond spread in a firm with a pension. Under the assumption that tax-free payments incurred
by one dollar of pension and external debt are equivalent, the first two theories predict that
pension and external debt are perfect substitutes. As a result, they predict a constant spread
of r∗ − rsafe for all levels of pension relative to external leverage (red/green line).
The other two theories allow agency frictions to influence the supply and demand for the
firm’s debt as pension debt changes relative to external debt. The third theory (orange line)
allows managers to have different agency relationships with their pensioners and external
bond holders. If pension debt is considered inside debt, bond spreads fall with higher levels
of pension leverage relative to external leverage: firms pay lower agency costs associated
with external debt when they maintain higher pension leverage. The final theory (blue
line) supposes that the agency relationship between managers and pensioners is similar to
that between managers and bondholders. However, pension regulations prevent pensioners
from effectively managing those agency problems. In this theory, higher pension relative to
external leverage leads to higher spreads on external bonds: firms pay higher agency costs
associated with external debt when they maintain higher pension leverage.
Figures 2.3(b) and (d) compare the relationship between external leverage and bond
spreads to the relationship between pension leverage and bond spreads in each theory.
Without a pension (Figure 2.3(b)), bond spreads rise as external leverage increases due
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to higher bankruptcy risk and agency costs. Figure 2.3(d) compares this rise in spreads to
the rise in spreads when pension leverage rises by an equivalent amount, keeping external
leverage fixed. Again, the theory of pensions as a put option suggests that bond spreads rise
at the same rate with pension leverage as they do with external leverage. Allowing for pen-
sion contributions to decrease the tax benefits of external debt (theory 2, green line), bond
spreads rise slower with pension debt than they do with external debt until the tax benefits
of debt are exhausted, when they begin to rise at the same rate. If managers internalize the
bankruptcy payoff to pensioners but not external bondholders (theory 3, orange line), bond
spreads rise at a slower rate with pension debt than with external debt. Finally, if managers
have the same agency relationships with pensioners and bondholders, but pensioners do not
have the full mechanisms available to internalize agency costs (theory 4, blue line), bond
spreads will rise faster with pension debt than with external debt. Table 2.1 summarizes the
main differences among the four theories.
Section 2.4 describes a group of publicly-listed firms with and without defined benefit
pensions, while section 2.5 translates these simple predictions into two descriptive regres-
sions. Figures (a) and (c) amount to holding total leverage fixed, but varying the percent of
pension leverage relative to external leverage. Figures (b) and (d) suggest comparing the
slope of bond spreads with respect to changes in pension leverage to that with respect to
changes in external leverage.
2.4 Publicly-listed firms: Data description
This section uses two sources of data to explore bond spreads for publicly-listed firms
with and without defined benefit pensions from 1990 through 2007. The sample analyzed
excludes financial and utilities firms (SIC codes 6000 through 6999 and 4900-4999). Com-
pustat, compiled from annual financial statements of publicly-listed firms, describes the
general financial status of a firm and reports limited information on pension assets and
liabilities. Deal Scan, a database of loans constructed by the Loan Pricing Corporation
(LPC), describes characteristics of loans to large firms. The two datasets are linked using
the Dealscan-Compustat Link Data, created by Michael Roberts, to investigate loan pricing
for firms with and without pensions.4
4The Dealscan-Compustat Link data is freely available through the Wharton Research Data Center
(WRDS) or on Michael Roberts’ website: http : //finance.wharton.upenn.edu/ mrrobert/styled −
9/styled− 12/index.html. The data is initially described in Chava and Roberts (2008)
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2.4.1 Sample selection
Table 2.2 describes selected balance-sheet indicators for firms with and without defined
benefit pensions. Firms are classified as sponsoring defined benefit pensions in each year
in which they report pension assets on their balance sheets. The full Compustat sample in-
cludes 13,012 firms, 2,944 of which report a defined benefit pension at some point between
1990 and 2007. This amounts to 97,601 firm-years with pensions and 37,617 firm-years
without pensions.
This table presents the three types of leverage described above: total leverage, exter-
nal leverage, and pension leverage.5 External leverage is the ratio of long-term debt to
non-pension assets. The book value of total assets reported on the balance sheet includes
adjustments for pension income and expenses reported on the cash-flow statement. The
measure of non-pension assets considered here is calculated as book assets cleansed of
these adjustments for pension income and expenses following Shivdasani and Stefanescu
(2012). Pension leverage is the ratio of unfunded pension liabilities to non-pension assets,
where unfunded pension liabilities is the projected benefit obligation less total pension as-
sets, both reported in the footnotes of firms’ 10-ks. To display the full variation, pension
leverage is multiplied by 100 in Table 2.2. Publicly-listed firms with and without defined
benefit pension supported similar total leverage ratios on average: .29 versus .27. At the
median, however, total leverage was substantially higher among pension firms than non-
pension firms: .25 versus .13. External leverage was lower at the mean and higher at the
median among firms with pensions than without, suggesting that the distribution of exter-
nal leverage among firms with pensions was more concentrated than the distribution among
firms without pensions. Pension firms face an average surplus in their pension accounts of
1.8 percent of total non-pension assets. The fact that total leverage is similar to external
leverage reflects the fact that pension debt is small relative to external debt. Firms with
defined benefit pensions in the full Compustat sample tend to be more likely to be rated,
larger, have more tangible assets, lower market-to-book ratios, and lower profitability than
their counterparts without pensions.
Deal Scan, a database of loan facilities viewed at their issuance date, describes spreads
firms face on corporate bonds. Deal Scan covers between 50 and 75 percent of all com-
mercial loans issued between 1988 and 2009 (Bharath, et al., 2009). Included loans can
be classified as long-term loans, short-term loans, or standard lines of credit according the
Deal Scan description of loan type. The ultimate sample includes 261,428 loans issued
from 1990 through 2007. The last column of Table 2.2 describes these loans: overall, these
5Appendix A describes variables and the procedure used to clean balance sheet data of pension assets.
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loans had an average loan amount of $195 million, and average maturity of 57 months.
Seven percent were rated, 18 percent secured, and 45 percent long-term loans. The main
outcome variable of interest in this study is the “all in drawn spread” provided in Deal
Scan. This variable, referred to as Spreadift throughout this paper, is the mark-up on the
loan over the market interest rate that matches the loan maturity (such as LIBOR). The av-
erage spread on the long-term and short-term loans in the sample is 227 basis points, while
the median is 225 basis points.
The linked sample includes 47,832 unique facilities, 23,300 of which are issued by firms
without pensions and 24,532 of which are issued by firms with pensions. This amounts to
23,156 firm-years in total, 11,192 of which are issued to firms sponsoring pensions. Table
2.2 compares main firm and loan-level characteristics of the matched and unmatched data
for defined benefit and non-defined benefit firms. The differences between pension and
non-pension firms described earlier are not as striking in the matched data as in the full
Compustat sample. Pension and non-pension firms have similar levels of total and external
leverage in the matched sample. Pension leverage, external leverage, and total leverage
are all higher, on average, than the full Compustat sample. Matched pension and non-
pension firms are also more similar in terms of tangibility and market-to-book ratio than
in the full Compustat sample.6 The matched facilities for non-DB firms are similar in
maturity but tend to be smaller in amount and have higher spreads, on average, than those
facilities matched in DB firms. This is consistent with the finding that matched non-DB
firms tend to be smaller than matched DB firms. The next section controls for a variety of
firm and facility-level factors, other than differences in leverage, that could account for this
systematic difference in bond spread.
2.4.2 Sample characteristics
Table 2.3 describes firm and facility characteristics of the main analysis sample in 1990,
1998, and 2007. The bond spread (Spread) is the facility-level outcome variable of interest
in the analysis below while the various leverage ratios are the explanatory variables of
interest. Consistent with the fact that non-pension firms tend to be smaller than pension
firms, they also face higher bond spreads overall. In 1990, non-pension firms faced an
average spread of 263 basis points – 40 percent higher than the average spread facing
pension firms (189 basis points). This difference maintained throughout the sample period,
though bond spreads fell for both types of firms. This difference in spreads may be a result
of consistent differences between the two types of firms (firm size, market-to-book ratio).
6As Deal Scan covers mostly large loans, so the link matches the largest of both defined benefit and
non-defined benefit firms.
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Alternatively, it could be a result of different firm behavior due to their respective capital
structures.
The table reflects a general pattern of rising pension debt in the U.S. economy. Average
pension leverage increased among pension firms in the matched sample, from .07 percent
of firm assets to 1.29 percent of firm assets, between 1990 to 2007. The median level
of pension obligations increased from 25 to 281 billion over this time. The basic trends
presented in this table show some evidence that pension firms may have maintained similar
levels of total leverage by decreasing non-pension debt over this period. Prior to 2007, both
pension and non-pension firms maintained similar levels of non-pension debt. By 2007,
pension firms had lower levels of external debt and total leverage than their non-pension
counterparts. Figure 2.4 reinforces the pattern of rising pension burden. This figure shows
a scatter plot of pension leverage versus total leverage in 1990, 1998, and 2007. While
total leverage ratios were largely similar across these three years, pension leverage was
more likely to be positive in 2007 than in 1990 or 1998. In 2007, in fact, most firms had
pension deficits.
Figure 2.5 compares the distribution of two measures of leverage – external and con-
solidated – aggregated over three illustrative categories of support for all publicly-listed
firms that sponsor and do not sponsor defined benefit pensions in 1990, 1998, and 2007.
The graphs on the left (a,c,e) plot the ratio of external debt to non-pension assets while
the graphs on the right (b,d,f) plot the ratio of total long-term debt (external and pension)
to total assets (on-balance sheet and pension). Each bar represents the fraction of pension
(navy bars) or non-pension (light blue bars) firms with leverage ratio in one of the follow-
ing categories: equal to zero, above zero but below .5, and over .5. These figures suggest
that the aggregate distribution of the external debt ratio is more concentrated among firms
with pensions: in 1990, for example, DB firms are seven percent less likely than their
non-DB counterparts to hold zero debt and 10 percent less likely to hold debt ratios above
.5. Consolidated leverage ratios among pension firms are similarly more concentrated than
leverage ratios among non-pension firms. The graphs on the right show that pension firms
are between eight and 30 percent less likely to have zero debt, and between zero and five
percent less likely to have debt ratios above .5, once pension liabilities are taken into ac-
count in 1990. A similar pattern arises within industry – in industries in which in which
defined benefit pensions are common (manufacturing and transportation), and in industries
in which defined benefit pensions are less common (services and retail trade).
Table 2.3 also describes firm-level and facility-level variables that are often considered
to influence the cost of debt. Non-pension firms tend to be smaller with higher book-to-
market ratios than their counterparts with pensions, though both types of firms grow from
52
1990 to 2007. Non-pension and pension firms have similar levels of tangibility, interest
coverage, and distribution of current assets. Throughout the sample, non-pension firms
are less likely to be rated. In 1990, non-pension firms took out smaller loans at shorter
maturities than firms with pensions. This difference in maturity declined by 2007, but the
difference in loan size remained.
2.5 Empirical tests for each theory of borrowing rates
This section lays the empirical groundwork to describe the basic relationship between
spreads and three types of leverage – total leverage, pension leverage, and external leverage.
The two specifications explored in sections 2.5.1 and 2.5.2 reflect the graphical expositions
in Figures 2.3(d) and (c), respectively. Strahan (1999) describes the standard issuance-level
regression to investigate the determinants of bond spreads:
Spreadift = βLeverageit + γFacility Controlsift + µFirm Controlsit + δj + δt (2.1)
In specification 3.1, i indexes the firm, f indexes the debt issuance, j indexes the in-
dustry, and t indexes the year the facility was issued. Facility controls include the loan
amount, maturity, and an indicator for whether the loan is secured. Lenders often use these
characteristics of the loan contract, in concert with the spread, to manage agency problems
with the lender. Larger loans with higher maturity tend to have lower spreads, as lenders
are willing to lend more to firms with less bankruptcy risk (Strahan, 1999). Secured loans
also face lower spreads. Firm controls include firm size, profitability, tangibility, market-
to-book ratio, interest coverage and ratio of current assets to current liabilities.
Two variables are of particular interest in testing the predictions of the theories laid out
in the previous section: the issuance-level spread, Spreadift, and the firm-level leverage,
Leverageit. In the traditional specification, β is predicted to be positive: a firm faces a
higher spread over the risk-free rate for new debt issues when it has higher leverage. In a
contingent-claims framework, higher leverage increases the probability of bankruptcy and,
therefore, the rate of return an investor requires to break even. Several papers, measuring
leverage as balance sheet leverage, highlight that this basic regression does not capture all
variation in bond spreads (Collin-Dufrense, et al., 2001; Huang and Huang, 2012; Strahan,
1999). This paper adds to that literature by exploring whether the composition of total debt
is informative.
Table 2.4 describes the results from specification (3.1) using five different measures of
leverage: net leverage, consolidated leverage, total leverage, external leverage, and pen-
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sion leverage. All columns restrict the regression to long-term debt facilities. The first five
columns present the results from specification (3.1) without modification, while the last
three columns include the log magnitude of pension liabilities in the regression of spreads
on various measures of leverage that account for pension debt. In all cases, as expected,
the spread rises with leverage. An increase in the net leverage ratio from 0 to 1 translates to
an increase in the long-term spread of 23 basis points. An interpretation of this coefficient
that is, perhaps, more realistic suggests that a 10 percentage point increase in balance-sheet
leverage is associated with an increase in the long-term spread of 2.3 basis points. The
coefficient estimates on external leverage and total leverage, columns (2) and (3), are sta-
tistically similar to this estimate on net leverage. The coefficient estimates on consolidated
and pension leverage, on the other hand, are both statistically higher; spreads increase by
3.82 basis points when consolidated leverage increases by 10 percentage points, and by
22.4 basis points when pension leverage increases by 10 percentage points (columns 4 and
5).
The higher estimates associated with measures of leverage that account for pension debt
could reflect a variety of factors, including the theoretical relationships described in the pre-
vious section. One factor associated with the pension account that could influence spreads
but is not captured by those theoretical relationships is the magnitude of pension liabilities.
Firms with the same amount of unfunded pension liabilities may have different levels of to-
tal pension obligations. Conditional on the level of unfunded liabilities, higher total pension
obligations will impose more risk on debtholders: firms with more total pension obligations
will face higher future unfunded pension liabilities if they suffer percentage declines in the
market value of pension assets. The higher coefficients on the leverage measures in models
(1-Net) and (4-Consolidated) support the hypothesis that pension obligations introduce this
additional risk. 7 The theoretical relationships described above, however, abstract from this
dimension of risk associated with the pension account and focus on the difference between
pension and external leverage. Empirical tests of those relationships, therefore, must con-
trol for risk associated with the magnitude of pension liabilities and distinguish pension
and external leverage.
Models (6) through (8) explore the impact of controlling for total pension obligations
on leverage coefficient estimates in Table 2.4. Reflecting the potentially non-linear relation-
ship between the magnitude of pension obligations and risk incurred, these models include
the log value of pension obligations. The magnitude of pension obligations is positively
7In fact, these differences highlight one of the key arguments for using consolidated rather than net lever-
age to capture risk introduced by pension accounts (Shivdasani and Stefanescu, 2012): consolidated leverage
captures the risk introduced by exposure to asset market fluctuations through the pension account.
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correlated with spreads in models (6) through (8), but the impact of including pension obli-
gations on the coefficient estimate of leverage differs slightly in each model. In model (6),
a ten percent increase in pension obligations is associated with a 7.4 basis point increase
in spread, but the coefficient on total leverage does not differ between models (3) and (6).
In these models, the coefficient on total leverage is primarily identified with variation in
external leverage, rather than pension leverage. The average ratio of pension to external
leverage among firms with pensions is .08; pension leverage is a much smaller component
of total leverage than external leverage. In model (7), a ten percent increase in pension
obligations is associated with a 6.5 basis point increase in spread, and the coefficient on
consolidated leverage is 2 basis points smaller in model (7) than in model (4). Consoli-
dated leverage captures both pension debt (unfunded pension liabilities) and risk due to the
exposure to asset market fluctuations (total pension obligations). Separately controlling for
pension obligations therefore decreases the coefficient estimate on consolidated leverage,
bringing it more in line with coefficient estimates on total or external leverage. In model
(8), a ten percent increase in pension obligations is associated with a 5.6 basis point in-
crease in spread, and the coefficient on pension leverage is 13 basis points smaller in model
(8) than model (5). Again, pension leverage includes variation in both pension debt and
market exposure due to the magnitude of pension obligations; as a result, controlling for
total obligations decreases the coefficient estimate on pension leverage. The specifications
in the following subsections control for log pension liabilities so that coefficients on lever-
age are primarily identified with variation in external and pension leverage, rather than
market exposure through the pension.
Despite the decidedly stronger relationship between pension leverage and spreads than
between external leverage and spreads, pension leverage is a much smaller component of
total leverage. A firm in the 90th percentile of pension debt maintains a pension leverage
ratio of .08, while a firm in the 95th percentile of external leverage maintains a external
leverage ratio of .87. Figure 2.6 compares the impact on spreads of moving from the 25th to
75th percentile of pension and external leverage. A pension firm that increases its pension
leverage from the 25th to 75th percentile (from a surplus equal to 2 percent of non-pension
assets to a deficit equal to 2 percent of non-pension assets) increases their bond spread by
8.68 basis points. This is equivalent to a 5.5 percent increase in spread for a pension firm
with the average spread in 2007. A pension firm that increases its external leverage from
the 25th to the 75th percentile (from 16 to 41 percent of total assets) would increase its
spread by 6.45 basis points, or 4.1 percent of the average spread in 2007. Therefore, while
an increase in pension leverage is associated with a increase in spread about 9 times larger
than an equivalent increase in external leverage, the overall impact of pension leverage
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and external leverage on spreads are much more comparable. The differential impact of
equivalent levels of pension and external debt, however, suggests that external investors do
not equally value the two types of leverage. With this in mind, the next subsection turns
to some more direct comparisons of the relationships among pension leverage, external
leverage, and bond spreads.
The graphical analysis in section 2.3.5 suggests two modifications of this regression
to distinguish the relationship between pension debt and bond spreads. Figure 2.3(d) sug-
gests comparing the change in bond spread associated with a change in pension debt to
the change in bond spread associated with an equivalent change in external debt. Figure
2.3(c) suggests looking at the change in bond spread as pension leverage increases relative
to external leverage, when the firm’s total leverage ratio is fixed. The following subsections
consider these specifications in turn.
2.5.1 Specification 1: Direct comparison of response to pension lever-
age and external leverage
The following modification of specification 3.1 compares the relationship between external
debt and bond spreads with that between pension debt and bond spreads.
Spreadift =β1External Leverageit + β2Pension Leverageit + αPension Obligationsit
+ γFacility Controlsift + µFirm Controlsit + δj + δt
(2.2)
The put-option model of pension leverage predicts that the well-documented positive
relationship between balance-sheet leverage and bond spreads will also exist between pen-
sion debt and borrowing rates. Further, if pension leverage incurs the same level of tax-free
payments and does not encourage managers to choose investments differently than they
would with an equivalent level of external leverage, the coefficients on pension debt and
external debt in specification 3.2 should be equal: β1 = β2.
However, two other theories presented in this paper – (3) pension debt as inside debt and
(4) pension debt as external debt – suggest that, taking into account regulatory incentives
and agency relationships associated with a pension account, pension leverage will induce a
different behavioral response among managers than external leverage. If the pension debt
aligns managers interests with bondholders, and the incentives associated with this inside
debt and the tax benefits of debt dominate, then β2 < β1: pension debt corresponds to a
smaller increase in spread than external debt. The firm with higher inside debt associated
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with the pension will make investment decisions more in line with the interest of the lender
and, therefore, face lower agency risk and spreads. Alternatively, if managers view pension
debt similarly to external debt but respond to the different regulatory incentives associated
with pension debt, then β2 > β1: pension debt corresponds to a larger increase in spreads
than external debt. The firm with more pension debt, the payments of which do not in-
ternalize the downside risk to their investments, will make riskier investments, leading to
higher agency risk and higher spreads.
Models (1) through (5) in Table 2.5 explore this specification for spreads on long-term
bonds. Each model includes industry and year fixed effects, the facility and firm controls
described in the previous section, and log pension obligations. Model (3) estimates that a 10
percentage point increase in external leverage, or 31 percent of the average external lever-
age among pension firms in 2007, is associated with a 2.7 basis point increase in spread.
This is equivalent to an increase in spread of 1.2 percent for a firm facing the average long-
term spread among pension firms in 2007. An analogous 10 percentage point increase in
pension leverage, or 800 percent of the average pension leverage among pension firms in
2007, leads to a 21.7 basis point increase in bond spread, or 9.7 percent of the average
spread among pension firms in 2007. The correlation between pension and external lever-
age is potentially large. Models (1) and (2) test the relationship between these measures
and bond spreads separately and find similar coefficient estimates, suggesting limited bias
in Model(3). In Model (5), the coefficient on the interaction term between external lever-
age and an indicator of whether the firm sponsors a defined benefit pension is insignificant,
suggesting that bond spreads respond the same to external debt in pension firms as they do
in non-pension firms. This supports the argument that the impact of structural differences
due to sample selection on coefficient estimates associated with leverage are small.
A higher response in bond spreads to pension debt relative to external debt supports
the agency theory that managers view pension debt as similar to external debt rather than
inside debt. It does not, however, rule out that pension contributions lower the tax benefits
of debt and contribute toward lower bond spreads. Model (4) interacts external leverage
with pension leverage, and shows that the stronger role of pension debt dominates at high
levels of external debt. Tax benefits of debt are smaller when firms have higher levels of
leverage. Also, firms with higher leverage likely have stronger agency problems initially:
with higher levels of external debt, firms face a higher chance of bankruptcy and a stronger
incentive to make risky investments. Pension debt, in the fourth theory, magnifies existing
agency costs of debt.
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2.5.2 Specification two: Examination of the behavioral response
Figure 2.3(b) suggests that the four models of pension leverage and bond spreads can be
distinguished by considering the impact of increasing pension leverage relative to external
leverage, holding total leverage constant:
Spreadift =β3Total Leverageit + β4PctPenDebtit + αPension Obligationsit
+ γFacility Controlsift + µFirm Controlsit + δj + δt
(2.3)
This specification assumes that the direct relationship between pension leverage and
bond spreads is the same as the direct relationship between external leverage and bond
spreads; echoing Modigliani-Miller (1958), the firm is indifferent among types of financ-
ing. However, agency relationships and regulations facing firms that sponsor defined bene-
fit pension may encourage firms to make different investment decisions when their debt is
tilted toward pension debt rather than external debt. PctPenDebtit – the percent of all debt
that is pension debt – captures the impact of those differences in investment decisions for
pension and external debt on long-term spreads. In Modigliani-Miller (1958), β4 = 0. If
β4 > 0, agency effects associated with outside pension debt dominate, encouraging firms
to make riskier investments when their leverage ratios shift toward pension debt; if β4 < 0,
the agency effects associated with inside pension debt dominate, encouraging firms to make
less risky investments when their leverage ratios shift toward pension debt.
Models (6) through (9) in Table 2.5 explore this specification in detail. Similar to
previous estimates of the impact of external leverage on spreads, each specification shows
estimates of β3 between 26 and 30 basis points: a 10 percentage point increase in total
leverage leads to an increase in bond spread between 2.5 and 3 basis points. Model (7) in
Table 2.5 shows that β4 > 0: increasing the percent of total debt that is pension debt by
one percentage point would increase long-term spreads by 4.89 basis points. The average
pension firm holds 8 percent of its total debt as pension debt; therefore, increasing the ratio
of pension to total debt by 12.5 percent of the mean leads to a 4.89 basis point increase
in long-term spread. Again, investment incentives consistent with the theory that pension
debt is external debt with imperfect agency control mechanisms dominate. As in section
2.5.1, higher spreads associated with pension debt are primarily seen at higher levels of
overall debt – levels at which agency costs are higher and tax benefits associated with
debt are lower. Model (8), where the coefficient on the interaction between total leverage
and percent of leverage that is pension debt is positive, presents this result. Further, total
leverage, again, has the same relationship with long-term spreads for pension firms as it
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does for non-pension firms (Model 9).
2.6 Agency costs and pension leverage: long-term versus
short-term spreads
Both of the above tests are consistent with the hypothesis that the indirect effect of pen-
sion debt leads to higher bond spreads than non-pension debt: the external debt incentives
dominate the inside debt incentives. This section explores, in greater detail, predictions as-
sociated with the theory that considers pension debt as external debt with imperfect agency
control mechanisms.
The extent of the agency problem between lenders and borrowers influences the rate at
which bond spreads rise with pension leverage. Firms with pension debt shift a portion of
the downside risk associated with investments onto pensioners, encouraging those firms to
make riskier investments than they would without pension debt. When the firm has more
opportunities to make risky investments (non-contractible risk) –that is, higher agency cost
without a pension – it will take on more investment risk than it would with lower non-
contractible risk at an equivalent level of pension debt. While pensioners do not raise rates
to reflect this risk, external lenders do. In this way, pension debt magnifies existing agency
costs between a firm and its external lenders.
This theoretical dynamic suggests that borrowing rates should rise more quickly with
pension debt when the existing agency costs between stockholders and bondholders are
larger. One indicator of the level of agency costs between stockholders and bondholders is
the maturity of the loan: due to the length of the exposure, long-term lenders assume more
risk associated with bankruptcy than short-term lenders. Table 2.6 replicates the results
from the cross-sectional regressions presented in Table 2.5, but including only short-term
loan facilities in the sample. As described section 2.5.1, theory 4 predicts that β2 > β1 > 0:
spreads on short-term bonds rise faster with pension debt than external debt. Further, as
short-term debt is associated with lower agency risk, this theory predicts that the estimates
of β2 in Table 2.6 should be smaller in magnitude than those in Table 2.5.
Table 2.6 is consistent with these predictions. The positive association between short-
term spreads and pension debt is stronger than that between short-term spreads and external
debt: a ten percentage point increase in pension leverage is associated with an increase
of 7.2 basis points in the bond spread, but an equivalent increase in non-pension leverage
corresponds to an increase of only 2.2 basis points. This increase in short-term bond spread
associated with a 10 percentage point increase in pension leverage is 5 basis points larger
59
than the increase in short-term bond spread associated with a 10 percentage point increase
in non-pension leverage. In comparison, this difference is almost 20 basis points in Table
2.5. In the alternative interpretation captured by specification 2.3, the ‘behavioral response’
on short-term rates, captured in specification (8), is an increase of 13.1 basis points, rather
than 48.9 basis points for long-term rates. These findings suggest that spreads associated
with long-term bonds that have higher agency costs tend to be more responsive to pension
debt relative to external debt than spreads associated with short-term bonds that have lower
agency costs.
One potential concern arising from the comparison of long-term to short-term bond
spreads is selection bias: perhaps short-term and long-term bonds are issued by funda-
mentally different firms. Strahan (1999) finds that lenders are, in fact, more likely to offer
short-term loans to smaller firms with higher default risk. The shorter maturity requires
firms to renew their bonds more frequently, allowing lenders to limit their risk exposure
and strengthen their ability to monitor riskier borrowers. As a result of this phenomenon,
agency risk associated with the long-term loan agreements in Table 2.5 and short-term loan
agreements in Table 2.6 differs because of sample selection as well as loan maturity. The
resulting differences in coefficient estimates associated with pension leverage reflect both
proxies for agency risk.
2.7 Conclusion
This paper explores the relationship among pension leverage, external leverage, and bond
spreads. Pension debt is a type of borrowing that firms can use to finance investments and,
like traditional borrowing, requires payments throughout the lifetime of the loan. Previous
literature has highlighted that exposure to market fluctuations through pension assets intro-
duces risk in the level of pension payments defined benefit firms must make at any given
time, and this risk induces higher spreads on new loans. This paper highlights another way
in which sponsoring a defined benefit pension influences firms’ loan spreads: unfunded
pension liabilities influence firms’ financing and investment incentives by introducing new
agency conflicts and affecting tax burdens. Therefore, differences in spreads due to pension
accounts also reflect differences in financing and investment risk.
This paper uses bond-level empirical analysis to show that pension leverage, separately
from the magnitude of pension obligations, is associated with higher bond spreads than
equivalent levels of external leverage. A 10 percentage point increase in pension debt is
associated with a 22 basis point increase in bond spread, while an equivalent increase in
external debt is associated with a 2.7 basis point increase in spread. Increasing pension
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leverage from the 25th to 75th percentile increases long-term spreads by 8.7 basis points,
while increasing external leverage from the 25th to 75th percentile increases long-term
spreads by only 6.5 basis points – despite the fact that the increase in pension leverage
would be much smaller than the increase in external leverage, as a percent of non-pension
assets. This finding suggests that external lenders view pension debt to be significantly
more risky than other external debt. This is consistent with a theory in which managers
view pension debt as external debt rather than inside debt. While market mechanisms, such
as bond covenants or maturity limitations, enable firms to lower agency costs associated
with conflicts of interest between debtholders and stockholders, those mechanisms are un-
available to firms trying to lower agency costs associated with conflicts of interest between
debtholders and pensioners.
In a decision representative of the burden that sponsoring defined benefit pension plans
exerts on firms, General Motors offloaded $26 billion worth of pension obligations by pur-
chasing private annuities for 76,000 salaried employees in 2012. Many observers cite the
payment risk associated with large pension obligations to be the motivating factor for this
decision.8 This paper suggests that these pension obligations had a further cost: they in-
creased the cost of external corporate debt. This increase in cost is due not only to payment
risk, but also to changes in investment incentives associated with unfunded pension obliga-
tions. In the year that General Motors made this decision, pension firms maintained average
unfunded pension liabilities equal to 6.3 percent of total non-pension assets. Estimates in
this paper suggest that a firm with that level of pension debt could borrow externally to
fully fund its pension and decrease its bond spread by 12 basis points, or 6.8 percent of
average long-term spreads facing pension firms. Perhaps it was not only payment risk, but
also decreases it the cost of corporate debt that encouraged General Motors to make the
largest one-time annuity purchase in history.
8See, for example, http : //www.pionline.com/article/20120822/ONLINE/120819895/mixed −
opinions− on− gms− plan− to− transfer − 29− billion− to− prudential
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Figure 2.1: Direct Effects of Pension Debt on the Supply and Demand for External Debt





















































Notes. Figure shows supply and demand of debt for one individual firm. Interest rate (not risk-adjusted), on
the vertical axis, is rate at which firms can take out new external loans. Total funds (external and pension debt
plus equity) remains fixed, but external debt increases along the horizontal axis. S∗ and D∗ are supply and
demand for the firm’s debt when it does not sponsor a pension. r∗ and L∗ represent firm’s interest rate and
total leverage when it does not have pension. Colored lines are supply and demand of the firm’s debt when it
has a pension surplus (dotted) or a pension deficit (dashed), conditional on external debt. rD and rs represent
the rates at which firm can issue new debt when it has a pension deficit and a pension surplus. BD(x) refers
to the agency benefits of debt when external leverage is equal to x; benefits decrease in external leverage.
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Figure 2.2: Indirect Effects of Pension Debt on the Supply and Demand for the External
Debt





































































Notes. Supply of and demand for a firm’s external for given level of total funds (External debt, pension debt,
and equity), according to three theories. Firm’s external debt ratio is on the horizontal axis and the return,
not risk-adjusted, to the firm or lender is on the vertical axis, leading to an unconventionally upward sloping
demand curve and downward sloping supply curve. Grey lines represent supply S∗ and demand D∗ for the
firm’s debt when it does not sponsor a pension: a firm without pension borrows at rate r∗. Dotted lines
represent demand DXS and supply S
X
S for a firm’s debt when the firm has a pension surplus. The superscript
X refers to the theory of interest. Dotted lines represent demand DXD and supply S
X
D for firm’s debt when it
has low pension debt. The lines are dash-dotted where the supply or demand for debt in a surplus or deficit
firm overlap.
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Figure 2.3: Interest Rates Facing Firms With and Without Pensions
(a) Fixed Total Leverage (b) Increasing Total Leverage













(c) Fixed Total Leverage (d) Increasing Total Leverage







Pension debt as 
inside debt
Pension debt as 
outside debt
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Pension debt as 
outside debt
Pension debt as put option
Notes. Describes the potential impact of sponsoring a defined benefit pension on a firm’s external leverage
and borrowing rate. Figures (a) and (c) assume that the total leverage ratio is fixed. In Figure (a), the
composition of the firm’s debt is constant because the firm does not have pension debt. In Figure (c), the
firms pension debt accounts for more of the firm’s total debt moving along the horizontal axis. In Figure (b),
external debt increases along the horizontal axis. In Figure (d), pension debt increases by the same amount
along the horizontal axis, but external debt remains fixed. Graph (c) reflects the second specification while
Graph (d) reflects the first.
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Notes. This figure is a scatter plot of pension leverage versus total leverage in four years for firms in the
matched sample. Pension and total leverage are windsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile. Note that the
range of the horizontal axis is larger than the vertical axis.
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Figure 2.5: Leverage with and without a Defined Benefit Pension




























































































































Notes. DB firms are those that report defined benefit pensions in Compustat in (a,b) 1990, (c,d) 1998, or (e,f)
2007. Non-DB firms are those without a pension in Compustat in those years. Firms are separated into three
categories based on their leverage ratio: (1) firms with zero debt, (2) firms with positive debt, but debt ratio
less than .5, and (3) firms with debt ratio above .5. Figures (a), (c), (e) separate firms by their external debt
ratio (external long-term debt to non-pension assets); figures (b), (d), (f) separate firms by their consolidated
debt ratio (long-term debt plus pension liabilities to non-pension and pension assets). The height of the bars
represents the percent of DB (dark bars) or non-DB (light bars) firms in each debt category.
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Figure 2.6: Pension Leverage Versus External Leverage
IQR Pension Leverage: -.02 to .02
Increase in Spread: 8.68 basis points
IQR Clean Leverage: .16 to .41























0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1
External Leverage
Notes. Scatter plot of pension leverage versus external leverage for all firm-years in sample in which the firm
sponsors a pension. Pension leverage and external leverage are windsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles.
Note that the range of the horizontal axis is smaller than the vertical axis. A firm at the 25th percentile of
pension leverage maintains a pension surplus equal to 2 percent of non-pension assets, while a firm at the
75th percentile of pension leverage maintains a pension deficit equal to 2 percent of non-pension assets. If
the firm moves from the 25th to 75 percentile of pension leverage, spreads increase by 8.68 basis points
(217 ∗ (.02−−.02)). This amounts to an increase in the bond spread of 5 percent at the mean. A firm at the
25th percentile of external leverage maintains external debt equal to 16 percent of non-pension assets, while
a firm at the 75th percentile of external leverage maintains external debt equal to 41 percent of non-pension
assets. If the firm moves from the 25th to 75 percentile of external leverage, spreads increase by 6.45 basis
points (25.8 ∗ (.41− .16)). This amounts to an increase in bond spread of 3.6 percent at the mean.
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Table 2.1: The Impact of Pension Debt on Bond Spreads
Type of Effect Coefficient Predictions
Pension Leverage Pct Pension
Relative to Conditional on
Direct Effect Indirect Effect External Leverage Total Leverage
Put Option Yes No Equal 0
Tax Benefits Yes No∗ Equal∗ 0∗
Inside Debt No Yes Lower Negative
External Debt No Yes Higher Positive
Notes. Each Theory is described in Section 4. The direct effect of pension debt is described in Figure 2.1,
while the indirect effect of pension debt is described in Figure 2.2. The Coefficient predictions are described
in Figure 2.3 and tested in Table 2.5. ∗ Under the assumption that each dollar of pension debt is leads to the
same level of future contributions as each dollar of external debt leads to interest payments, then the theory
that discusses the impact of pension leverage on the tax benefits of debt has no implication for the indirect
effect of pension debt on bond spreads.
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Table 2.2: Sample Selection from Compustat and Deal Scan Firms
All Compustat Both All DealScan
No Pension Pension No Pension Pension
Total Leverage
Mean .29 .27 .33 .32
Median .12 .23 .26 .28
External Leverage
Mean .29 .27 .33 .32
Median .12 .23 .26 .29
Pension Leverage ×100
Mean 0 -.18 0 .73
Median 0 .09 0 .48
Pension Obligations
Mean 0 795 0 1448
Median 0 28 0 109
Firm Size1
Mean 3.47 6.2 5.22 7.30
Median 3.63 6.42 5.21 7.29
Tangibility
Mean .27 .35 .32 .35
Median .17 .3 .23 .3
Market-to-book
Mean 3.66 1.87 1.97 1.64
Median 1.67 1.35 1.45 1.38
Profitability
Mean .24 .1 .12 .06
Median .13 .04 .05 .03
Percent of Firms:
Rated 6 24 20 35
Bond Spread2
Mean 243 176 227
Median 250 150 225
Loan Amount
Continued on next page
69
Table 2.2 – continued from previous page
All Compustat Both All DealScan
No Pension Pension No Pension Pension
Mean 161 376 195
Median 40 130 60
Loan Maturity
Mean 48 50 57
Median 43 58 60
Percent of Facilities:
Secured 60 40 18
Rated 23 44 7
Long-Term 31 27 45
N Facilities 23,300 24,532 261,428
N Firm-year 97,601 37,617 11,964 11,192 161,223
N Firms3 12,942 2,944 4,572 2,255 39,733
Notes. This table describes all firms in Compustat with and without pensions (columns 1 and 2), all bond
issuances in Deal Scan classified as long-term or short-term (column 5), and Compustat firms and matched
Deal Scan bond issuances (columns 3 and 4). The two datasets are matched using the Compustat-Deal Scan
link provided by Michael Roberts, described in Chava and Roberts (2008). Pension firms are those that report
a pension on their 10-k; non-pension firms are those that do not report pension liabilities on their 10-k. The
data appendix describes the construction of variables. (1) Firm size is reported in terms of log sales. (2) The
bond spread is the all-in-drawn spread reported on Deal Scan: the spread over the term-relevant interest rate,
reported in basis points. (3) The number of firms in Columns 1-4 is reported according to the Compustat
identifier; the number of firms in column 5 is reported in terms of the Deal Scan identifier for borrower. The
Deal Scan identifier for borrower is at a finer level of aggregation.
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Table 2.3: Descriptive Statistics
No Pension Pension
1990 1998 2007 1990 1998 2007
Spread
Mean 263 224 214 189 158 157
Median 255 225 190 150 150 125
IQR 205 125 130 218 188 175
Long Term
Mean 299 252 275 217 228 222
Median 280 250 225 215 225 200
IQR 183 100 150 205 100 150
Short Term
Mean 248 211 170 178 132 117
Median 255 200 150 125 100 88
IQR 230 143 125 205 160 140
External Leverage
Mean .39 .44 .42 .36 .4 .32
Median .34 .39 .36 .32 .38 .29
IQR .43 .49 .41 .27 .32 .26
Pension Leverage ×100
Mean 0 0 0 .07 -.69 1.29
Median 0 0 0 .1 0 .55
IQR 0 0 0 1.75 1.25 2.09
Firm Controls
Firm Size
Mean 4.67 5.41 6.83 6.38 7 8.44
Median 4.64 5.4 6.68 6.32 6.94 8.34
IQR 2.21 2.49 1.9 2.67 2.46 2.35
Pension Obligations ($Bil)
Median 0 0 0 25 37 281
Mean 0 0 0 481 1,088 2,293
IQR 0 0 0 164 287 1,298
Profitability
Continued on next page
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Table 2.3 – continued from previous page
No Pension Pension
1990 1998 2007 1990 1998 2007
Mean 1.4 1.06 .96 1.26 1.09 .99
Median 1.16 .86 .72 1.08 .95 .85
IQR .96 .95 1 .85 .71 .72
Tangibility
Mean .36 .31 .35 .38 .34 .3
Median .29 .23 .25 .32 .29 .25
IQR .37 .35 .54 .28 .28 .31
Market-to-book
Mean 1.42 1.86 1.78 1.27 1.65 1.69
Median 1.19 1.39 1.46 1.11 1.31 1.45
IQR .6 .92 .96 .46 .82 .76
log Interest Coverage
Mean 1.52 1.52 1.76 1.44 1.76 2.09
Median 1.38 1.43 1.61 1.41 1.65 1.98
IQR 1.23 1.42 1.44 .96 1.03 1.32
Current Ratio
Mean 1.86 2.22 1.99 1.88 1.72 1.6
Median 1.64 1.63 1.39 1.54 1.52 1.44
IQR 1.14 1.44 1.17 1.12 .91 .87
Percent of Firms
Rated 15 28 42 43 59 70
Investment Grade 2 5 5 22 25 33
Facility Controls
Loan Amount ($ Mil)
Mean 46 123 400 178 298 865
Median 15 50 150 50 125 328
IQR 38 115 350 144 250 830
Long-term
Mean 40 98 434 140 185 839
Median 8 30 165 37 100 300
IQR 23.44 95 345 106.98 171 750
Continued on next page
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Table 2.3 – continued from previous page
No Pension Pension
1990 1998 2007 1990 1998 2007
Short-term
Mean 49 133 376 192 336 880
Median 16 50 150 51 150 375
IQR 45 140 310 180 295 870
Loan Maturity (Months)
Mean 45 55 58 60 55 58
Median 36 58 60 59 60 60
IQR 52 45 28 50 48 18
Long-term
Mean 52 64 67 76 66 69
Median 53 61 72 68 70 71
IQR 46 41 24 42 26 24
Short-term
Mean 42 51 51 55 51 53
Median 32 38 60 52 58 60
IQR 49 48 24 50 54 24
Percent of Facilities
Secured 53 62 65 38 41 46
Long-term 27 28 41 25 25 37
N Firms 489 1120 551 345 749 645
N Facilities 865 2064 1016 644 1445 1250
Notes. This table describes the firms, facilities, and variables included in the regression presented in tables
2.4, 2.5, and 2.6 in 1990, 1998, and 2007. The full 1990-2007 sample includes 47,832 facility-years, 26,315
firm-years, and 3,046 firms. Bond spread, loan amount, loan maturity, and the percent of loans secured
are from Deal Scan. All other variables are from Compustat. N firms is reported according to Compustat
identifiers. Variable descriptions are available in the data appendix. Long-term facilities are those classified
as term bonds and long term issuances by Deal Scan. Short-term facilities are those classified as short-term
loans or lines of credit in Deal Scan.
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Table 2.4: Response of Bond Spreads to Leverage
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
DB=1 -6.05 -5.53 -6.31 -7.31∗ -7.41∗ -15.5∗∗ -15.2∗∗ -14.3∗∗





Total Leverage 26.3∗∗∗ 26.2∗∗∗
(9.09) (9.1)
Consolidated Leverage 38.2∗∗∗ 36.4∗∗∗
(11.2) (11.2)
Pension Leverage 224∗∗∗ 211∗∗∗
(80.1) (79.3)
Log Pension Liabilities .742∗ .647∗ .564
(.386) (.385) (.386)
Firm Controls X X X X X X X X
Facility Controls X X X X X X X X
Observations 8117 8117 8117 8117 8117 8117 8117 8117
R2 0.339 0.342 0.339 0.343 0.344 0.340 0.344 0.344
Notes. Standard errors, clustered at the firm-level, in parentheses; ∗p < .10, ∗∗p < .05, ∗∗∗p < .01. All regressions include year and industry fixed effects. The
unit of analysis is the facility-firm-year. Firm controls include firm size, pension obligations, profitability, tangibility, market-to-book ratio, log interest coverage,
current ratio, and whether the firm was rated or investment grade. Facility controls are loan amount, maturity, and an indicator for whether the loan was secured.
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Table 2.5: External Leverage, Pension Leverage, and Spreads on Long-term Bonds
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
DB=1 -15.6∗∗∗ -14.3∗∗ -14.7∗∗ -14.7∗∗ -14.4∗ -15.5∗∗ -13.8∗∗ -13.2∗∗ -13.4∗
(6.03) (6.03) (6.01) (6) (8.43) (6) (6.01) (6) (8.09)
External Leverage 25.4∗∗ 26.9∗∗ 23.7∗∗ 27.3∗∗
(10.9) (10.9) (10.9) (13.9)
Pension Leverage 211∗∗∗ 217∗∗∗ 47.8 217∗∗∗
(79.3) (80.9) (126) (81.1)
External Leverage × Pension Leverage 584∗
(335)
DB=1 × External Leverage -.833
(16.8)
Total Leverage 26.2∗∗∗ 29.5∗∗∗ 27.2∗∗∗ 30∗∗
(9.1) (9.37) (8.82) (12.3)
Pct Pen Leverage 48.9∗∗∗ 24.4 48.9∗∗∗
(16.5) (19.2) (16.6)
Total Leverage × Pct Pen Leverage 213∗∗
(104)
DB=1 × Total Leverage -.942
(14.5)
Observations 8117 8117 8117 8117 8117 8117 7939 7939 7939
R2 0.343 0.344 0.345 0.346 0.345 0.340 0.347 0.348 0.347
Notes. Standard errors, clustered at the firm-level, in parentheses; ∗p < .10, ∗∗p < .05, ∗∗∗p < .01. All regressions include year and industry fixed effects.
Sample is isolated to long-term loans, classified according to loan description available on Deal Scan. Firm controls are firm size, pension obligations, profitability,
tangibility, market-to-book ratio, log interest coverage, current ratio, and whether the firm was rated or investment grade. Facility controls are loan amount, maturity,
and an indicator for whether the loan was secured.
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Table 2.6: External Leverage, Pension Leverage, and Spreads on Short-term Bonds
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
DB=1 -5.28∗∗ -4.74∗ -5.23∗∗ -5.19∗∗ -5.05 -5.04∗∗ -5.24∗∗ -5.13∗∗ -7.18∗∗
(2.49) (2.5) (2.49) (2.49) (3.17) (2.51) (2.55) (2.54) (3.52)
External Leverage 21.6∗∗∗ 21.9∗∗∗ 21.3∗∗∗ 22.2∗∗∗
(5) (4.99) (4.98) (6.61)
Pension Leverage 69.8∗∗∗ 71.8∗∗∗ 22 71.8∗∗∗
(24.2) (24.5) (40) (24.5)
External Leverage × Pension Leverage 215∗
(127)
DB=1 × External Leverage -.6
(7.83)
Total Leverage 28.8∗∗∗ 27.3∗∗∗ 25.7∗∗∗ 24.1∗∗∗
(5.89) (6.04) (6.21) (8.25)
Pct Pension Leverage 13.1∗∗∗ 10.2∗∗ 13.6∗∗∗
(4.26) (4.28) (4.3)
Total Leverage × Pct Pen Leverage 43.7
(31.1)
DB=1 × Total Leverage 6.37
(9.19)
Observations 20445 20445 20445 20445 20445 20110 19383 19383 19383
R2 0.565 0.565 0.566 0.566 0.566 0.564 0.569 0.569 0.569
Notes. Standard errors, clustered at the firm-level, in parentheses; ∗p < .10, ∗∗p < .05, ∗∗∗p < .01. All regressions include year and industry fixed effects. The
sample is isolated to short-term loans, classified according to the loan description available on Deal Scan. Firm controls include firm size, pension obligations,
profitability, tangibility, market-to-book ratio, log interest coverage, current ratio, and whether the firm was rated or investment grade. Facility controls are loan
amount, maturity, and an indicator for whether the loan was secured.
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CHAPTER 3
Defined Benefit Pensions and Firm Performance
in the Great Recession
Many firms with defined benefit pensions experienced dramatic losses in the value of pen-
sion assets between 2007 and 2009 that led to high required pension payments. A gen-
eral concern was that those payments prevented firms from making productive investments
that could assist economic recovery. This paper suggests, instead, that pension losses al-
lowed firms to borrow from their pensioners, while the credit crunch prevented those firms
from taking on sub-optimally high leverage ratios and investment risk that are usually moti-
vated by costly pensions. Indeed, firms making minimum required contributions from 2000
through 2007 supported leverage ratios that were 4.6 percentage points higher and default
premiums that were 22 percent higher than their counterparts with less costly pensions.
This wedge did not exist during the Great Recession.
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3.1 Introduction
The value of employer-sponsored defined benefit pension plans fell by $473 billion, or 25
percent, from 2007 to 2009.1 Some firms that had maintained fully funded pension plans
prior to the recession faced substantial pension deficits by 2008. General Motors, for exam-
ple, supported a pension surplus equal to 6 percent of non-pension assets in 2007. By 2008,
that surplus had disappeared, and the company faced a pension deficit equal to 22 percent
of non-pension assets. Policy-makers, academics, and businessmen alike expressed con-
cerns that required pension payments would divert cash flow from productive investments
at time when the economy was in dire need of stimulus. This paper, however, suggests a
more positive aspect of the pension losses and credit crunch during the Great Recession:
pension losses allowed firms to borrow from their pensioners to support productive invest-
ments, while the credit crunch prevented those firms from taking on the sub-optimally high
leverage ratios and investment risk that are usually motivated by costly pensions.
Between 2000 through 2007, defined benefit firms with costly pensions maintained
higher leverage ratios and bankruptcy risk than firms with less costly pensions. During the
Great Recession, defined benefit firms with costly pensions maintained the same leverage
ratios and bankruptcy risk as firms with less costly pensions: they were avoiding risky
positions that they might have taken before the recession. In this story, firms face costly
pensions if contributing less to their pensions would induce high regulatory costs. This
paper uses a unique regulatory characteristic to identify those firms: firms contributing at
the legally required minimum have chosen a corner solution. They have particularly costly
pensions because they would like to contribute less to their pensions, but face a very high
cost of doing so. In pension-level data from the Department of Labor’s Form 5500 linked
to firm-level data available in Compustat, firms contributing at the legal minimum support
leverage ratios that are 4.6 percentage points higher and default premia that are 22 percent
higher than firms contributing above the minimum. This difference disappears during the
Great Recession.
A theory of financing that incorporates pension regulations and conflicts of interest
between stockholders and bondholders can explain these empirical patterns (Lay 2016a).
Firms with defined benefit pensions can borrow from a unique type of lender: their pen-
sioners. Regulations facing firms with defined benefit pensions create two characteristics
of pension debt that influence firms’ optimal capital structure and profile of investment
risk over the business cycle. First, the structure of pension payments ensures that firms’
1Pension Insurance Data Book (2014), Pension Benefit Guarantee Corporation. http :
//www.pbgc.gov/prac/data− books.html
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equity holders will never internalize the full externality that their investment decisions im-
pose upon pensioners. This encourages firms with pension debt to make riskier invest-
ments and, as a result, pay higher premiums on traditional debt: pension debt magnifies
existing agency costs of external debt (Lay, 2016b). Second, firms can only borrow from
pensioners by constraining contributions to under-funded pension plans. Among other reg-
ulations, legally required minimums prevent firms from taking assets out of pension plans.
However, widespread market declines like those in 2008-2009 allow firms with previously
well-funded pensions to borrow from their pensioners by constraining contributions. The
Great Recession was associated with two other unique characteristics that influenced this
dynamic: funding relief lowered the regulatory cost of constraining pension contributions
and unprecedented tightness in the credit market made it particularly difficult for firms to
borrow externally.
This theory predicts that firms with costly pensions borrow more to make pension con-
tributions when external debt is cheap, but constrain borrowing at the expense of pension
contributions when external debt is more costly. Contracting problems associated with
pension debt lead to a pro-cyclical pattern in investment risk among firms with more costly
pensions that mirrors this pro-cyclical pattern in borrowing. As a result, firms with costly
pensions that make the riskiest investments during normal times will be more conservative
during a credit crunch, and firms with less costly pensions during normal times may ac-
tually borrow from their pensioners to maintain productive investments, but avoid overly
risky investments, during a credit crunch. This pattern may have been particularly strong
during the 2000s due to regulatory and macroeconomic conditions that led to high cost
pensions throughout the 2000s.
This paper is related to two strands of existing literature. First, several papers investi-
gate determinants of leverage among firms (Rajan and Zingales, 1995; Frank and Goyal,
2007). This literature highlights the importance of firm characteristics that proxy for vari-
ous aspects of agency cost in explaining firms’ leverage ratios. Shivdasani and Stefanescu
(2012) suggest that pension debt should also be taken into account when determining firms
total leverage ratios. They argue for a consolidated measure of debt: the ratio of long-
term debt and pension obligations to non-pension and pension assets. This paper suggests
that pension debt may affect firms’ choices of external leverage differently under different
macroeconomic and regulatory conditions, and that it may be useful to measure the two
types of debt separately.
This paper also sheds light on a recent empirical literature that exploits variation in
minimum required pension contributions to speak to a long-standing debate on whether
an observed correlation between cash-flow and investment levels indicates the presence of
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financing constraints (Fazzari et. Al, 1988; Kaplan and Zingales, 1997). This literature
uses differences in required pension contributions as exogenous variation in cash-flow to
identify cash-flow effects on investment. Some of these papers use non-linearities in the
formula used to calculate minimum required pension contributions as exogenous variation
(Rauh, 2006; Bakke and Whited, 2012), while others use policy changes that decrease
minimum required contributions between 2010 and 2014 (Dhambra, 2014; Kubick, et.
Al, 2014). This paper argues that firms may respond differently to minimum required
contributions in different macroeconomic environments, suggesting that policy changes
that occurred during the Great Recession may not be valid instruments for cash flow.
Further, the paper speaks to the larger theoretical literature that motivates the search for
instruments for cash-flow: cash flow influences investment in financially constrained firms
when there is a wedge between the internal and external cost of funds. In highlighting that
firms increase external borrowing to make minimum pension contributions, this paper em-
phasizes that pension regulation, conflicts of interest between stockholders and bondhold-
ers, and macroeconomic conditions interact to influence the wedge between the internal
and external cost of funds. The extent to which this interaction influences that wedge de-
pends on the regulatory cost of lowering pension contributions relative to the agency cost of
external borrowing. Rather than using legal differences in minimum required contributions
as an instrument for cash flow, as in Rauh (2006), this paper uses them as variation in the
regulatory cost of lowering pension contributions.
This paper makes the argument that external borrowing and investment risk are pro-
cyclical among firms with high pension costs in six steps. Section 3.2 describes the pen-
sion regulation and macroeconomic conditions that led to an environment in which pension
obligations were particularly costly in the 2000s. Section 3.3 details the theoretical forces
that encouraged a pro-cyclical pattern in borrowing and investment risk over that period.
Section 3.4 describes testable empirical predictions from this theory, while section 3.5 de-
scribes the data and sample selection. Section 3.6 details the empirical specification used
to identify the pro-cyclical trend, as well as the empirical results. Section 3.7 places those
results in a broader context. Section 3.8 concludes.
3.2 Defined benefit pension obligations and regulations,
1975-2013
Figure 3.1(a) describes total employer contributions to private employer-sponsored defined
benefit pension plans from 1975 through 2013, while Figure 3.1(b) describes the aggre-
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gate funding status of those plans. Until the early 2000s, pension plans were significantly
over-funded in aggregate, and contributions were limited in comparison to their magnitude
after 2000. In 2000, the aggregate funding ratio in employer-sponsored pensions was 144
percent – that is, the market value of assets held in employer sponsored pension accounts
was 144 percent of the present discounted value of their projected pension obligations. By
2003, the aggregate funding ratio had fallen to 85 percent. Over that same period, total con-
tributions to employer-sponsored pensions increased five-fold, from $20.8 billion to $104
billion.
Both regulatory and macroeconomic conditions contribute to this pattern. In 1974, the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) was enacted to regulate firms spon-
soring defined benefit pensions. This regulatory framework includes the Pension Benefit
Guarantee Corporation (PBGC), a public corporation that insures privately-sponsored de-
fined benefit pensions, and a set of regulations that dictates how private firms manage their
DB pension assets. In particular, this framework establishes a legally separate pension
account, provides tax exemptions on contributions to and interest earned on assets held
in the pension account for under-funded and moderately funded plans, and requires firms
to maintain a minimum level of assets in the pension account to fund promised pension
payments.
Macroeconomic conditions since 1974 have influenced firms’ incentives to over-fund
or under-fund their pension accounts within this regulatory framework. High interest rates
in the late 1970s and early 1980s increased the attractiveness of the tax-break to pension
contributions and returns, encouraging firms to maintain over-funded pensions. Yet asset
price and interest rate declines in the early 2000s lowered the value of pension assets and
increased the value of pension liabilities, creating large deficits in previously well-funded
pension accounts. Continued low interest rates and large deficits created high minimum
required contributions throughout the 2000s.
Changes to pension legislation post-ERISA have also contributed to the trends high-
lighted in Figure 3.1. Policy makers, responding to large pension surpluses in the 1980s,
established an excise tax on the distribution of excess pension assets to plan sponsors. The
excise tax increased from 10 percent in 1987 to 50 percent by 1990, discouraging firms
dramatically from holding excess funds in their pension account. As low contributions and
falling funding ratios of the 1990s suggest, many firms decreased pension surpluses in re-
sponse to these regulatory changes by allowing pension obligations to accumulate without
equivalent increases in pension assets.
As a result of this response, firms met the asset price and interest rate declines of the
early 2000s with lower funding ratios than they might have absent these regulatory changes.
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Funding ratios reached a post-ERISA historical low and contributions a historical high in
2003. By 2007, high asset returns and stricter pension funding requirements issued by the
Pension Protection Act of 2006 led to an aggregate funding ratio over 100 percent, with the
median plan-level funding ratio at 95 percent. Asset price and interest rate declines from
2007 to 2009, however, had a similar impact on pension funding status as declines earlier
in the decade: the aggregate funding ratios returned to 80 percent in 2009 and contributions
increased to $114 billion. Historically high contributions of over $100 billion from 2010
through 2012 coincided with funding ratios that continued to fall. The aggregate funding
ratio in 2012 set a new historical low of 72 percent.
During the Great Recession, several relief packages were passed to decrease the con-
tribution burden facing firms struggling to make minimum required contributions. The
Funding Relief Act of 2010 allowed firms to temporarily decrease their minimum required
contribution for 2009 through 2012. Further, in an effort to increase taxable corporate in-
come, bipartisan budget acts from 2012 through 2014 have decreased minimum required
contributions yet further. What was initially a temporary decrease in minimum required
contributions could become more permanent, leading to consistently lower regulatory costs
to lowering pension contributions.
3.3 Contracting problems introduced by pension regula-
tion
The pension account can be considered a wholly owned subsidiary of the firm; as such,
reductions in pension value due to declines in asset prices or interest rates should pass
through to the firm. Sponsoring a pension in the presence of certain frictions may encourage
firms to make behavioral changes in borrowing and investment that indirectly influence
firm value. This section describes one such friction: pension regulations create contracting
problems that magnify agency costs arising from conflicts of interest between stockholders
and external debtholders. The extent to which this friction influences firm value depends
on the regulatory cost associated with lowering pension contributions relative to the agency
cost of borrowing more to make those contributions. When macroeconomic fluctuations
change this relative cost, firms will adjust both their external leverage ratio and their profile
of investment risk.
Firms with defined benefit pensions face two sources of borrowing: they can borrow
externally by issuing external debt, or they can borrow from pensioners by making lower
pension contributions than required to maintain a fully funded pension account. External
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debt refers to both corporate bonds and bank debt; bondholders and banks set borrowing
premia that reflect the cost of the overly-risky investments the firm would make so that, in
expectation, they recoup the opportunity cost of the funds they lend. The adjective “ex-
ternal” distinguishes debt held by bondholders and banks, that use such traditional market
mechanisms to address the agency problem between firms and their lenders, from debt held
by pensioners. Pensioners manage contracting problems associated with non-contractible
risk in a fundamentally different way: they limit the extent of pension debt with minimum
funding requirements and depend on a government-sponsored insurance agency to provide
payments if their firm enters bankruptcy with an underfunded pension account. Neither the
minimum funding requirement nor the insurance premium depend on the firm’s profile of
investment risk.
3.3.1 The mechanism through which pension debt magnifies agency
cost
A key difference between external and pension debt is that pension debt payments are de-
termined independently of the additional investment risk the firm imposes on its lenders
while external debt payments are not. This characteristic of pension debt implies that
defined-benefit firms that borrow from pensioners avoid internalizing the full agency cost
associated with non-contractible production risk. Traditionally, firms pay this agency cost
through higher bond spreads that internalize the externalities of risky investments imposed
upon lenders in bankruptcy. However, while bondholders have full information and are
aware that firms with pension debt will make riskier investments than firms without pen-
sion debt, they also share bankruptcy liability with pensioners. As a result, bondholders
raise premiums only enough to reflect the investment risk imposed on bondholders – not
pensioners – in bankruptcy. A firm with pension debt will pay higher borrowing premi-
ums than an equivalently positioned firm without pension debt because it faces stronger
incentives to make riskier investments, but those premiums do not internalize the downside
consequences imposed on pensioners in bankruptcy. In this way, the interaction between
pension regulations and conflicts of interest among stakeholders provides the firm a source
of financing – pension debt – that does not internalize the consequences of overly-risky
investments.
When large unfunded pension liabilities allow firms to avoid the full cost associated
with bankruptcy, those firms support higher leverage positions that lead to higher bankruptcy
risk: external debt is more attractive relative to equity as a form of financing. The amount
of external debt those firms take on determines both the amount they have available to dis-
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tribute between investments and pension contributions, and the spread they face on external
bonds. Therefore, defined benefit firms with pension deficits face a trade-off when deciding
how much to borrow. Borrowing more allows them to make higher pension contributions,
and higher pension contributions reduce the regulatory cost associated with the defined
benefit pension. Yet to make those higher contributions, firms must borrow externally at
rates that increase with their leverage ratios and agency costs. As a result, firms can take
on more external debt and contribute more to their pensions, but make riskier investments
and face higher bond premiums; or they can constrain the amount of external debt they
take on and make fewer risky investments, but contribute less to pension accounts and face
higher regulatory pension fees. Thus, the key factor determining how much firms with
unfunded pension liabilities borrow is the regulatory cost they face of contributing less to
their pensions relative to the agency costs associated with higher external leverage.
3.3.2 Pension regulation
Pension regulations influence this relative cost by directly affecting the regulatory cost of
contributing less in several ways. First, PBGC insurance premiums and minimum required
contributions are increasing functions of the magnitude of unfunded pension liabilities,
and often increase the cost of contributing less to under-funded pensions: lower pension
contributions lead to higher future pension deficits and, in turn, higher future insurance
premiums and minimum required contributions. A tax exemption on pension contributions
and returns earned on assets held in the pension account may also increase the cost of con-
tributing less to the pension: lower pension contributions imply more taxable corporate
income. On the other hand, the excise tax and removal of the tax exemption for plans that
are over 150 percent funded may decrease the cost to contributing less for firms that spon-
sor well-funded pension plans: firms with pension plans funded near or over 150 percent
may be less motivated to contribute because those contributions are not exempt from the
corporate tax, and firms must pay an excise tax of 50 percent on any surplus pension funds
they revert. Finally, congressional changes in minimum required contributions or pension
funding relief can influence the cost of contributing less. Over the period 2008-2013, three
different congressional acts lowered minimum required contributions, decreasing the cost
of constraining contributions to the pension during the Great Recession.
3.3.3 Macroeconomic conditions
Two macroeconomic factors can also influence this relative cost. First, fluctuations in the
value of pension assets can change the regulatory cost of contributing less, since that cost
84
depends directly on the pension shortfall. When defined benefit firms faced rising asset
prices as they did from 2003-2007, they also faced low costs of contributing less to their
pension accounts because gains in market value improved plans’ funding status. Rising
asset prices may have prevented some firms from borrowing externally to make pension
contributions. Second, changes in aggregate investment risk can influence agency costs of
borrowing. When firms face a widespread credit crunch like the one associated with the
Great Recession, bond spreads rise, reflecting higher agency costs of leverage in a credit
crunch. Like rising asset prices, rising aggregate investment risk leading to tighter credit
may also encourage some firms from borrowing externally to make pension contributions.
These dynamics likely contributed to pension firms’ borrowing, investment and contri-
bution decisions throughout the 2000s. Firms with high costs to contributing less to their
pensions relative to their peers – “costly” pensions – would have supported higher exter-
nal leverage ratios and made riskier investments from 2000-2007. The asset price declines
from 2007 to 2009 meant that more firms faced costly pensions, as well as the decision
to increase pension contributions to manage their new pension deficits. With high pen-
sion deficits and looming bankruptcy risk, external debt would be the preferred method
to finance such pension contributions. However, drastic increases in perceived aggregate
investment risk led to a credit crunch during the Great Recession. As a result, the cost of
supporting high external leverage increased, especially for firms with high pension debt
that were more prone to make risky investments. Therefore, firms with costly pensions
during the Great Recession were less likely to support inflated leverage ratios – and, as a
result, inflated investment risk – during the prime years of the credit crunch.
3.4 The Empirical Specification
This analysis implies a key empirical prediction: firms facing costly pensions will borrow
more and make riskier investments than firms with less costly pensions when credit is
cheap, but that difference will narrow when credit is more expensive. The rest of this paper
explores this prediction over the period 2000 through 2013.
3.4.1 Specification
Consider, first, the borrowing decision of a firm that does not have a pension. Standard
regressions investigating the determinants of corporate leverage include observable proxies
for the tax benefits of debt, agency costs due to conflicts of interest, and bankruptcy costs




= Θ1Fit + µit (3.1)
The outcome variable in equation 3.1 is the book leverage ratio of firm i in year t, Fit is a
vector of firm characteristics determining the optimal leverage ratio, and µit is unobserved
characteristics that influence firms’ borrowing decisions. These unobserved characteristics
include error due to mis-measured proxies for the determinants of leverage.
Now, suppose the firm sponsors a defined benefit pension. Define pension debt as
unfunded pension liabilities: total pension liabilities less pension assets. If external and
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The regression framework analogous to equation 3.1 describes the ratio of external debt to
non-pension assets as a function of its components:
External Debt
Non-Pension Assets it




If external and pension leverage are perfect substitutes and Fit captures the observable de-
terminants of debt without measurement error, Θ′1 = Θ1 and θ2 = −1: the determinants
of debt, Fit, should have the same impact on external leverage of firms without pensions
as they do on the total leverage of firms with pensions, and an increase in pension leverage
should be associated with an equivalent decrease in external leverage. Further, µit = µ′it:
the error term after incorporating pension debt includes the same unobservable character-
istics of the firm that influence the leverage ratio.
If sponsoring a pension changes the firm’s incentives or behavior in ways that indirectly
influence its optimal external debt ratio, then Θ′1 and µ
′
it capture a behavioral response to
pension obligations that Θ1 and µit do not. In the theory proposed above, pension obliga-
tions make external debt more attractive and firms choose how much to borrow by trading
off the costs of lowering contributions with agency costs of borrowing more to make con-
tributions. The resulting behavioral response to pension obligations, f(Cit, Ait), depends
on the firm’s regulatory cost of contributing less to the pension (Cit) relative to the agency
costs associated with borrowing more (Ait):
External Debt
Total Assets it
= Θ′′1Fit + θ2
Pension Debt
Non-Pension Assets it
+ f(Cit, Ait) + µ
′′
it (3.3)
When f(Cit, Ait) precisely captures this behavioral response to pension obligations and is
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independent from the unobserved characteristics influencing the borrowing decision of a
non-pension firm, µit = µ′′it. The behavioral response, however, will likely be correlated
with unobserved factors influencing the firm’s borrowing decision, and proxies for the be-
havioral response are subject to their own measurement error.
Several characteristics of the firm, regulatory environment, and macroeconomic envi-
ronment influence the regulatory cost of contributing less (Cit) or agency cost of borrowing
more (Ait). The level of pension debt and funding ratio interact with pension regulations to
determine insurance premiums and required minimum contributions, while the magnitude
of pension liabilities captures firms’ exposure to market fluctuations through the pension








The firm pays the agency cost to borrowing more through its premium on external debt.
This premium increases with external and pension leverage, as well as the amount of non-










Idiosyncratic Investment Riskit,Aggregate Investment Riskt
) (3.5)
Each of the determinants of the relative cost described in equations 3.4 and 3.5 changed
dramatically in the Great Recession. The specification studied in Section 3.6 controls
for changes in pension leverage, pension liabilities, funding ratios, and year and indus-
try (j) specific leverage patterns. The coefficients of interest in that section are on in-
dicator variables that identify firms with particularly high regulatory costs to contribut-
ing less or particularly high aggregate investment risk. In the following specification,
MRCit = 1 when the firm faces an extremely high cost to lowering pension contributions
and Credit Crunchit = 1 in years in which the cost of external borrowing is particularly




= Θ1Fit + Θ2Pit + αMRCi,t + β
(
MRCi,t × Credit Crunchi,t
)
+ δj + δt
(3.6)
where Pit includes pension leverage, the magnitude of pension liabilities, and the pension
funding ratio. These pension characteristics control for continuous changes in the cost of
contributing less relative to borrowing more, as well as substitution between pension and
external debt. Firms with particularly high cost pensions are expected to borrow more to
make contributions (α > 0), but be less prone to do this when the cost of credit is extremely
high (β < 0). While this specification has been built considering leverage is the outcome
variable, these predictions maintain when investment risk is the outcome variable, provided
that Fit and Pit include external leverage and other determinants that directly influence the
measure of investment risk.
3.4.2 Variable Definition
The outcome variables of interest in the following sections are measures of external lever-
age and investment risk. This section describes external leverage in reference to pension
leverage, and investment risk as the firm’s default premium measured from long-term bond
ratings. The explanatory variables of interest are binary variables that indicate extremely
high costs to contributing less and widespread high agency costs of external borrowing.
3.4.2.1 External leverage and pension leverage
Two measures of leverage are relevant to the analysis below: external leverage and pension
leverage. External leverage is measured as the book ratio of long-term debt to total non-
pension assets. Non-pension assets are the book value of total firm assets cleansed of
adjustments that reflect pension income and expenses. Pension leverage is the ratio of
unfunded pension liabilities – total pension liabilities, measured as the projected benefit
obligation, less pension assets – to non-pension assets. Both pension liabilities and pension
assets are reported off the balance sheet. The advantage of these measures is that they
cleanly separate external from pension debt. Further, they define the relevant portion of
pension debt to be those obligations that are not supported by the collateral of pension
assets.
A standard measure of long-term leverage is the ratio of the book value of total liabili-
ties to the book value of total assets, calculated from firms’ 10-k reports and referred to as
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balance-sheet leverage below. The book values of total assets and liabilities reflect adjust-
ments for pension income and expenses reported in the cash-flow statement, and total lia-
bilities includes unfunded pension obligations. Shivdasani and Stefanescu (2012) suggest,
instead, a measure of consolidated leverage that incorporates off-balance sheet pension debt
directly: the ratio of long-term debt and total pension liabilities to non-pension and pension
book assets. They calculate this measure by cleansing book assets of adjustments associ-
ated with pension income and expenses, consolidating pension assets with non-pension
assets, and consolidating total pension liabilities with long-term debt. Shivdasani and Ste-
fanescu (2012) argue that a benefit of this consolidated leverage measure is to incorporate
risk associated with high levels of pension obligations: a percentage decline in the market
value of pension assets or interest rates will lead to higher future pension debt for firms
with larger magnitudes of pension liabilities. While the measure of pension leverage used
in this paper does not directly capture this component of pension risk, specification 3.6
controls for the magnitude of pension liabilities.
3.4.2.2 Investment risk
Differences in investment risk are measured by differences in default premiums implied
by S&P long-term debt ratings. The methodology used to calculate S & P long-term debt
ratings is designed to capture the probability that debt holders will receive their promised
payments. This probability is a key factor in determining the bond spreads external lenders
offer and, in turn, agency cost the firm faces. Differences in S&P ratings are then translated
into differences in default premia using annual average bond spreads by rating notch for
industrial firms, provided by Rueters.
While credit ratings have traditionally been a valuable measure of default risk, con-
cern arose during the recession that the methodology used to rate bonds was a questionable
indicator of their default risk during the mid-2000s. Increased attention to that methodol-
ogy led to some substantial changes following 2008. Two factors ease potential concern
that changes to ratings methodologies in the late 2000s bias the results below. First, ques-
tionable ratings practices related primarily to mortgage securities and banks. Financial
institutions are excluded from the following analysis. Second, the specifications below in-
clude year fixed effects. The difference of interest in credit ratings is that between firms
facing costly and less-costly pensions within year. For changes in ratings methodology to
bias this result, those changes would have to be differentially applied to firms with costly
and less-costly pensions.
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3.4.2.3 Cost of contributing less to pension
In the analysis below, firms face high costs to lowering their pension contribution further
when they contribute at or below the minimum required contribution. In equation 3.6,
MRCit = 1 when the firm contributes at or below the minimum required contribution and
MRCit = 0 when the firm contributes nothing or above the minimum required contribu-
tion. Firms contributing only the legally required minimum have two characteristics that
identify firms with high costs to lowering pension contributions. First, they face substan-
tial pension deficits that encourage them to finance with debt rather than equity. Second,
they would face high regulatory penalties if they lowered contributions further. Minimum
required contributions are positive when the pension faces a deficit and, as their name sug-
gests, legally required. Consequently, any firm contributing at the minimum faces a pension
deficit that encourages it to lean toward debt finance and a very high cost of contributing
below their current level since it is legally prohibited. Rather than constrain pension con-
tributions further, firms at the minimum (MRCit = 1) likely borrow at higher premiums to
avoid large regulatory penalties.
3.4.2.4 Agency cost to external borrowing
Agency costs to external borrowing are high, Credit Crunchit = 1 in specification 3.6, dur-
ing the years of the aggregate credit crunch associated with the Great Recession: 2009,
2010, and 2011. The collapse of Lehman Brothers in September of 2008 instigated a
period of unprecedented financial uncertainty. Traditional measures of the lending envi-
ronment describe aggregate uncertainty that remained high throughout 2011 and coincided
with low willingness to lend that increased corporate borrowing costs across the board.2
Credit Crunchit, then, captures high borrowing costs due to high aggregate investment risk
facing all firms. Many firms also face idiosyncratic factors that raise the particular bor-
rowing rate they face. In fact, firms contributing at the minimum required contribution –
identified as having high costs to contributing less – are more likely to face high idiosyn-
cratic risk: high idiosyncratic risk leads to high agency costs of borrowing relative to reg-
ulatory costs of lowering pension contributions and encourages firms to decrease pension
contributions to the lowest possible. Those idiosyncratic agency costs are not high enough,
however, to prevent the firm from borrowing more to avoid marginal pension penalties. The
aggregate credit crunch in 2008-2011, on the other hand, may have driven agency costs of
borrowing high enough to discourage some firms from borrowing enough to contribute
above the minimum and encourage others to use funds they would have spent on other
2https : //www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/snloansurvey/
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investments, rather than borrow, to meet the minimum required contribution.
3.4.3 Identifying Variation
The ideal experiment to test this prediction identifies exogenous variation in the cost of
contributing less to the pension account relative to the agency cost associated with borrow-
ing more externally. This paper looks at average differences in borrowing and investment
risk among firms contributing at the minimum required contribution and those contributing
above. Non-linearities in the minimum required contribution as a function of the pension
funding ratio introduce exogeneity in the cost firms face to lowering pension contributions
nearer to the minimum, and firms contributing at or below the minimum identify them-
selves to have the highest costs of lowering contributions. The regressions in the following
section control for the pension funding status to isolate some of this regulatory variation in
the cost of constraining contributions relative to issuing more external debt.3
Previous work has similarly considered variation in pension contributions due to legal
differences in the minimum required contribution, but as an instrument for cash flow rather
than to directly measure the regulatory cost of contributing less to the pension. This liter-
ature has used two approaches to capture legal differences in the minimum required con-
tribution. The first approach is to use policy changes that decrease the minimum required
contribution for all firms (Dhambra, 2014; Kubick et. Al, 2014). The history described
above suggests that pension regulations change in response to macroeconomic conditions
and investment risk facing firms. As a result changes in pension legislation are unlikely to
induce exogenous variation in minimum pension contributions. The second approach has
been to use non-linearities in the formula used to calculate minimum required contributions
as a function of the plan funding ratio. Bakke and Whited (2012) use a regression discon-
tinuity design that recognizes the funding ratio as the running variable, while Rauh (2006)
exploits these non-linearities with an instrumental variables specification that controls for
the funding ratio. Frequent sorting above funding thresholds throughout the 2000s, which
may not have been present in the period Bakke and Whited studied (1990-1998), prevents
the use of a regression discontinuity design in this paper. Instead, this paper builds on the
method used in Rauh (2006), but recognizes that exogenous differences in minimum re-
quired contributions influence not only cash flow, but also firms’ borrowing and investment
decisions.
3See Rauh (2006) or Bakke and Whited (2012) for a detailed description of how the minimum required
contribution changes as a function of the firm’s funding ratio.
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3.5 Data and Sample Selection
Two sources of data provide information on publicly listed firms that sponsor defined ben-
efit pensions. Compustat, data compiled from firms’ financial statements, describes the
general financial status of the firm, including long-term borrowing and S&P rating, and re-
ports whether the firm sponsors a defined benefit pension. The Form 5500, regulatory data
released by the Department of Labor, provides detailed plan-level information on all pen-
sion plans, including an indicator of whether the firm makes only the minimum required
contribution. This section describes the sample and potential selection that results from
merging the two datasets to explore the key prediction: defined benefit firms contributing at
the minimum required contribution should borrow more and make riskier investments prior
to 2008, but these differences should narrow when financing tightens from 2009-2011.4
3.5.1 Sample Selection
The sample of publicly-listed firms available in Compustat is limited to all firms for which
data are continuously available, beginning in 2000, that report pension assets on their bal-
ance sheet. The sample excludes financial and utilities firms (SIC codes 6000 through 6999
and 4900-4999), and those firms for which pension asset or debt information is missing.
The final sample includes 3,806 firms that report a defined benefit pension for at least one
year between 2000 and 2013. Table 3.1 describes the main characteristics of this sample
in the last column. Defined benefit firm in Compustat support long-term debt equal to
26 percent, on average, of their total non-pension assets. Their average pension shortfall,
measured as the difference between the firms’ projected benefit obligation and their pension
assets reported in the footnotes of their 10-ks, is 3 percent of total non-pension assets.
The Form 5500 data, including all plans with over 100 participants in each year, are filed
by firms that are both publicly-listed and not publicly-listed; therefore, many of the firms
that sponsor pension plans included in Form 5500 data will not be included in Compustat.
4The analysis in this section focuses on Compustat firms that are matched to pension plans in the Form
5500 using the employer identification number and a fuzzy match method on firm name. The match rate is
approximately 11 percent for DB sponsors reported in the Form 5500 and 35 percent for firms that report a
pension plan in Compustat. Many sponsors on the Form 5500 are not publicly-listed and therefore will not
appear in Compustat. Between 1990 and 1998, cusips of plan sponsors appeared on the Form 5500 and, as
a result, this alternative time period yields a higher match rate. However, an important regulatory change
in 1990 make the following years a less useful environment to test these model predictions. Prior to 1990,
many firms held large surpluses in their pension plans as a method of allowing assets to accumulate tax-
free. In 1990, the excise tax increased from 20 to 50 percent (following an increase from 0 to 20 percent
between 1986 and 1987). This excise tax effectively discouraged firms from maintaining pension surpluses;
as a result, many firms were contributing nothing to their pension accounts throughout the 1990s to decrease
existing pension surpluses.
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Entities in the Form 5500, described in the first two columns of Table 3.1, are defined
by their employer identification number, a finer level of consolidation than the Compustat
identifier used to describe the number of firms in the last three columns. Columns 1 through
4 exclude Form 5500 plans sponsored by firms in the financial and utilities sectors and are
isolated to the years 2000 through 2013. This table reports separately plan-years in which
the firm contributes nothing or above the minimum required contribution, and those in
which the firm contributes at the minimum required contribution or below. The full sample
amounts to 12,540 plans to which sponsors have contributed zero or above the minimum
required contribution at least once from 2000 through 2013, and 4,725 plans to which
sponsors have contributed at or below the minimum required contribution at least once
over that time frame. Plans to which the firm contributes at the minimum tend to be smaller
with lower funding ratios. Unsurprisingly, those plans receive lower total contributions and
face higher minimum required contributions. They also maintain an average pension deficit
of $2.2 million, in comparison to the average pension surplus of $43.2 million among plans
to which the firm contributes nothing or above the minimum required.
The final matched sample, described in columns 3 and 4, includes observations from
1,047 different firms that contribute above the minimum required contribution at some point
between 2000 and 2013, and 474 firms that contribute at or below the minimum required
contribution at some point over that period. Firms in the matched sample support slightly
higher long-term leverage and pension leverage than the full Compustat sample: firms
contributing above the minimum maintain average long-term leverage of .28 and median
pension leverage of .02, in comparison to average long-term leverage of .26 and median
pension leverage of .01 among the full Compustat sample. Matched firms are also larger
and less profitable, with average log sales over 7 and an average ratio of cash to non-pension
assets of .08, than the full Compustat sample that supports average log sales of 6.88 and
ratio of cash to non-pension assets of .13. While the market-to-book ratio is similar at the
median, it is substantially smaller than the full sample at the mean; this implies that pension
firms with very high book-to-market ratios – which is often considered a proxy for growth
opportunities – are not included in the final analysis sample.
The comparison of columns (1) and (2) versus (3) and (4) sheds light on how well the
final sample represents all private employer-sponsored pension plans with over 100 partic-
ipants. Like all plans with over 100 participants, plans in the matched sample (columns 3
and 4) show lower funding ratios, and pension deficits rather than surpluses, among firms
contributing at the minimum relative to firms contributing above the minimum. Plans in
the final sample, however, are larger in terms of contributions, pension obligations, and
participants. Further, unlike the full Form 5500 sample, plans receiving the minimum con-
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tribution are larger, both in terms of total participants and in terms of total obligations,
than their counterparts receiving above the minimum required contribution. This suggests
that many small, under-funded plans to which firms contribute only the minimum required
contribution are excluded from the final analysis sample.
The final sample, therefore, captures slightly larger firms with significantly larger pen-
sion plans. These are the firms among which the predicted pattern – pro-cyclical borrowing
and investment risk – should be strongest. The under-funded plans that are smaller relative
to firm size, excluded from this sample, should impose a cost of contributing less that is
minimal in comparison to agency costs associated with borrowing more. As a result, the
model predicts that these firms contribute at the minimum required contribution. However,
the small size of the pension plan relative to total assets would allow the firm to make min-
imum required contributions with only slightly higher leverage, implying a smaller impact
of this “costly pension” on the firm’s total leverage ratio and investment risk would be min-
imal. Therefore, the final sample that excludes these firms should display larger differences
in borrowing and investment risk between firms with high and low cost pensions.
3.5.2 Sample Description
Table 3.2 compares firms in the matched sample that contributed at or below the minimum
required contribution to at least one plan to firms that contribute zero or above the minimum
to all plans in 2001, 2007, and 2010. The two outcome variables of interest are the ratio
of long-term debt to non-pension assets, or external leverage, and the S&P long-term bond
rating. The external leverage ratio falls from 2001 to 2010 among both groups of firms.
However, it is lower throughout the period among firms that contribute above the minimum
required contribution. The long-term bond rating is converted to an index that ranges from
0 to 1. The highest rating, AAA, registers as 1 on this index, while the lowest rating, D,
registers as 0. Each notch increase in ratings is equivalent to an increase in the index of .04¯5.
A rating of .6 is equivalent to a S&P long-term bond rating of BBB-. Firms contributing
above the minimum face lower ratings than their counterparts contributing at or below
the minimum. The median ratings index remains near .6 for firms contributing above the
minimum required contribution throughout this period. Among firms contributing at the
minimum required contribution, however, the median falls from .48 to .45 from 2001 to
2007, and rises to .57 by 2010.
The funding ratio, pension shortfall, and pension obligations describe a generally rising
pension burden over this period. The funding ratio, reported on the Form 5500, is the ratio
of pension assets to pension liabilities of the firm’s largest pension plan. Most pensions
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receiving contributions of zero or above the minimum required began the decade funded or
over-funded, with a median funding ratio of 99 percent. This median funding ratio fell to 83
percent by 2010. Pensions receiving the minimum required contribution, on the other hand,
faced a median funding ratio of 86 percent in 2001. This funding ratio fell slightly over
the decade, but was very similar to funding ratios among plans with higher contributions
in 2010. The ratio of unfunded pension liabilities to total assets (labeled pension shortfall)
shows a similar pattern. The absolute magnitude of pension obligations, however, describes
an important difference between costly plans receiving the minimum required contribution
or below, and less costly plans receiving contributions of zero or above the minimum from
2001 through 2010: prior to 2010, costly pension plans tended to be smaller in terms of
total obligations; in 2010 costly plans were substantially larger.
Several firm characteristics mirror this pattern. First, the percent of firms with less
costly pensions that contributed nothing to their largest pension fell from above 50 in 2001
and 2007, to 20 in 2010. This suggests that many firms that began contributing at the
minimum during the credit crunch were previously contributing very little or nothing to
well-funded pension accounts. Second, the firms with costly pensions contributing at the
minimum were smaller, younger and faced a lower chance of bankruptcy (according to
their Z-score, a measure that increases with firms’ chance of bankruptcy) than their coun-
terparts with less costly pensions in 2001 and 2007. However, these characteristics reversed
in 2010: firms with costly pensions during the credit crunch were larger, older, and faced
higher bankruptcy risk than their counterparts with less costly pensions. Firm’s tangibility
and profitability were similar across these two groups throughout the 2000s. The following
analysis controls for this structural difference in firms contributing at the minimum before
and during the credit crunch using detailed controls for leverage and investment decisions
within industry and, in a separate specification, within firm. Further, non-linearities in min-
imum required contributions as a function of pension funding status introduce exogenous
variation in firms’ cost of reducing pension contributions when they already contribute at
the minimum.
3.6 External leverage and investment risk among firms
with costly pensions
Figure 3.2 shows the fraction of firms that contribute at or below the minimum required
contribution to at least one plan from 2000 through 2013.5 Prior to the credit crunch of
5In 2008, the DOL changed reporting forms for actuarial data, from the Schedule B to the Schedule SB.
The first year of new reporting forms, 2008, is not released electronically. As a result, the year 2008 is omitted
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2009, approximately 10 percent of firms contributed at the minimum required contribution
to at least one plan; 55 percent of those firms were contributing at or below the minimum
to all plans. The fraction of firms contributing at or below the minimum to at least one plan
was significantly higher during the Great Recession than earlier in the decade, peaking at
25 percent in 2011, with 57 percent of those firms contributing at or below the minimum
to all plans. The previous section suggests that the new firms contributing at the minimum
during the credit crunch were larger and older and, while their pension deficit was similar
relative to total assets, the absolute magnitude of their pension obligations was larger than
firms contributing at the minimum earlier in the decade.6 Further, firms that did not con-
tribute at or below the minimum during the credit crunch were substantially less likely to
contribute nothing than they were before the credit crunch (see appendix D). These patterns
suggest that some firms allowed large, well-funded plans to accumulate without contribut-
ing through the early 2000s, but were required to make contributions to those plans when
the value of pension assets fell in the Great Recession.7
Figure 3.3 compares the mean ratio of debt to non-pension assets and the ratings in-
dex of firms that contributed the minimum required contribution to those of firms that con-
tributed above the minimum. As the model predicts, debt levels are higher and bond ratings
lower among firms that contribute at the minimum required contribution in 2007 and ear-
lier. The differences between the groups narrow during the years of the credit crunch, 2009
through 2011.
This pattern is a combination of two effects. The first is that firms contributing at the
minimum before the credit crunch face higher borrowing costs during the credit crunch
that discourage them from increasing leverage to make minimum contributions. Figure 3.4
isolates the sample of firms that contributed at the minimum required contribution at some
point before the recession, and shows that many of them continued to do so during the
recession. Figure 3.5 shows that external leverage ratios among these firms were higher
from 2000 through 2005, and ratings lower, than firms that contributed at the minimum
prior to the credit crunch but not during. Figure 3.6 returns to the full sample of firms to
show within-firm differences in external leverage and ratings in years when firms contribute
at and above the minimum. Within firm differences appropriately identify changes in the
behavioral response to contributing at the minimum before and during the credit crunch
from the following analysis.
6There is substantial overlap in firms that contribute at the minimum before and after the recession: 335
firms contribute at the minimum for at least one year from 2000 through 2007, with 244 of those firms
contributing for 2 years or fewer; while 279 firms contribute at the minimum for at least one year from 2009
through 2011, with 171 of those firms contributing at the minimum only once over that period; and 90 firms
contribute at the minimum for at least one year in both of those time frames.
7See Appendix D for detail on firms contributing at zero throughout the 2000s.
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if consistent firm characteristics determine which firms contribute at the minimum only
during the recession. From 2000 through 2007, firms support debt ratios that are higher
relative to their average debt ratios, and ratings that are lower relative to their average
rating, in years in which they contribute at the minimum than in years when they contribute
above the minimum. Again, this difference narrows from 2009 through 2011.
The second effect contributing to the narrowing of the gap between external leverage
and ratings is that more firms face large pension deficits following the asset price declines
of 2008-2009 and choose to contribute at the minimum. These firms may have contributed
above the minimum absent market declines but, instead, borrow from pensioners by con-
straining pension contributions to support investment during the credit crunch. These firms
may support lower debt ratios and higher ratings than firms that contributed at the minimum
earlier in the decade. Figure 3.7 isolates the sample of firms that contribute at the minimum
at some point between 2009 and 2011 and shows the fraction of those firms contributing
at the minimum in each year. Unlike those firms contributing at the minimum before the
credit crunch that continued to do so after 2008, firms contributing at the minimum during
the credit crunch were substantially less likely to do so before 2008. Figure 3.8 shows that
the pro-cyclical pattern of debt and investment risk among firms contributing at the min-
imum maintains in this constrained sample of firms. The fluctuations among firms at the
minimum are likely magnified in this figure because firms contributing the minimum both
before and during the credit crunch identify the borrowing and ratings averages for firms
at the minimum before 2008; these firms, with continually high costs to contributing less
relative to agency costs of borrowing more, will support the highest leverage ratios when
credit is loose.
3.6.1 Empirical Specification
These patterns are consistent with the hypothesis that firms facing a high cost of contribut-
ing less borrow more, face higher agency costs, and make riskier investment decisions in
years with easy financing, but constrain their borrowing and make fewer risky investments
in years with tighter financial markets. The following regression, slightly modified from
specification 3.6, explores this hypothesis further:




+ Θ1Pit + Θ2Fit + δj or i + γt (3.7)
In specification 3.7, yit is either the ratio of long-term debt to non-pension assets or the
index created from the S&P rating, i indexes the firm, j indexes the industry, t indexes the
year, MRCi,t is an indicator of a firm that contributes at the minimum required contribution
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to at least one pension plan, and Credit Crunchi,t is an indicator for whether the economy
faces a credit crunch in year t that proxies for widespread credit constraints between 2009
and 2011. Tables 3.3 and 3.4 include industry fixed-effects to compare debt and ratings of
firms with costly and less costly pensions within industry (δj), while Table 5 includes firm
fixed-effects to compare debt and ratings within firm (δi).
The vector of controls for the firm’s pension liabilities, Pit, includes the ratio of un-
funded liabilities to total non-pension assets; the log of the magnitude of the firm’s pro-
jected pension obligations; and the funding status of the largest account that receives the
minimum required contribution, for firms contributing at the minimum, or the largest pen-
sion account overall for firms contributing above the minimum. The coefficient α is in-
tended to capture variation in the cost of contributing less relative agency risk of borrowing
more – not the actual cost of sponsoring a defined benefit pension. The first two measures
of pension liabilities proxy for the cost of maintaining a pension account, as maintenance
costs rise with each. Further, the formula used for calculating the minimum required con-
tribution is a non-linear function of the pension funding status.8 By controlling for this
funding status, the regression isolates in α the variation in the minimum required contribu-
tion that is exogenous from the funding status of the pension.
The vector of controls for the firm’s financial position, Fit, differs with the outcome
variable. When the outcome variable is long-term leverage, controls include those identi-
fied by Frank and Goyal (2008) to reliably predict book leverage ratios: tangibility of assets,
profitability, and median leverage within industry. Following the literature, the specifica-
tion also includes the market-to-book ratio, firm size measured by log sales, firm age, and
Altman’s Z-score (Rajan and Zingales, 1995; Frank and Goyal, 2008; Shivdasani and Ste-
fanescu, 2012). When the outcome variable is the firm’s credit rating, additional controls
include the log of non-pension assets, the ratio of debt to total assets, and the interest cover-
age ratio. With these controls, the specification captures variation in firms’ financial status
that can predict differences in their long-term leverage ratio or credit rating.
The coefficients of interest are α and β. When firms face high costs to contributing less
to their pension, proxied by MRCit, they should borrow more and make riskier investment
decisions when financing is cheaper: α > 0 when yi,t is the ratio of debt to non-pension
assets, and α < 0 when yi,t is the continuous ratings index. When financing is tighter,
firms facing high costs to contributing less face higher costs of borrowing more relative
to constraining their pension contributions. As a result, they constrain external borrowing,
face smaller increases in agency cost, and maintain lower investment risk. This suggests
8See Rauh (2006) and Bakke and Whited (2012) fordetailed explanation of the formula used to calculate
these minimum required contributions and this identification strategy.
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that the total effect of contributing at the minimum required contribution during a credit
crunch, α + β, should be weaker than during a time of easy financing: |α + β| < |α|.
3.6.1.1 Debt to non-pension assets
Table 3.3 presents estimates of α and β when the dependent variable is the ratio of debt to
non-pension assets, controlling for industry fixed-effects. This table shows specifications
that jointly consider firms contributing at the minimum required contribution in all years
(odd-numbered specifications), and specifications that separately consider firms contribut-
ing at the minimum required contribution during normal times and during a credit crunch
(even-numbered specifications). In the preferred complete specification (6), α = .0459
implies that pension firms that contribute at the minimum required contribution support a
leverage ratio that is 4.6 percentage points higher than the leverage ratio of their counter-
parts that face less costly pensions relative to agency cost. This difference, however, disap-
pears in years in which credit constraints are widespread: β = −.0549 suggests that firms
facing contribution constraints and credit constraints do not borrow significantly more than
their counterparts that do not face contribution constraints. Under the fixed-effects specifi-
cation in Table 3.5, firms support leverage ratios that are 2.14 percentage points higher in
years when they contribute at the minimum than in years in which they contribute above
the minimum when the economy does not face a credit crunch. This difference, again,
disappears in years in which credit constraints are widespread: β = −.0354 suggests that
firms do not borrow significantly more in years in which they are contributing at the mini-
mum than in years in which they are contributing above the minimum from 2009 through
2011. Defined-benefit sponsors raise more debt, relative to their industry average, in years
in which financing is easy and they contribute at the minimum required contribution than
in years in which they make unconstrained contributions. Yet when facing financing con-
straints, firms facing higher costs to lowering their pension contributions do not take on
higher leverage: they likely use other sources of funds to finance their pension contribu-
tions.
The four groups of specifications presented in Table 3.3 explore several possible deter-
minants of pension firms’ leverage ratios. Models (1) and (2) consider uncontrolled average
debt ratios: firms with high costs to lowering pension contributions support leverage ratios
that are 3.7 percentage points higher than their counterparts with lower pension costs; these
ratios are 5.8 percentage points higher during periods of easy credit, but no different dur-
ing the credit crunch. Specifications (3) and (4) consider the role of pension leverage. In
theory, pension and external leverage could be complements or substitutes.9 Specifications
9See Shivdasani and Stefanescu (2012) for an explanation of how the tax benefits of debt may create a
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(3) and (4) control for the level of pension debt the firm maintains and find higher external
debt ratios among firms contributing at the minimum. This suggests that pension and ex-
ternal debt may function as substitutes rather than complements. Controlling for the plan
funding status allows regulatory variation in non-linear minimum required contributions
to help identify α and β. A variety of financial factors may very well be correlated with
firms’ decisions to contribute only the minimum to their pensions. Specifications (5) and
(6) control for the impact of a range of financial characteristics that are typically consid-
ered determinants of debt. Controlling for these factors minimally reduces the estimated
difference in leverage between firms at and above the minimum required contribution: dur-
ing times of easy credit, firms contributing at the minimum support leverage ratios that are
only 4.6 percentage points, rather than 6.1 percentage points, higher than their counter-
parts contributing above the minimum.10 The more conservative estimates in Table 3.5 that
control for firm, rather than industry, fixed-effects present a similar pattern: firms support
leverage ratios that are 2.1 percentage points higher in years in which they contribute at the
minimum than in years they contribute above the minimum from 2000 through 2007 and
2012-2013, but this difference is insignificant during the credit crunch.
Finally, specifications (7) and (8) explore a situation in which high costs of contributing
less to the pension may play a less important role in the firm’s borrowing decision. Firms’
decisions to borrow more to make minimum required contributions result from contracting
problems and conflicts of interest between stockholders and bondholders. The decisions of
a firm with negative owner equity, however, may be less driven by this conflict. Specifica-
tions (7) and (8) control for an indicator of whether the firm faces negative owner equity.
As predicted, absent the differences driven by variations in the conflict of interest, firms
with costly pensions support a leverage ratio that is only 2.5 percentage points higher than
their counterparts with less costly pensions when facing easy credit.
3.6.1.2 S&P Long-term bond ratings
Table 3.4 presents estimates of α and β when the dependent variable is the ratings index.
Lower ratings suggest higher default probabilities. Like Table 3.3, this table shows specifi-
cations that jointly consider firms contributing at the minimum in all years (odd-numbered
specifications) and specifications that separately consider firms contributing at the mini-
mum during normal times and in the credit crunch (even-numbered specifications). The
substitutes relationship between pension and external debt and careful empirical evidence of such a pattern,
or Lay (2016) for an overview of several theories of the relationship between pension and external debt.
10Robustness checks in appendix 2 show that adding controls sequentially maintains a stead estimate of α
.046.
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preferred specification (6) estimates α = −.0376 and β = .0338. These estimates suggest
that firms contributing the minimum required contribution in years of easy credit face bond
ratings that are over three-quarters of a notch lower than their counterparts contributing
above the minimum. At the average sample rating of BBB- for firms contributing at the
minimum, a decrease in the S&P rating by three-quarters of a notch is equivalent to an
increase in the 3-year bond spread over treasuries of 24 basis points, or an increase in the
3-year default premium of 22 percent.11
The four groups of specifications in Table 3.4 shed light on the role of several deter-
minants of firms’ bond ratings. Models (1) and (2) show that the uncontrolled average
difference in ratings is α = −.043, or about one ratings notch, from 2000 through 2013.
This estimate is driven by lower ratings among firms contributing at the minimum from
2000 through 2007 and after 2012. In specification (2), α = −.0969: firms contributing
at the minimum face lower ratings by one and a half notches. The magnitude of this esti-
mate diminishes substantially in specifications (3) through (8) after controlling for the plan
funding status and other determinants of ratings. Estimates in Table 3.5 controlling for firm
fixed effects suggest a similar pattern. In the preferred specification (7), firms contributing
at the minimum required contribution face bond ratings that are 2
5
notches lower, or a de-
fault premium that is 5.9 percent higher, than their counterparts with less costly pensions.
Again, this difference disappears during the credit crunch.
3.7 Discussion
The previous section suggests that firms making the minimum required contribution bor-
row more than their counterparts contributing above the minimum during periods of easy
financing (2000-2007, 2012-2013) than they do during a credit crunch (2009-2011). This
financing pattern could motivate several different patterns of investment. Suppose, for ex-
ample, that firms contributing at the minimum in 2000 through 2007 borrowed more so
that they could make the minimum required contribution without decreasing their invest-
ment. In this situation, bond ratings among firms contributing at and above the minimum
should be the same from 2000 through 2007 after controlling for standard determinants of
ratings, including leverage ratios. Continuing with this example, suppose high borrowing
costs prevent firms with costly pensions from borrowing more in 2009 through 2011. As a
result, firms with high minimum required contributions are forced to cut back on profitable
investments so that they have enough cash to contribute to their pensions. In this exam-
ple, firms contributing at the minimum during the credit crunch forgo profitable investment
11Using the differences in the bond spread for industrials by S&P rating in 2006 provided by Rueters.
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opportunities and would have lower ratings than their counterparts contributing above the
minimum. In specification 3.7, α would be zero and β negative when the outcome variable
is the ratings index.
Section 3.6 describes a different pattern. Instead, α is negative, β is positive, and
α + β = 0: firms contributing at the minimum required face lower ratings than their
counterparts contributing above the minimum required during times of easy credit, and
no difference in ratings during the credit crunch. This suggests that firms that borrowed
to make their minimum required contributions actually made worse investment decisions
during normal times than their counterparts that had less costly pensions and lower borrow-
ing. During the credit crunch, firms contributing at and above the minimum contribution
borrowed the same amount and faced the same bond ratings.
One potential concern is that this finding of no difference between firms contributing at
and above the minimum during the credit crunch is driven by a smaller difference between
those two groups in the average realized regulatory cost of lowering contributions during
the credit crunch than before it. This difference could be smaller during the credit crunch
if firms contributing above the minimum prior to the recession contributed significantly
above the minimum and faced an extremely low regulatory cost to lowering contributions,
while firms contributing above the minimum during the credit crunch only contributed only
slightly higher than the minimum and faced higher regulatory costs to lowering contribu-
tions. In this case, the difference in regulatory costs to lowering contributions between
firms at and above the minimum would be smaller during the recession than before. As a
result, the expected difference in leverage and investment risk between these groups would
also be smaller. Two empirical facts run counter to this scenario. First, firms that con-
tributed at the minimum required contribution during but not before the credit crunch, in
fact, contributed closer to their minimum, on average, prior to the credit crunch than their
counterparts that never contributed at the minimum. Using this metric, the difference in
the regulatory cost of lowering contributions should be larger during than before the credit
crunch. Second, Figure 3.3 shows that debt and ratings levels among firms at the minimum
during the credit crunch the recession were in line with debt and ratings levels among firms
above the minimum prior to the credit crunch. If the insignificant coefficients during the
recession were driven by smaller differences in regulatory costs, then firms at the minimum
would borrow less, on average, than they did before the recession, while firms above the
minimum would borrow more.
A second potential concern is that the indicator of high regulatory costs employed in
specification 3.7 is correlated with unobserved investment opportunities. Firms with high
unobserved investment opportunities may have high demand for cash flow that is not cap-
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tured by the standard controls and may also contribute only the minimum required to the
pension. At the same time, unobserved investment opportunities can influence the outcome
variables of interest. Asymmetric information between the borrower and lender would
imply that unobserved investment opportunities create a wedge between the internal and
external cost of funds, encouraging firms to finance more with inside equity than debt.
Further, firms with unobserved investment opportunities would likely have higher than ex-
pected ratings. This dynamic implies that the estimate of the impact of high regulatory
pension costs on the external leverage ratio would be biased downward, while the estimate
of that impact on ratings would be biased upward. Consequently, it is despite this bias
that, before the recession, leverage is higher and ratings lower for firms contributing at the
minimum than their counterparts contributing above the minimum. Further, while this bias
contributes to the narrowing of the gaps between firms contributing at and above the min-
imum during the credit crunch, it is because firms are constraining their contributions to
their pensions so that they have funds to finance these unobserved investment opportunities:
they are borrowing from their pensioners to support productive investment.
The theory presented in Section 3.3 turns to the impact of pension regulations on firms’
financing and investment incentives when agency problems exist among stakeholders to
explain the patterns revealed in this paper. Firms with large pension debts that can be
written-off in bankruptcy at a lower cost than traditional bonds see debt as a more attractive
form of finance than equity. Firms contributing at the legally required minimum are at a
corner solution: they would like to contribute less, but are legally prohibited from doing so.
These firms borrow externally to make their contributions. Contracting problems between
stockholders and bondholders encourage these firms with inflated leverage to over-invest
in risky projects. In a credit crunch, external debt is more expensive relative to the cost
of contributing less to their pension. Firms finance pension contributions out of internal
funds, diverting money from socially risky investments. This leads to a pattern of high
debt and risky investments (low ratings) among firms contributing at the minimum required
contribution during normal times, but more similar levels of debt and investment risk during
a credit crunch.
3.8 Conclusion
Macroeconomic conditions rendered defined benefit pension plans particularly costly through-
out the 2000s. Market declines in 2001-2002 led to large losses in the value of pension
assets. At the same time, falls in interest rates implied higher discounted levels of pen-
sion liabilities. In 2003, the aggregate funding ratio of private pensions hit 84 percent, a
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historical low, while the total amount of employer contributions increased five-fold from
the beginning of the decade. Asset price increases throughout the mid-2000s and changes
in pension regulations helped pension plans regain funding status and lowered contribu-
tion requirements. Yet, just after the aggregate funding ratio climbed above 100 percent in
2007, the Great Recession issued in a new decline in market values of pension assets and
further increased the present discounted value of pension liabilities.
As a result of these dynamics, costly pensions with large deficits and high contribu-
tion requirements were a prominent concern in the 2008 financial crisis. The high profile
bankruptcies of General Motors and Chrysler, two automakers deemed “too big to fail,”
incited further concern regarding how these costly pensions influenced firms’ performance
when the economy needed stimulus. A prevailing concern has been that large required
pension contributions during the recession diverted cash-flow that is in high demand from
productive investments. However, this concern ignores pension regulations that allowed
firms to temporarily waive or reduce pension contributions, and the potential impact of
interactions between pension regulations and existing stakeholder conflicts on how firms
chose to invest.
This paper suggests that the real detrimental impact of costly pensions on firm per-
formance occurred before the recession: when firms with costly pensions faced the easy
financing of the mid-2000s, they borrowed externally to make pension contributions and
supported leverage ratios that were 4.6 percentage points higher than their counterparts
with less costly pensions. At the same time, conflicts of interest between their managers
and pensioners encouraged managers to make investments that increased default premiums
by 22 percent relative to their counterparts with less costly pensions. During the recession,
firms with costly pensions did not increase leverage – because external financing was more
costly than decreasing pension contributions – and their default premiums were no higher
than their counterparts with less costly pensions. This dynamic suggests that, in the reces-
sion, firms with costly pensions borrowed from pensioners without borrowing externally
to decrease the regulatory cost of pensions. They also did not have higher default premia
than their counterparts with less costly pensions, suggesting that diversion in cash flow to
pension contributions was minimal or from over-investment in risky projects, rather than
productive investment.
A full treatment of how costly pensions influenced firm performance in the 2008 reces-
sion would take into account dynamics beyond firms’ adjustment in borrowing and invest-
ment risk in response to costly required pension contributions within year. This paper finds
that costly pensions encouraged firms to borrow more and assume higher default premiums
in the mid-2000s. Were those firms, in fact, more likely to default in the turmoil following
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the collapse of Lehman Brothers? Raising another question: not all pension plans expe-
rienced the market crash of 2008 in the same way. Some firms in the sample studied in
this paper lost as much as 55 percent of total pension assets from 2007 to 2009, while oth-
ers gained as much as 32 percent. Did firms that experienced worse performance in their
pension account similarly experience worse performance in their general accounts over the
recession? These are some of the remaining questions about how defined benefit pensions
influenced firm performance over the Great Recession.
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Figure 3.1: Employer-Sponsored Defined Benefit Plans, 1975-2013
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Notes. These figures show aggregate data for all single-employer defined benefit pension insured by the
Pension Benefit Guarantee Corporation. Employer contributions represents all employer contributions made
to insured plans within the year. The aggregate funding ratio is the ratio of total assets held in insured plans
to the total projected benefit obligation of insured plans. Note that the funding ratio is available in 1980,
1985, and then every year from 1990 through 2013. Contributions are available at an annual frequency
from 1975 through 2013. Data source is the 2014 Pension Insurance Data Book released by the PBGC
(http : //www.pbgc.gov/prac/data− books.html).
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Notes. Shows the fraction of firms that contribute at or below the minimum required contribution to at least
one pension plan reported on the Form 5500 and matched to its sponsor in Compustat. The base sample is the
matched sample described in Table 1. Plans are categorized as contributing at or below the minimum required
contribution if total employer contributions for the given year, reported in schedule B of the Form 5500, are
less than or equal to the minimum required contribution reported on that same schedule. The Department of
Labor shifted to electronic reporting in 2008; the first year of data following this shift, 2008, is not available in
the Form 5500 data released online. The method by which firms report contributions and minimum required
contributions remains the same before and after 2008.
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Figure 3.3: Debt and Ratings of Firms Contributing at and above the Minimum
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Notes. These figures show average debt ratio and ratings within year among firms that contributed at or
below the minimum required contribution (solid line) and firms that contributed zero or above the minimum
required contribution (dotted line). The underlying sample is all firms in the matched sample reported in
Table 1. The debt ratios and long-term bond ratios are reported in Compustat. The long-term bond rating is
transformed into a continuous index: a rating of AAA translates to 1 while a rating of D translates to 0. Each
notch improvement in bond rating, such as an increase from B to B+, increases the index by .04¯5. An index
of .6 is equivalent to a bond rating of BBB-. Firms are categorized as contributing at or above the minimum
required contribution with data from Form 5500, Schedule B/SB. No average is reported for 2008.
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Notes. The sample underlying this figure is isolated to firms that contributed at or below the minimum
required contribution to at least one pension plan between 2000 and 2007. The figure shows the fraction
of firms in that sample that contributed at or below the minimum in each year from 2000 through 2013.
30 percent or fewer of these firms contributed at the minimum in any given year, suggesting that firms in
the sample contribute at the minimum during some years and above the minimum in others. This provides
observations of the behavior of any given firm both in years in which it contributes at the minimum and years
in which it contributes above the minimum. A similar fraction of firms in this isolated sample contribute at
the minimum during the credit crunch as before, implying that firms that contribute at the minimum before
the recession are likely to do so after, as well.
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Figure 3.5: Debt and Ratings of Firms Contributing at and above the Minimum: Pre-credit
crunch sample
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Notes. The sample underlying this figure is isoalted to firms that contributed at or below the minimum
required contribution to at least one pension plan in some year between 2000 and 2007. The figure shows
the average debt ratio and ratings index within year among firms in that sample contributing at or below
the minimum (solid line) or firms contributing zero or above the minimum (dotted line). The debt ratio and
long-term bond index are reported in Compustat. The long-term bond rating is transformed into a continuous
index: a rating of AAA translates to 1 while a rating of D translates to 0. Each notch improvement in bond
rating, such as an increase from B to B+, increases the index by .04¯5. An index of .6 is equivalent to a bond
rating of BBB-. The lines plot the average within year and contribution group. No data is available for 2008.
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Figure 3.6: Debt and Ratings of Firms Contributing at and above the Minimum
Deviation from Mean within Firm
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Notes. The sample underlying this figure is all firms in the matched sample reported in Table 1. The individual
observations underlying this figure are deviations from the average debt or ratings within firm in years when
the firm contributes at the minimum or above. The figure plots the average deviation from the mean within
firm in years in which firms are contributing at and above the minimum required. The debt ratio and long-term
bond index are reported in Compustat. The long-term bond rating is transformed into a continuous index: a
rating of AAA translates to 1 while a rating of D translates to 0. Each notch improvement in bond rating,
such as an increase from B to B+, increases the index by .04¯5. An index of .6 is equivalent to a bond rating
of BBB-. The lines plot the average within year and contribution group. No data is reported for 2008.
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Notes. The sample underlying this figure is isolated to firms that contributed at or below the minimum
required contribution to at least one pension plan between 2009 and 2011. The figure shows the fraction of
firms in that sample that contributed at or below the minimum in each year from 2000 through 2013. Between
38 and 45 percent of firms in the sample contributed at the minimum in any given year during the recession.
Fewer than 10 percent of firms contributed at the minimum prior to the recession, suggesting that many new
firms contribute at the minimum during the recession.
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Figure 3.8: Debt and Ratings of Firms Contributing at and above the Minimum: Credit
crunch sample
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Notes. The sample underlying this figure is isoalted to firms that contributed at or below the minimum
required contribution to at least one pension plan in some year between 2009 and 2011. The figure shows
the average debt ratio and ratings index within year among firms in that sample contributing at or below
the minimum (solid line) or firms contributing zero or above the minimum (dotted line). The debt ratio and
long-term bond index are reported in Compustat. The long-term bond rating is transformed into a continuous
index: a rating of AAA translates to 1 while a rating of D translates to 0. Each notch improvement in bond
rating, such as an increase from B to B+, increases the index by .04¯5. An index of .6 is equivalent to a bond
rating of BBB-. The lines plot the average within year and contribution group. No data is available for 2008.
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Table 3.1: Sample Selection from Compustat and Deal Scan Firms
All Form 5500 Both All Compustat
Above At MRC Above At MRC
MRC MRC
MRC ($ Thous)
Mean 2,104 4,489 5,422 19,468
Median 0 665 0 1,700
Total Contributions ($ Thous)
Mean 8,182 3,278 21,802 11,782
Median 516 557 749 1,417
Pct. Contributing Zero 30 0 38 0
Total Participants
Mean 3,975 2,010 11,252 7,822
Median 621 426 2,491 1,358
Funding Ratio
Mean 99 89 105 87
Median 93 86 98 85
Total Liabilities ($ Thous)
Mean 152,590 87,885 671,905 774,034
Median 13,550 10,103 114,305 143,676
Pension Shortfall ($ Thous)
Mean -43,264 2,210 -95,755 19,579
Median 57 641 265 2,266
External Leverage
Mean .28 .32 .26
Median .24 .26 .22
Pension Leverage
Mean .03 .15 .03
Median .02 .03 .01
Firm Size
Mean 7.53 7.31 6.88
Median 7.54 7.19 7.05
Tangibility
Continued on next page
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Table 3.1 – continued from previous page
All Compustat Both All DealScan
Above At MRC Above At MRC
MRC MRC
Mean .31 .3 .31
Median .27 .27 .25
Market-to-Book Ratio
Mean 1.68 1.53 2.59
Median 1.42 1.29 1.37
Profitability
Mean .09 .08 .13
Median .05 .06 .07
N Obs 88,946 28,301 6,639 934 28,190
N Firms 9,381 3,725 1,047 474 3,806
N Plans 12,540 4,725
Notes. The “All Form 5500” sample includes all defined benefit pension plans with more than 100 participants
from 2000 through 2013, excluding those plans sponsored by firms in financial or utilities sectors (identified
by SIC codes 6000-6999 and 4900-4999). The “All Compustat” sample includes all firms that sponsor defined
benefit pensions in Compustat from 2000 through 2013, excluding firms in the financial or utilities sectors.
Matched firms include firms that were able to be matched to pension plans using their identification number
or a fuzzy name match. All variables are described in the data appendix.
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Table 3.2: Pension Firms Contributing at and above the Minimum Required Contribution
Contributing Zero Contributing At
or Above MRC or Below MRC
2001 2007 2010 2001 2007 2010
External Leverage
Mean .32 .26 .25 .42 .29 .26
Median .28 .21 .21 .36 .23 .23
Ratings Index
Mean .58 .56 .55 .51 .45 .56
Median .61 .57 .57 .48 .43 .57
Control Variables
Funding Ratio
Mean 110 99 88 86 80 87
Median 99 94 83 86 79 82
Pension Shortfall Ratio
Mean .01 0 .05 .04 .05 .05
Median .01 .01 .03 .02 .02 .04
Pension Obligations ($mil)
Mean 1,246 2,300 2,185 491 276 4,034
Median 119 304 341 40 129 521
Market-to-Book Ratio
Mean 1.59 1.83 1.62 1.5 1.62 1.54
Median 1.29 1.58 1.44 1.16 1.28 1.34
Firm Size
Mean 7.11 7.84 7.77 6.31 6.96 7.98
Median 7.08 7.84 7.82 6.51 6.97 8.25
Tangibility
Mean .33 .29 .28 .34 .29 .29
Median .3 .24 .24 .34 .25 .26
Profitability
Mean .06 .09 .11 .07 .08 .11
Median .03 .05 .09 .02 .05 .08
Z-score
Continued on next page
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Table 3.2 – continued from previous page
Contributing Zero Contributing At
or Above MRC or Below MRC
2001 2007 2010 2001 2007 2010
Mean 7,721 17,103 15,955 4,144 5,625 26,720
Median 1,595 4,444 3,829 638 1,006 5,403
Firm Age
Mean 28 33 35 26 25 38
Median 30 36 37 27 20 44
Non-Pension Assets ($mil)
Mean 7,029 12,285 10,972 2,891 2,901 24,154
Median 1,080 2,793 2,806 554 917 4,227
Interest Coverage
Mean 20 34 37 28 11 22
Median 5 9 10 3 5 7
Pct. Rated 57 68 65 47 55 72
Pct. Investment Grade 62 55 57 40 26 55
Pct. Zero Contrib 53 51 20 0 0 0
Pct. Neg Owner’s Eq 9 5 9 19 16 10
N Firms 170 56 51 52 27 61
Notes. The sample presented includes all matched firms in 2001, 2007, and 2010. Variables, reported at the
firm-year level, are described in the Data Appendix.
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Table 3.3: Differences in the Ratio of Debt to Non-Pension Assets for Firms at and above the Minimum Required Contribution
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
MRC (α) .0367∗∗∗ .058∗∗∗ .0424∗∗∗ .0607∗∗∗ .0311∗∗∗ .0459∗∗∗ .0158∗ .025∗∗
(.0101) (.0128) (.0107) (.0134) (.00971) (.0123) (.00841) (.0107)
MRC × Credit Crunch (β) -.0746∗∗∗ -.0718∗∗∗ -.0549∗∗∗ -.034∗∗
(.0178) (.0188) (.0172) (.0161)
α + β -.0165 -.0111 -.0090 -.0090
(.0312) (.0326) (.0302) (.0257)
Shortfall to non-pen assets .00809∗∗∗ .00793∗∗∗ .00963∗∗∗ .0095∗∗∗ .00775∗∗∗ .00768∗∗∗
(.000339) (.000353) (.000504) (.000509) (.000787) (.000793)
Pension Funding Status 4.19e-08 3.75e-08 1.24e-09 2.78e-09 1.72e-08 1.80e-08
(8.42e-08) (7.97e-08) (5.02e-08) (4.97e-08) (4.96e-08) (4.93e-08)
Log Pension Obligations -.00489∗ -.00445 .00552 .00576 -.00132 -.00115
(.00296) (.00295) (.00498) (.00497) (.00441) (.00441)
Market-to-book ratio .00655 .00659 -.00266 -.00259
(.00686) (.00684) (.00581) (.0058)
Firm size .00241 .0026 .0133∗∗∗ .0134∗∗∗
(.00585) (.00582) (.00503) (.00502)
Tangibility .0412 .0412 .0379 .0378
Continued on next page
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Table 3.3 – continued from previous page
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
(.034) (.0338) (.0318) (.0317)
Profitability -.483∗∗∗ -.481∗∗∗ -.465∗∗∗ -.463∗∗∗
(.0489) (.0487) (.0471) (.0471)
Z-score -4.92e-07∗∗∗ -4.94e-07∗∗∗ -4.59e-07∗∗∗ -4.61e-07∗∗∗
(1.29e-07) (1.29e-07) (1.03e-07) (1.03e-07)
Median Industry Leverage .385∗∗ .376∗∗ .329∗ .322∗
(.187) (.186) (.17) (.169)
Negative Equity .267∗∗∗ .266∗∗∗
(.0312) (.0312)
Observations 7526 7526 7246 7246 6342 6342 6342 6342
R2 0.040 0.043 0.043 0.045 0.137 0.139 0.229 0.230
Notes. Table presents results from specification (7), with the ratio of debt to non-pension assets as the outcome variable. Standard errors, clustered at firm level, in
parentheses; ∗p < .10, ∗∗p < .05, ∗∗∗p < .01. All specifications include year and industry fixed effects. MRC is an indicator of whether the firm contributed at the
minimum to any of its pension plans in the previous year. Credit Crunch is an indicator for the years 2009, 2010, and 2011. Control variables are described in the
Data Appendix. The hypotheses are α > 0 and α+ β = 0. α > 0 implies firms contributing at the MRC borrow more than firms in the same industry contributing
above the MRC in years in which financing is easy. α+ β¡α implies that firms contributing at the MRC do not borrow as much more other firms in the industry not
contributing at the MRC when financing is tight.
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Table 3.4: Differences in S&P Long-term Bond Ratings for Firms Contributing at and above the Minimum Required Contribution
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
MRC (α) -.0434∗∗∗ -.0696∗∗∗ -.0375∗∗∗ -.0489∗∗∗ -.0282∗∗∗ -.0376∗∗∗ -.0266∗∗∗ -.0351∗∗∗
(.00935) (.0109) (.00756) (.00894) (.00656) (.0077) (.00628) (.00733)
MRC × Credit Crunch (β) .0835∗∗∗ .0408∗∗∗ .0338∗∗∗ .0307∗∗∗
(.0157) (.0136) (.011) (.0108)
α + β -.0139 -.0081 -.0037 -.0044
(.0244) (.0216) (.0192) (.0193)
Shortfall to non-pen assets -.747∗∗∗ -.745∗∗∗ -.393∗∗∗ -.391∗∗∗ -.328∗∗∗ -.326∗∗∗
(.112) (.112) (.082) (.0818) (.0794) (.0792)
Pension Funding Status -9.66e-08∗ -9.36e-08∗ -2.57e-08 -2.31e-08 -1.88e-08 -1.65e-08
(4.98e-08) (5.33e-08) (8.14e-08) (8.44e-08) (9.98e-08) (1.02e-07)
Log Pension Obligations .0419∗∗∗ .0416∗∗∗ -.00356 -.00376 -.00256 -.00274
(.00355) (.00355) (.00387) (.00387) (.00382) (.00383)
Log Assets .0563∗∗∗ .0563∗∗∗ .0544∗∗∗ .0544∗∗∗
(.00524) (.00522) (.00524) (.00522)
Debt to Total assets -.173∗∗∗ -.172∗∗∗ -.125∗∗∗ -.125∗∗∗
(.0226) (.0225) (.025) (.0249)
Interest Coverage .0000939 .0000942 .0000998 .0001
Continued on next page
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Table 3.4 – continued from previous page
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
(.0000589) (.0000592) (.0000617) (.0000619)
Tangibility -.0584∗∗ -.0586∗∗ -.052∗∗ -.0522∗∗
(.024) (.024) (.0239) (.0239)
Profitability -.0897∗ -.0924∗ -.0639 -.0666
(.0542) (.0542) (.0526) (.0526)
Negative Equity -.0737∗∗∗ -.0733∗∗∗
(.0163) (.0162)
Observations 4748 4748 4607 4607 4571 4571 4571 4571
R2 0.022 0.030 0.290 0.291 0.529 0.530 0.540 0.542
Notes. Standard errors, clustered at firm level, in parentheses; ∗p < .10, ∗∗p < .05, ∗∗∗p < .01. Table presents results from specification (7), with the ratio of debt
to non-pension assets as the outcome variable. All specifications include year and industry fixed effects. MRC is an indicator of whether the firm contributed at the
minimum to any of its pension plans in the previous year. Credit Crunch is an indicator for the years 2009, 2010, and 2011. Control variables described in the Data
Appendix. The hypotheses are α < 0 and α+β = 0. α < 0 implies firms facing easy financing make riskier investments relative to the industry average than firms
contributing above the minimum. α+β+α = 0 implies that firms contributing at the minimum face similar ratings relative to the industry average when financing
is tight.
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Table 3.5: Within-firm Differences in Debt and Ratings in Years when Firms Contribute at and above the Minimum Required Contribu-
tion
Debt to non-pension assets Ratings Index
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
MRC (α) .0216∗∗ .0235∗∗∗ .0214∗∗ .0177∗ -.01∗∗ -.00745 -.00897∗ -.00833∗
(.00837) (.00871) (.00966) (.00922) (.00505) (.00499) (.00475) (.0046)
MRC × Credit Crunch (β) -.0335∗∗ -.0336∗∗ -.0354∗∗ -.0325∗∗ .00531 .00841 .0104 .0092
(.0131) (.015) (.0148) (.0146) (.00676) (.00784) (.00731) (.00709)
α + β -.0119 -.0101 -.0140 -.0148 -.0047 .0010 .0014 .0009
(.0351) (.0382) (.0401) (.0388) (.0142) (.0151) (.0150) (.0145)
Firm and Year Fixed Effects X X X X X X X X
Pension Controls X X X X X X
Firm Controls X X X X
Neg. Equity Indicator X X
Observations 5838 5656 4949 4949 3528 3423 3398 3398
R2 0.023 0.024 0.044 0.073 0.103 0.137 0.213 0.240
Notes. Standard errors, clustered at firm level, in parentheses; ∗p < .10, ∗∗p < .05, ∗∗∗p < .01. All specifications include year and firm fixed effects. MRC is an
indicator of whether the firm contributed at the minimum to any of its pension plans in the given year. Credit Crunch is an indicator for the years 2009, 2010, and
2011. Control variables are described in the Data Appendix. The hypotheses are α > 0 and β < 0 for Debt to non-pension assets, and α < 0 and β > 0 for the
ratings index: pension firms borrow more and make riskier investments in years in which they contribute at the MRC than in years when they contribute above the




The model solution consists of three mutually consistent decisions of the firm and the
lender: the firm’s financing decision in period 1, the lender’s loan offering in period 1,
and the firm’s allocation decision in period 2. The following shorthand describes various
measures related to the pension and production.
1. The expected return on the pension account:
E{1 + ρ} = `(1 + ρs) + (1− `)(1 + ρF )
2. The expected square return to the pension account
E{(1 + ρ)2} = `(1 + ρs)2 + (1− `)(1 + ρF )2
3. The expected pension surplus
E(S|C) =`(1 + ρS)[(P + C)−D]+ (1− `)(1 + ρF )[(P + C)−D]
=E{1 + ρ}(P + C)−D
4. The expected squared pension surplus
E(S2|C) = `[(1 + ρS)(P + C)−D]2 + (1− `)[(1 + ρF )(P + C)−D]2
5. The expected amount of claimable pension assets in bankruptcy:
E(χS|C) = `χF [(1 + ρS)(P + C)−D]2 + (1− `)χS[(1 + ρF )(P + C)−D]2
6. Expected productivity:
E(z) = pzS + (1− p)zF
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A.1 The Allocation Decision
The firm begins the second period with total operating funds Y (total operating funds Y =
E + B + X), pension assets P and pension liabilities D. The firm faces a loan repayment
b that must be made at the beginning of the third period. It allocates Y across investment
I and pension contributions C before realizing risky returns. The firm that raised enough
equity to avoid bankruptcy if production fails (safe agreement), and the firm that did not
(risky agreement) face the following optimization problems:
A Safe Agreement
The sponsor chooses IS and CS to
maximize:
(






Y ≥ IS + CS multplier: ηS
IS ≥ 0 CS ≥ 0 multipliers: ξI , ξC
Solvency when production fails:
gF (IS, CS) ≥ bS
A Risky Agreement










Y ≥IR + CR multiplier: ηR
IR ≥ 0 CR ≥ 0 multipliers: ξI , ξC
Bankruptcy when production fails:
gF (IR, CR) < br
Solvency when production succeeds
gS(IR, CR) ≥ br
Notes: The function gX(I, C) is the amount of funds the sponsor has on hand to pay expenses in period 3:
gX(I, C) = zXf(I) + (1 + r)(Y − I − C) + χF [(1 + ρF )(P + C)−D]
A.1.1 The allocation decision when the sponsor chose a safe agree-
ment
With a safe agreement, the sponsor will not go bankrupt if production fails. Ignoring the
bankruptcy constraints, let the LaGrange multipliers be ηS (cash constraint), ξI and ξC
(non-zero investment and contribution constraints). Note that f(•) satisfies the Inada con-













E{1 + ρ} − (1 + r)





− P + ξC − η
µE{(1 + ρ)2} (A.2)
Define:
C¯ =
E{1 + ρ} − (1 + r)







Two solutions to maximization problem (1) are of interest: the interior solution when the
firm allocates some funds toward a safe asset (η = 0 and Y > I + C) and the constrained
solution when the firm invests or contributes all of its funds (η > 0 and Y = I + C).1










Constrained Let I∗SC and C∗SC be the firm’s allocation when Y < I∗S + C∗S or ηS > 0. In
this case, the firm does not allocate any funds toward the safe asset. Further suppose that
C∗S > 0 (note that if CS = 0, C
∗
SC = 0 and I
∗








C∗SC = C¯ −
η
µE{(1 + ρ)2} (A.7)
1This appendix does not solve solutions in when the bankruptcy constraint binds. Those solutions are
available upon request, but do not contribute substantially to the understanding of the model: the uncon-
strained sponsor will choose an allocation that allows it to go bankrupt rather than adopt one of these corner
solutions.
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Solve this system of equations for I∗SC and note that C
∗
SC = Y − I∗SC to find that I∗SC solves
the equation:
I∗SC −
f ′(I∗SC)E(z)− (1 + r)
µE{(1 + ρ)2} = Y − C¯ (A.8)
When f(I) has decreasing returns to scale, the left-hand side of equation A.8 is increasing
in I∗SC .
2 Therefore, a solution exists on the interval [0, Y ] for a given Y if:
Y −
(
E(z)f ′(Y )− (1 + r)
µE{(1 + ρ)2}
)
> Y − C¯ > 0−
(
E(z)f ′(0)− (1 + r)
µE{(1 + ρ)2}
)
The Inada conditions imply f ′(0) =∞; a solution exists for all positive values of Y .
A.1.3 The allocation decision when the sponsor chose a risky agree-
ment
With a risky agreement, the sponsor will go bankrupt if production fails but remain solvent
when production succeeds. Again ignoring the bankruptcy constriants, let the LaGrangian
multipliers be ηR (cash constraint), ξI and ξC (non-zero investment and contribution con-












C = C¯ +
ξC − ηR
µE{(1 + ρ)2} (A.10)
Note that the first-order condition for contributions is the same as that under a safe agree-
ment (equation A.10 is the same as equation A.2), but the first-order condition for invest-
ment differs (equation A.9 differs from equation A.1).
A.1.4 Solutions
Again, two solutions are of interest: the interior solution where ηR = 0 and Y > I + C,
and the constrained solution when ηR > 0 and Y = I + C.
2Note that E(z)µE{(1+ρ)2} > 0 and f
′′(I∗SC) < 0, implying that
∂(LHS)
∂I = 1− E(z)µE{(1+ρ)2}f ′′(I∗SC) > 1
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Constrained Let I∗RC and C∗RC be the constrained firm’s allocation when Y < I∗R + C∗R
(ηR > 0) and the firm does not allocate any funds to the safe asset. Further suppose that










µE{(1 + ρ)2} (A.14)
Solve this system of equations for I∗RC and note that C
∗










= Y − C¯ (A.15)





zsf ′(Y )− (1 + r))
µE{(1 + ρ)2}
)
> Y − C¯ > 0
A.2 The Schedule of Loans
A.2.1 A safe agreement
Suppose the firm has raised equity E and requests a loan of size B from the lender. Let
(I, C) be the firm’s known allocation when the lender sets a required repayment of b. The
lender offers a safe loan when the firm will avoid bankruptcy if production fails:
zFf(I) + (1 + r)(X + E +B − I − C) + E(χS|C) ≥ (1 + r)b (A.16)
The lender, who operates in a competitive market and always gets repaid, will set the re-
quired repayment equal to his opportunity cost of funds:
127
b = (1 + r)B (A.17)
Given the firm’s allocation decisions described above, an equilibrium in which the lender
offers a safe rate is possible when equations A.16 and A.17 are consistent, or:
(1 + r)(X + E) ≥ (1 + r)(I∗S + C∗S)− zFf(I∗S)− E(χS|C∗S) (A.18)
A.2.2 A risky agreement
Suppose the firm has raised equity E and requests a loan of size B from the lender. Let
(I, C) be the firm’s known allocation when the lender sets a required repayment of b. The
lender offers a risky loan when the firm avoids bankruptcy when production succeeds, but
faces bankruptcy when production fails:
zFf(I) + (1 + r)(X +E +B − I −C) + χF [(1 + ρF )(P + C¯)−D]< (1 + r)b (A.19)
zSf(I) + (1 + r)(X +E +B − I −C) + χS[(1 + ρF )(P + C¯)−D]≥ (1 + r)b (A.20)
The lender sets the borrowing premium so that it breaks even in expectation. For a given
amount borrowed, B, the lender’s expected payoff will be:
E1(W (b|B, I(B, b), C(B, b)) = pb+(1−p)zFf(I)+(1+r)(B+X+E−I−C)+E(χS|C)
In the above equation, I andC are known, non-decreasing functions ofB and non-increasing
function of b. The lender sets b so that:




(1 + r)(I −X − E)− zFf(I)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Standard without pension
+ (1 + r)C − E(χS|C)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Premium due to pension
}
(A.21)
Given the firm’s optimal allocation under a risky agreement, the lender offers a risky loan
when equations A.19, A.20, and A.21 are mutually consistent, or:
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(1 + r)(I∗R + C
∗
R)− zFf(I∗R)− E(S|C∗R) >(1 + r)(X + E)
≥(1 + r)(I∗R + C∗R)− zSf(I∗R)− E(S|C∗R)
(A.22)
A.3 The Financing decision
In the first period, the sponsor chooses among a schedule of safe and risky loan agreements.
On the extensive margin, it chooses between a safe and risky loan; on the intensive margin
it chooses how much debt and equity to raise.
A.3.1 Safe Financing: how much will the firm borrow and equity will
it raise?
Suppose the firm raises enough equity to avoid bankruptcy when production fails. The
firm faces borrowing rate 1 + r. Suppose the shareholder receives a safe return on outside
investments of 1 + ro; this is the cost of equity. The firm’s expected payoff is:





I and C are determined in the second period as a function of the financing position
(B,E). As shown in section A.1, investment and contributions are chosen according to







0 if η = 0µE{(1+ρ)2}








0 if η = 0−E(z)f ′′(I)
µE{(1+ρ)2}−E(z)f ′′(I) if η > 0
(A.25)
The firm considers the borrowing rate as a function of the amount borrowed. Let E be
the minimum equity required for the lender to offer a safe loan. The firm’s optimization
problem in the first period is:
max
E,B
V S(E,B, I(B,E), C(B,E))
subject to X + E +B ≥ C + I, E ≥ E, B ≥ 0, C ≥ 0, I ≥ 0
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Let φ be the multiplier on the first constraint, and λx be the multiplier on the non-zero
constraint with respect to variable x. The first order conditions for E and B:
λE =(1 + r

















































are determined in the second period according to equa-
tions (A.24) and (A.25). Therefore, there are two potential classes of solutions for equations
(A.26) and (A.27): (1) interior, where η = 0 and B+E is large, and (2) constrained, where
η > 0 and B + E is small.









= 0. The first-order conditions with respect to equity and debt reduce to:
λE = (1 + r
o)− (1 + r) (A.30)
λB = 0 (A.31)
If the shareholder receives the same safe return inside and outside of the firm (ro = r) the
firm is indifferent between using equity and debt; both are used: λE = λB = 0. If the
shareholder receives a higher return outside of the firm than inside, 1 + ro > 1 + r, and
λE > 0 while λB = 0: debt, but not equity, is used. The firm borrows an amount B∗ so
that X +B∗ ≥ I∗S + C∗S .
Firm allocates at constrained solution Consider the case in which η > 0, implying

















firm’s second-period optimization (equations A.1 and A.2) implies that G = 0 and H = 0,
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leading to the following first-order conditions for debt and equity:
λE = (1 + r
o)− (1 + r)− φ (A.32)
λB = −φ (A.33)
As LaGrange multipliers, λB ≥ 0 and φ ≥ 0 requiring λB = 0. A firm is indifferent
between debt and equity when r = ro and finances only with debt when ro > r.
A.3.2 Risky Financing: bankruptcy when production fails
Now suppose the firm does not raise enough equity to face bankruptcy when production
fails. In this case, the borrowing rate br is described in equation (A.21). The firm’s expected
payoff in such an equilibrium is:
V R = p
{
(1 + r)(X + E +B − I − C) + E(S|C)− µ
2
E(S2|C) + zsf(I)}
− E(1 + ro)− pbr
Total differentiation of bR with respect to debt and equity yields:
∂bR
∂B




































As shown in section A.1.2, investment and contributions are determined as a function of the








0 if η = 0µE{(1+ρ)2}








0 if η = 0−E(z)f ′′(I)











, implying that ∂bR
∂B
= 1 + r + ∂bR
∂E
. The firm chooses




subject to X + E +B ≥ C + I, E ≥ 0, B ≥ 0, C ≥ 0, I ≥ 0
Let φ be the multiplier on the first constraint, and λx be the multiplier on the non-zero
constraint with respect to variable x. The first-order conditions with respect to equity and
debt imply:















































− (1 + r)
)
+ λC
The firm’s allocation across investment and contributions in the second period is deter-
mined by how much it borrows in the first period. The firm may either (1) borrow enough
to allocate at the interior solution: I = I∗R > I
∗
S and C = C
∗
R, implying that φ = 0, or (2)
borrow less and allocate according to the constrained solution: I = I∗RC and C = C
∗
RC ,
implying that φ > 0.




















λE =(1 + r
o)− p(1 + r) + p∂bR
∂E
=(1 + ro)− p(1 + r) + λB
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Suppose ro = r. Then (1 + ro)− p(1 + r) > 0. With λB ≥ 0, then λE > 0. The firm
is no longer indifferent between debt and equity finance; an equilibrium in which the firm
raises non-zero funds in the first period exists only if the firm raises debt but not equity
(λB = 0 and λE > 0). The firm raises enough debt so that X +B ≥ I∗R + C∗R.
The firm allocates at a constrained solution If φ > 0, then η > 0 in equations A.9 and
A.10. Those equations further also allow us to solve for J and K, leading to:
λE =
1 + ro − p
(
1 + r − ∂br
∂E
)
if λC = 0
















− (1 + r))− ∂C
∂B
(1− p)λc if λC > 0
(A.39)
λB =










, we again have: λE = 1 + ro− p(1 + r) + λB. By reasoning analogous
to the case in which the levered firm allocates at the interior solution, the firm will raise
only debt when 1 + ro = 1 + r. To determine the amount of debt that the firm will raise,
note that a non-trivial solution to the optimization problem exists only when λB = 0, or:






















. λB = 0 when:






















Suppose the firm faces enough of a pension deficit so that λC = 0. Further, the total
amount the firm expects to be able to revert from the pension to service debt is 0; this is true
if the pension will be in deficit regardless of the return on pension assets given the optimal


















µE{(1 + ρ)2} − zsf ′′(I)
)
zFµE{(1 + ρ)2} (A.44)
The paper defines this optimal level of investment I∗R −∆I . The marginal return to contri-
butions will be equal to the marginal return to investment when I = I −∆I . The pension
contribution, referred to as C¯ −∆C in the paper, is then determined according to equation
A.10:
C∗RC = C¯ −
(1 + r)p(1− p)(zS − zF )
E(z)µE{(1 + ρ)2} (A.45)
When the firm chooses to constrain its financing φ > 0, it borrowsB such thatX+B =




A.3.3 Endogenous Choice of Financing
These results suggest three potential optimal financing positions, described as E1, D1, and
D2 in Figure 3. Each position is associated with a specific allocation of funds between
investment and contributions. The parameters describing the firm’s production and pension
processes dictate which of the three positions the firm chooses.
When does the levered firm choose to over-invest rather than under-
contribute?
The firm chooses to borrow enough to over-invest when the agency cost of over-investment
is less than the regulatory cost of under-contributions. Suppose a sponsor has chosen a
risky agreement. The sponsor’s payoff from borrowing enough to over invest:










The sponsor’s payoff from constraining borrowing to under-contribute:
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V BC =(1 + r)X − (1 + r)
{







E(S2|C¯ −∆C)}+ (1− p)E(χS|C¯ −∆C)
It will be worthwhile for the firm to borrow less when V BC > V
B
U . This is true when:
(














+ (1− p){E(χS|C¯)− E(χS|C¯ −∆C)}− (1 + r)∆C
(A.46)
The left-hand side of this equation represents the cost of over-production. The right-
hand side represents the cost of under-contributions. The firm borrows enough to over
invest when it is less costly to over-invest than under-contribute.
The cost of over-production When the sponsor borrows under a risky arrangement, the
lender sets the borrowing premium so that the sponsor fully internalize the cost of over-
production. Therefore, when the sponsor chooses to over-invest, it suffers the same cost
associated with production when it borrows under a risky agreement as when it borrows
under a safe agreement–ie., the full cost of over-production:
OPCost =
(




E(z)f(I∗R)− (1 + r)(I∗R)
)
(A.47)
Since I∗S is the optimal solution when the firm internalizes the upside and downside risk
of production, E(z)f(I∗S) − (1 + r)(I∗S) > E(z)f(I∗R) − (1 + r)(I∗R). Therefore, the cost
of over-production is positive.
The cost of under-contributing The optimal level of contributions to the pension ac-
count, regardless of whether the firm borrows under a safe or risky arrangement, is C¯.




E(S|C¯)− E(S|C¯ −∆C)}︸ ︷︷ ︸





E(S2|C¯ −∆C)}︸ ︷︷ ︸
Change in implicit pension cost
+ (1− p){E(χS|C¯)− E(χS|C¯ −∆C)}− (1 + r)∆C︸ ︷︷ ︸
Change in borrowing premium
(A.48)
The decrease in pension surplus will be positive when the firm contributes less to the
pension account. However, the change in the implicit pension cost and the change in bor-
rowing premium may be positive or negative, according to pension parameters. When




pE(1 + ρ)− (1 + r) + (1− p)E{χ(1 + ρ)}
)




The cost to under-contributing is positive, and therefore, potentially larger than the cost
to over-investment, when the firm faces a large expected pension deficit: the second term
in the equation above is negative. The cost may also be increasing in µ, the regulatory
burden of lower contributions, when the firm expects a pension deficit. This identifies two
indicators of a sponsor with a high cost of under-contributing to the pension account: a large
pension deficit or a high regulatory burden of lower contributions. In the empirical analysis,
a firm with an optimal contribution below the federally required minimum contribution is
assumed to face a high regulatory burden of contributing less.
The choice of risky borrowing without a pension A firm without a pension cost will
face a zero cost of under-contributing. Therefore, the positive cost of over-contributing will
be larger than the zero cost of under-contributing: the firm constrains its borrowing in the
first period so that it optimally allocates I∗S in the second period.
When does the firm choose a risky over a safe financing position?
The firm’s payoff when it chooses a risky financing position is:




The firm’s payoff when it chooses a safe financing agreement is:
V S = (1 + r)(X − I − C) + E(S|C)− µ
2
E(S2|C) + E(z)(I)
The firm chooses safe financing over risky finaning when V B > V E .
A firm that over-invests under a risky agreement If the cost to over-investment is lower
than the cost to under-contributions, the sponsor knows that the ideal risky financing ar-
rangement will allow it to over-invest in production. The firm chooses a safe agreement
when:
(












The left-hand side of this inequality is the familiar cost of over-investment. The right-
hand side is the cost associated with the pension account that the sponsor avoids if it enters
bankruptcy and is larger when the firm expects a pension deficit. The paper refers to this as
the pension cost avoided in bankruptcy, or simply the ‘avoided pension cost’:







Therefore, a firm that would over-invest under a risky agreement will choose a safe
agreement when the cost of doing so – fully internalizing the pension cost when production
fails – outweighs the benefit – avoiding the cost of over-investment.
A firm that under-contributes under a risky agreement If the cost to under-contributions
is lower than the cost to over-investment, the sponsor knows that the ideal risky financ-
ing arrangement will imply it under-contributes to the pension. The firm chooses a safe
agreement when the cost to under-contributing is greater than the pension cost avoided in
bankruptcy:




E(S2|C¯ −∆C)− E(χS|C¯ −∆C)− E(S|C¯ −∆C)
)
A firm without a pension The previous section suggests that a firm without a pension
will choose to constrain its borrowing so that it invests optimally. The results of this sug-
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gestion suggest that a firm will make a safe agreement when the cost of under-contributing
are higher than the avoided pension cost. When a firm does not sponsor a pension, both are
zero. Therefore, a firm without a pension is indifferent between safe and risky financing.
This is the canonical Modigliani-Miller result.
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APPENDIX B
Model Solution With Corporate Tax
Now suppose assets held in the firm are subject to a corporate tax τ . Debt payments and
pension contributions are both tax deductible, and returns earned on assets held in the
pension account can be claimed as an exemption. If the pension is over 150 percent funded,
contributions to and returns on the pension account are no longer tax deducible.
B.1 Bankruptcy constraints and 3rd period payoff
The firm remains solvent if it is able to repay the lender with after-tax corporate profits and
the claimable amount in the pension account:
(1− τ)[zjf(I) + (1 + r)(B +X + E − I − C)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
After-tax assets held within the firm
+ χw
[
(1 + ρk)(P + C)−D]︸ ︷︷ ︸
Pension assets that could be used
to cover required payments
− τC1{(1 + ρk)(P + C) > 150D}︸ ︷︷ ︸





Let T be the excise tax on assets taken out of the pension, F be the (proportional) cost
associated with terminating a pension plan, and τ be the corporate tax rate. The claimable
portion of pension assets is:
χ =

0 If pension is in deficit: (1 + ρk)(P + C) < D
(1− T − F ) if (1 + ρk)(P + C) ∈ (D, 1.5D)
(1− T − F − τ) if (1 + ρk)(P + C) > 1.5D
(B.2)
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Contributions to the pension account are tax deductible and returns earned on the assets
held in the pension account can be claimed as tax exemptions. The loss of the tax break
when the pension account is over 150 percent funded is captured in the regulatory cost of
pension. The firm’s third period payoff is:
V jk =

(1− τ)[zjf(I) + (1 + r)(B +X + E − I − C)− b]︸ ︷︷ ︸
Profits held in firm
+
[
(1 + ρk)(P + C)−D]︸ ︷︷ ︸




(1 + ρk)(P + C)−D]2︸ ︷︷ ︸
Regulatory pension cost
If the firm is solvent
0 If firm is insolvent
(B.3)
The lender’s third period payoff is:
W jk =

b If firm is solvent
(1− τ)[zjf(I) + (1 + r)(B +X + E − I − C)]︸ ︷︷ ︸




(1 + ρk)(P + C)−D]︸ ︷︷ ︸
Potential claimable pension assets
If the firm is insolvent
(B.4)
B.2 The loan agreement
A safe agreement When the firm agrees to raise equity E¯ such that it will not face
bankruptcy if production fails, the firm sets bS = (1 + r)B
A risky agreement Suppose the firm agrees to raise equity E < C¯, implying that the








B.3 The Allocation Decisions
In the second period, after the firm raises Y , it allocates under a safe or risky agreement
(depending on its period 1 financing decision):
A Safe Agreement












Y ≥ IτS + CτS multplier: ηS
Y = B +X + E
IτS ≥ 0 CτS ≥ 0 multipliers: ξI , ξC
Solvency when production fails:
gF (IS, CS) ≥ bS
A Risky Agreement










Y ≥I + C multiplier: ηR
Y =B +X
I ≥ 0 C ≥ 0 multipliers: ξI , ξC
Bankruptcy when production fails:
gF (I, C) < br
Solvency when production succeeds
gS(I, C) ≥ br
Notes: E(z) = pzF + (1 − p)zS is the expected productivity. The function gX(I, C) is the amount of
funds the sponsor has on hand to pay expenses in period 3: gX(I, C) = (1− τ)(zXf(I) + (1 + r)(Y − I −
C)) + χF
[
(1 + ρF )(P + C)−D]−τC1{(P + C)(1 + ρk) > 150D}













=(1− τ)(1 + r) + η − ξC
(B.6)














=(1− τ)(1 + r) + η − ξC
p
(B.7)
As in the solution without taxes, the interior solutions to the above problems describe






. The available deduction for the return to assets held in the pension account
encourages the firm to contribute make a higher optimal contribution:
C¯τ =








With taxes, a levered firm that over-invests sets (I, C) = (I∗R, C¯τ ). Under a safe agree-
ment, the firm sets (I, C) = (I∗S, C¯τ )
B.4 Financing
B.4.1 Expected firm payoffs under safe and risky financing
The value to a firm of raising debt B and equity E under a risky agreement is:
V R =(1− τ)
(









− (1− τE)(1 + ro)E
Where τE is the income tax rate the shareholder faces. Substituting equation B.5 for
bR(B,E),1 the firm value is:
V R =(1− τ)
(








+ (1− p)E(χS|C) + E
(
(1− τ)(1 + r)− (1− τE)(1 + ro)
) (B.9)
If the tax rate facing the shareholder is lower than the tax rate facing the firm, equity is
more costly than debt.
1Noting that full information implies that the lender will adjust the borrowing rate according to actual
firm decisions.
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The value to a firm of raising debt B and equity E under a safe agreement is:
V S =(1− τ)
(








− (1− τE)(1 + ro)E
Substituting the safe rate for borrowing:
V S =(1− τ)
(










(1− τ)(1 + r)− (1− τE)(1 + ro)
) (B.10)
Again, equity is costly, but the firm internalizes pension gains and costs regardless of
whether production fails or succeeds.
B.4.2 Firm’s financing optimization
A Safe Agreement
(BS, ES) = arg max
B,E
V S(B,E)
s.t : I(B,E)+C(B,E) ≤ X +B + E
B ≥ 0 E¯ ≥ E ≥ 0 I ≥ 0
Where E¯ is the level of equity required to
ensure solvency when the firm makes risky
over-investment
A Risky Agreement
(BR, ER) = arg max
B,E
V R(B,E)
s.t : I(B,E)+C(B,E) ≤ X +B + E
B ≥ 0 E¯ ≥ E ≥ 0 I ≥ 0
Where E¯ is the level of equity required to
ensure solvency when the firm makes risky
over-investment
Risky agreement Let φ be the multiplier on I(B,E) + C(B,E) ≤ X + B + E and ξx





































ξE − ξ¯E =







































0 if φ = 0C¯τ−µE{(1+ρ)2} ∂ξC∂B





0 if φ = 0p(1−τ)f ′′(IτRC−Cτ− ∂ξC∂B
p(1−τ)f ′′(IτRC)−µE{(1+ρ)2} if φ > 0
(B.12)
Therefore, if the firm borrows enough to save in the safe asset, η = 0 and
ξE − ξ¯E = (1− τE)(1 + ro)− (1− τ)(1 + r) (B.13)
ξB = 0 (B.14)
The firm borrows B > 0. If (1 − τE)(1 + ro) > (1 − τ)(1 + r), ξE > 0 and the firm




















. Therefore, when the firm does not raise enough funds to save in the save































One solution exists where A = B = 0. In this case, the firm sets investment at the
social optimum I∗S , and contributions:
C¯τ −∆Cτ = C¯τ − (1 + r)(1− τ)p(1− p)(z
s − zF )
E(z)µE{(1 + ρ)2} (B.18)
When the return on pension assets can be claimed as an exemption, the firm will con-
tribute more to its pension when it borrows endogenously but constrains its funds raised
by: τ∆C
Choosing financing position As in the case without taxes, a levered firm chooses to
borrow substantially and over invest if VR(I∗R, C¯
τ ) > VR(I
∗
S, C¯

















E(S|C¯τ −∆Cτ )− E(S|C¯τ)− pµ
2
(
E(S2|C¯τ −∆Cτ )− E(S2|C¯τ)
+(1− p)(E(χS|C¯τ −∆Cτ ))− (1− τ)(1 + r)∆Cτ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
UCCostτ (C¯τ−∆Cτ )+τ∆Cτ
(1− τ)OICost(I∗R) < UCCostτ (C¯τ −∆Cτ ) + τ∆Cτ (B.19)
A higher corporate tax makes it more likely for a levered firm to borrow more and, as a
result, over-invest in risky production. A firm will choose the levered position that involves
investment risk when V R(I∗R, C¯















E(S2|C¯τ )− E(S|C¯τ ) + E(χS|C¯τ ))︸ ︷︷ ︸
APCost(C¯τ )
+ E¯S((1 + ro)(1− τE)− (1 + r)(1− τ))︸ ︷︷ ︸
MECost(E¯S)
(B.20)
Here, MECost(E¯S) is the cost of the minimum amount of equity the firm must raise
to avoid bankruptcy – or minimize the moral hazard problem. A higher corporate tax will
encourage the firm to choose a safe financing position because it decreases the payoff the
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firm can get from making a safe investment choice (decreasing the LHS). On the other
hand, since a firm must raise costly equity, a higher corporate tax would encourage the firm
to take on a levered position. Similarly, a firm that chooses to under-contribute will do so
when:
APCost(C¯τ ) + E¯S(1− τL)(1 + ro) < UCCost(C¯τ −∆C¯τ ) + τ(1 + r)∆Cτ (B.21)
Again, a firm that does not face bankruptcy will raise costly equity, decreasing the
attractiveness of a safe agreement. A firm that faces bankruptcy but under-contributes will
pay the cost associated with under-contributing – which is higher when taxes are higher
due to the tax break on returns. Therefore, higher taxes encourage a firm to raise more
debt and make riskier investment decisions (choosing the unconstrained borrowing amount
rather than the constrained borrowing amount).
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APPENDIX C
Firms Contributing Minimum Before and
During Recession
Firms that contribute at the minimum required contribution during the credit crunch are
larger, with larger pension obligations relative to their counterparts that do not contribute
at the minimum required contribution, than firms contributing at the minimum required
contribution in the early 2000s. To explore the role of this particular sample selection in
driving the estimates in Tables 3 and 4, this appendix considers two groups of firms. The
“pre-credit crunch” sample includes those firms that contributed at or below the minimum
required contribution in some year before 2009. The “credit crunch” sample includes those
firms that contributed at or below the minimum at some point during the credit crunch.
Figure 3.4 shows the fraction of firms in the pre-credit crunch sample that contribute at
or above the minimum required contribution from 2000 through 2013. Firms contributing
at or below the minimum at some point before the recession were almost as likely to con-
tribute at or below the minimum during the recession: over 15 percent percent of the firms
in this sample contributed at the minimum required contribution from 2009 through 2012.
This pre-credit crunch group can shed light on differences in leverage and ratings among
firms that frequently contribute only the minimum required, separating out those firms that
were driven to the minimum by asset price declines in the recession. Figure 3.7 describes
the fraction of firms in the credit crunch sample that contributed at or below the minimum
from 2000 through 2013. Unlike the pre-credit crunch sample, firms contributing at the
minimum during the credit crunch were substantially less likely to do so prior to the reces-
sion. This sample maximizes the difference in the ratings and leverage differences between
firms at the minimum and over the minimum before and after the recession due to a change
in the mix of firms contributing at the minimum during the credit crunch.
Figures 3.5 and 3.8 describe the average long-term debt ratio and S&P ratings index
for firms contributing at and above the minimum for these two groups. Both groups show
patterns similar to the aggregate pattern: in the early 2000s, firms contributing at the min-
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imum borrowed more and had lower ratings; these differences narrowed during the reces-
sion. Tables C.1 and C.2 show the results from running main empirical specification on
each sample. In the pre-credit crunch sample, firms contributing at the minimum borrow
4 percentage points more than firms contributing above the minimum from 2000 through
2007. Their ratings are insignificantly lower prior to the credit crunch, but approximately
three-quarters notch higher during the credit crunch. This pattern is particularly strong
among firms contributing at the minimum required contribution during the recession. This
suggests that a lot of the pre- and post-credit crunch differences are due to changes in the
mix of firms contributing at and below the minimum during the recession.
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Table C.1: Difference in Leverage and Ratings for Firms at and above Minimum: Pre-credit crunch sample
Debt to non-pension assets Ratings Index
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
MRC (α) .0421∗∗∗ .0362∗∗ .041∗∗ -.0195∗ .00217 -.00486
(.0161) (.0165) (.0163) (.011) (.00772) (.00774)
MRC × Credit Crunch (β) -.0357 -.0344 -.0548 .0458∗ .00717 .0344∗
(.0412) (.0421) (.0372) (.0252) (.0215) (.0196)
α + β .0264 .0093 .0295 .0064 .0017 -.0138
(.0870) (.0513) (.0531) (.1204) (.1169) (.1039)
Industry and Year Fixed Effects X X X X X X
Pension Controls X X X X
Firm Controls X X
Observations 1922 1870 1610 1082 1058 1055
R2 0.063 0.064 0.169 0.065 0.420 0.592
Standard errors, clustered at firm level, in parentheses; ∗p < .10, ∗∗p < .05, ∗∗∗p < .01. All specifications include year and industry fixed effects.
MRC in previous year is an indicator of whether the firm contributed at the minimum to any of its pension plans in the previous year. Credit Crunch is
an indicator for the years 2009, 2010, and 2011. Firm size is measured by the log of sales, Tangibility is measured as the ratio of PPE to total assets, Profitability
is measured as the ratio of cash to total assets. Controls also include Altman’s z-score (a measure of financial distress), median industry leverage, and an indicator
for negative owner equity. The hypotheses are α > 0 and α + β = 0. α > 0 implies firms contributing at the MRC borrow more than firms in the same industry
contributing above the MRC in years in which financing is easy. α+β¡α implies that firms contributing at the MRC do not borrow as much more other firms in the
industry not contributing at the MRC when financing is tight.
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Table C.2: Difference in Leverage and Ratings for Firms at and above the Minimum: Credit crunch sample
Debt to non-pension assets Ratings Index
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
MRC (α) .0745∗∗∗ .0864∗∗∗ .063∗∗ -.0719∗∗∗ -.0614∗∗∗ -.0417∗∗
(.0254) (.0272) (.0256) (.0209) (.0191) (.0197)
MRC × Credit Crunch (β) -.0794∗∗∗ -.0905∗∗∗ -.0572∗∗ .0622∗∗ .0398∗ .0304
(.0277) (.0318) (.0287) (.024) (.0227) (.021)
α + β -.0097 -.0216 -.0113 -.0049 -.0041 .0058
(.0530) (.0559) (.0468) (.0457) (.0489) (.0477)
Industry and Year Fixed Effects X X X X X X
Pension Controls X X X X
Firm Controls X X
Observations 2283 2149 1952 1507 1411 1398
R2 0.047 0.048 0.151 0.068 0.324 0.512
Standard errors, clustered at firm level, in parentheses; ∗p < .10, ∗∗p < .05, ∗∗∗p < .01. All specifications include year and industry fixed effects.
MRC in previous year is an indicator of whether the firm contributed at the minimum to any of its pension plans in the previous year. Credit Crunch is
an indicator for the years 2009, 2010, and 2011. Firm size is measured by the log of sales, Tangibility is measured as the ratio of PPE to total assets, Profitability
is measured as the ratio of cash to total assets. Controls also include Altman’s z-score (a measure of financial distress), median industry leverage, and an indicator
for negative owner equity. The hypotheses are α > 0 and α + β = 0. α > 0 implies firms contributing at the MRC borrow more than firms in the same industry
contributing above the MRC in years in which financing is easy. α+β¡α implies that firms contributing at the MRC do not borrow as much more other firms in the




Firms that contribute zero to their pension account are at a corner solution like firms con-
tributing at the minimum required contribution: they may prefer to take money out of their
pension but are legally prohibited from doing so. These firms do not, however, face an
incentive to borrow to make minimum contributions when the cost of borrowing is low.
Therefore, the main analysis considers firms contributing zero in hand with firms con-
tributing above the minimum required contribution. Figure D.1 shows the fraction of firm
contributing at the minimum required and the fraction of firms contributing zero. Between
30 and 60 percent of firms contribute nothing from 2000 through 2007; this percentage is
higher in years, like 2000 and 2007, in which high asset returns have increased the value
of pension assets. The fraction of firms contributing nothing drops precipitously during the
credit crunch. In 2011, for example, on 6 percent of firms contributed zero. Figure D.2
shows that firms contributing zero display debt and ratings patterns similar to those firms
that contribute above the minimum required contribution.
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Notes. Shows the percent of firms that contribute at or below the minimum required contribution to at least
one pension plan reported on the Form 5500 and matched to its sponsor in Compustat. Plans are categorized
as contributing at or below the minimum required contribution if total employer contributions for the given
year, reported in schedule B of the Form 5500, are less than or equal to the minimum required contribution
reported on that same schedule. The Department of Labor changed reporting forms in 2008; the first year of
the new reporting forms is not available in the online release Form 5500.
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Figure D.2: Debt and Ratings of Firms Contributing at and above the Minimum: Credit
crunch sample
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At MRC Zero




























2000 2005 2010 2015
year
Credit Crunch Above MRC
At MRC Zero
Notes. The dotted line includes firms making zero contribution to their pension, while the solid line includes
firms contributing below the minimum required contribution. Constrained firms are those that contributed at
the minimum required contribution in the previous year. Unconstrained firms are those that contributed above
the minimum required contribution in the previous year. Data on both variables plotted – debt to non-pension
assets and the S&P long-term bond rating – is from Compustat. The long-term bond rating is transformed
into a continuous index: a rating of AAA translates to 1 while a rating of D translates to 0. Each notch
improvement in bond rating, such as an increase from B to B+, increases the index by .04¯5. An index of .6 is




Collateral: The ratio of tangible assets to total assets. Compustat variable ppent over Non-
Pension Assets.
Consolidated Assets: The sum of Non-Pension Assets and Pension Assets.
Consolidated Debt: The sum of External Debt and Pension Debt
Consolidated Leverage: The ratio of consolidated debt to consolidated assets, where con-
solidated debt is the sum of non-pension assets and pension assets and consolidated debt is
the sum of external and pension debt.
Contributions: (Table 4, Form 5500) Employer contributions reported on schedule SB
DB: An indicator equal to 1 if the Compustat firm reports pension obligations in the given
year.
External Debt: The sum of current liabilities and long-term debt: Compustat variables
dltt+ dlc
External Leverage: The sum of current liabilities and long-term debt, Compustat vari-
ables dltt+ dlc, over non-pension assets
Firm Age: Number of years since firm entered the Compustat sample
Firm Size: Log of total sales, Compustat variable sale
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Funding Ratio: (The ratio of the market value of assets at the beginning of the year to the
actuarial liability, both reported on Form 5500 Schedule SB
Interest Coverage Ratio: The ratio of operating income after depreciation and interest
payments to interest payments. The sum of Compustat variables oiadp and xint over xint.
Investment Grade: An indicator equal to one if the firm’s long-term S&P bond rating,
Compustat variable splticrm, is investment grade or higher (above BBB-).
Loan Amount: Amount of loan, in $ millions. Deal Scan variable loanamount.
Loan Maturity: The number of months between issuance and maturity of the loan, Deal
Scan.
Long-term: An indicator equal to 1 if facility is classified as a term loan or long-term bond
according to Deal Scan.
Market-to-Book: The ratio of the firm’s market value to book value. Market value is
Compustat variables (prccf ∗ cshpri+ at− ceq) and book value of assets is at.
Oeneg: An indicator equal to 1 if the owner’s equity, Compustat variable seq is less than
zero.
Non-Pension Assets: The book value of assets (Compustat variable at) less pension assets
reported in the balance sheet (Compustat variable pcppao), and cleansed of income adjust-
ments to book assets.
Participants: Sum of active and retired participants reported on the Form 5500.
Pension Assets: Total pension assets reported on the 10-k, the sum of Compustat variables
pplao and pplau
Pension Deficit: Pension assets reported at the beginning of the year less the current lia-
bility reported on Schedule SB/B
Pension Leverage: Total pension assets reported on the 10-k, the sum of Compustat vari-
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ables pplao and pplau, over non-pension assets.
Pension Obligations: The projected benefits obligation reported on a DB sponsor’s bal-
ance sheet. The sum of Compsutat variables pbpro and pbpru
Profitability: The ratio of operating income before depreciation (Compustat variable oibdp)
to Non-Pension Assets.
Ratings Index: A index from 0 to 1 created from the S&P long-term bond rating, Compu-
stat variable splticrm. A rating of AAA registers as 1, a rating of D (default) registers as
0. Each notch increase in rating (eg., from A to A+) increases the index by .04¯5
Rated: An categorical variable equal to one if the firm’s long-term S&P bond rating, Com-
pustat variable splticrm, is available, equal to 2 if the firm’s long-term S&P bond rating is
is investment grade or higher (above BBB-), and zero otherwise.
Short-term: An indicator equal to 1 if facility is classified as a short-term loan or equity
line of credit.
Secured: An indicator equal to 1 if the loan is classified as secured in Deal Scan.
Spread: All-in spread on the drawn portion of the facility, Deal Scan variable allindrawn.
Tangibility: The ratio of tangible assets to total assets. Compustat variable ppent over
Non-Pension Assets.
Total Leverage: The sum of pension and external leverage.
Zscore: Altman’s Z-score, measure of closeness to bankruptcy, calculated as a linear com-
bination of the Compustat variables: 3.3 ∗ ebit+ sale+ 1.4 ∗ re+ 1.2 ∗ ((act− dlc)/at)
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